Armed Servants : : Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations /

Armed Servants : : Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations / / Peter D. Feaver.

How do civilians control the military? In the wake of September 11, the renewed presence of national security in everyday life has made this question all the more pressing. In this book, Peter Feaver proposes an ambitious new theory that treats civil-military relations as a principal-agent relations...

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Bibliographic Details
Superior document:Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter HUP eBook-Package Backlist 2000-2013 (Canada)
VerfasserIn:
Feaver, Peter D.,
Place / Publishing House:Cambridge, MA : : Harvard University Press, , [2009]
©2005
Year of Publication:2009
Language:English
Online Access:
Physical Description:1 online resource (400 p.)
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Table of Contents:
  • Frontmatter
  • Contents
  • Preface
  • CHAPTER 1. Introduction
  • CHAPTER 2. Huntington’s Cold War Puzzle
  • CHAPTER 3. The Informal Agency Theory
  • CHAPTER 4. A Formal Agency Model of Civil-Military Relations
  • CHAPTER 5. An Agency Theory Solution to the Cold War Puzzle
  • CHAPTER 6. Explaining the Post–Cold War “Crisis,” 1990–2000
  • CHAPTER 7. Using Agency Theory to Explore the Use of Force in the Post–Cold War Era
  • CHAPTER 8. Conclusion
  • Notes
  • References
  • Index

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