Deadly Dilemmas: Deterrence in U.S. Nuclear Strategy / / James H. Lebovic.
Addresses the socio-political dilemma of the nuclear arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States. Specifically examines the psychology of foreign policy goal formation and achieving nuclear consensus, as well as strategic action, assessment, objectives, weapon deployments, and processes...
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| Superior document: | Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Columbia University Press eBook-Package Archive 1898-1999 |
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| VerfasserIn: | |
| Place / Publishing House: | New York, NY : : Columbia University Press, , [1990] ©1990 |
| Year of Publication: | 1990 |
| Language: | English |
| Online Access: | |
| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (252 p.) |
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Table of Contents:
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1. The Psychology of Foreign Policy Goal Formation
- 2. Strategic Assessment
- 3. Strategic Action
- 4. Strategic Objectives and Weapon Deployments
- 5. Strategic Processes: Rationality and Nonrationality
- 6. Concluding Thoughts on Achieving Nuclear Consensus
- Notes
- References
- Name Index
- Subject Index