Shouting in a Cage : : Political Life After Authoritarian Co-optation in North Africa / / Sofia Fenner.

Durable authoritarian rule often rests on the co-optation of challengers. The conventional story is straightforward: rulers entice opposition groups to “sell out,” offering them benefits if they set aside their antiauthoritarian aspirations and become part of the system. However, co-optation does no...

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Superior document:Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Columbia University Press Complete eBook-Package 2023
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Place / Publishing House:New York, NY : : Columbia University Press, , [2023]
©2023
Year of Publication:2023
Language:English
Series:Columbia Studies in Middle East Politics
Online Access:
Physical Description:1 online resource
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Other title:Frontmatter --
Contents --
Acknowledgments --
Note on Transliterations, Names, and Titles --
Introduction --
PART ONE. Co-optation in History and Theory --
ONE. The Wafd and the Istiqlal --
TWO. Conceptualizing Co-optation --
PART TWO. A Changed Life --
THREE. Co-optation as Interpretative Dilemma --
FOUR. Co-optation as Interpretive Dilemma --
PART THREE. Life Goes On --
FIVE. Party-as- Family --
SIX. Generation After Generation --
Conclusion: Authoritarianism as Tragedy --
Notes --
Bibliography --
Index
Summary:Durable authoritarian rule often rests on the co-optation of challengers. The conventional story is straightforward: rulers entice opposition groups to “sell out,” offering them benefits if they set aside their antiauthoritarian aspirations and become part of the system. However, co-optation does not always neutralize former adversaries, and even seemingly domesticated opponents can turn on their rulers. Co-optation does weaken opposition—but it is not as simple, reliable, or transactional as existing theories claim.Shouting in a Cage offers new ways to understand co-optation’s power and its limits by examining two co-opted parties, the Wafd Party in Egypt and the Istiqlal Party in Morocco. Sofia Fenner argues that co-optation is less a corrupt bargain than a discursive contest—a clash of competing interpretations. Co-opted parties conjure up imagined futures in which their short-term choices will lead to the realization of their long-term democratic goals. Meanwhile, other actors point to the disconnect between these parties’ antiauthoritarian aspirations and their participation in authoritarian systems. Fenner demonstrates that co-opted parties come to look hypocritical precisely because they refuse to give up their oppositional commitments. Their credibility sapped, they become unappealing allies and, eventually, political afterthoughts. However, such parties retain a surprising capacity for opposition, rooted in the literal and metaphorical idea of “party as family.” Based on extensive archival research and ethnographic fieldwork in North Africa, Shouting in a Cage broadens our understanding of political behavior under authoritarianism.
Format:Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
ISBN:9780231557504
9783110749670
DOI:10.7312/dodd20918
Access:restricted access
Hierarchical level:Monograph
Statement of Responsibility: Sofia Fenner.