Regulating Infrastructure : : Monopoly, Contracts, and Discretion / / José A. Gómez-Ibáñez.
In the 1980s and ’90s many countries turned to the private sector to provide infrastructure and utilities, such as gas, telephones, and highways—with the idea that market-based incentives would control costs and improve the quality of essential services. But subsequent debacles including the collaps...
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| Place / Publishing House: | Cambridge, MA : : Harvard University Press, , [2009] ©2006 |
| Year of Publication: | 2009 |
| Language: | English |
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| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (448 p.) |
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Table of Contents:
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Monopoly as a Contracting Problem
- 2 The Choice of Regulatory Strategy
- I Regulatory Politics and Dynamics
- 3 The Behavior of Regulatory Agencies
- 4 Capture and Instability: Sri Lanka’s Buses and U.S. Telephones
- 5 Incompleteness and Its Consequences: Argentina’s Railroads
- 6 Forestalling Expropriation: Electricity in the Americas
- II Contract versus Discretionary Regulation
- 7 The Evolution of Concession Contracts: Municipal Franchises in North America
- 8 The Rediscovery of Private Contracts: U.S. Railroad and Airline Deregulation with John R. Meyer
- 9 Price-Cap Regulation: The British Water Industry
- III Vertical Unbundling and Regulation
- 10 The Trade-off in Unbundling: Competition versus Coordination
- 11 Regulating Coordination: British Railroads
- 12 Designing Capacity Markets: Electricity in Argentina with Martín Rodríguez-Pardina
- 13 The Prospects for Unbundling
- 14 The Future of Regulation
- Notes
- Index