Too Little, Too Late : : The Quest to Resolve Sovereign Debt Crises / / ed. by Martin Guzman, José Antonio Ocampo, Joseph E. Stiglitz.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Columbia University Press Complete eBook-Package 2016
• MitwirkendeR: Brooks, Skylar,; Chodos, Sergio,; Conn, Richard A.,; DeSieno, Timothy B.,; Gelpern, Anna,; Gitlin, Richard,; Guzman, Martin,; Haley, James A.,; Heller, Ben,; Herman, Barry,; House, Brett,; Howse, Robert,; Kaiser, Jürgen,; Lombardi, Domenico,; Ocampo, José Antonio,; Raffer, Kunibert,; Stiglitz, Joseph E.,; Uy, Marilou,; Varoufakis, Yanis,; Zhou, Shichao,
• HerausgeberIn: Guzman, Martin,; Ocampo, José Antonio,; Stiglitz, Joseph E.,
• Place / Publishing House: New York, NY : : Columbia University Press, , [2016]; ©2016
• Year of Publication: 2016
• Language: English
• Series: Initiative for Policy Dialogue at Columbia: Challenges in Development and Globalization
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (312 p.) :; 13 b&w illustrations

The current approach to resolving sovereign debt crises does not work: sovereign debt restructurings come too late and address too little. Though unresolved debt crises impose enormous costs on societies, many recent restructurings have not been deep enough to provide the conditions for economic recovery (as illustrated by the Greek debt restructuring of 2012). And if the debtor decides not to accept the terms demanded by the creditors, finalizing a restructuring can be slowed by legal challenges (as illustrated by the recent case of Argentina, deemed as "the trial of the century").A fresh start for distressed debtors is a basic principle of a well-functioning market economy, yet there is no international bankruptcy framework for sovereign debts. While this problem is not new, the United Nations and the global community are now willing to do something about it. Providing guidance for those who intend to take up reform, this book assesses the relative merits of various debt-restructuring proposals, especially in relation to the main deficiencies of the current nonsystem. With contributions by leading academics and practitioners, Too Little, Too Late reflects the overwhelming consensus among specialists on the need to find workable solutions.

Table of Contents

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Part I. General Issues of Sovereign Debt Restructuring -- 1. Creating a Framework for Sovereign Debt Restructuring That Works -- 2. Sovereign Debt of Developing Countries: Overview of Trends and Policy Perspectives -- 3. Private Creditor Power and the Politics of Sovereign Debt Governance -- Part II. Two Case Studies: Argentina and Greece -- 4. From the Pari Passu Discussion to the "Illegality" of Making Payments: The Case of Argentina -- 5. Greek Debt Denial: A Modest Debt Restructuring Proposal and Why It Was Ignored -- Part III. Improvements to the Contractual Approach -- 6. Count the Limbs: Designing Robust Aggregation Clauses in Sovereign Bonds -- 7. Contractual and Voluntary Approaches to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: There Is Still More to Do -- 8. Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Coasean Perspective -- 9. Creditor Committees in Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Understanding the Benefits and Addressing Concerns -- Part IV. Proposals for a Multinational Framework for Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Principles, Elements, and Institutionalization -- 10. A Brief History of Sovereign Debt Resolution and a Proposal for a Multilateral Instrument -- 11. Toward a Multilateral Framework for Recovery from Sovereign Insolvency -- 12. Making a Legal Framework for Sovereign Debt Restructuring Operational: The Case for a Sovereign Debt Workout Institution -- 13. Perspectives on a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Framework: Less Is More -- 14. Toward a Framework for Sovereign Debt Restructuring: What Can Public International Law Contribute? -- 15. Debts, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law: Advocating a Fair and Efficient Sovereign Insolvency Model -- Contributors -- Index