NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2021 : : Compliance and Integrity in International Military Trade.

• Superior document: Nl Arms Series
• Author: Beeres, Robert.
• TeilnehmendeR: Bertrand, Robert.; Klomp, Jeroen.; Timmermans, Job.; Voetelink, Joop.
• Place / Publishing House: The Hague : : T.M.C. Asser Press,, 2021.; ©2022.
• Year of Publication: 2021
• Edition: 1st ed.
• Language: English
• Series: Nl Arms Series
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (313 pages)

Table of Contents

• Intro
• Foreword
• Contents
• Editors and Contributors
• 1 Introduction
• 1.1 Introduction
• 1.2 The Compliance and Integrity in International Military Trade (CIIMT) Master Programme
• 1.2.1 Focus of the MSc Programme on CIIMT
• 1.2.2 Learning Styles and Structure of the MSc Programme on CIIMT
• 1.3 Outline of NL ARMS 2021
• References
• 2 Economics of Arms Trade: What Do We Know?
• 2.1 Introduction
• 2.2 Research Methodology
• 2.2.1 Scope
• 2.2.2 Selection
• 2.2.3 Research Synthesis
• 2.3 Weapons of Mass Destruction
• 2.3.1 Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements
• 2.3.2 Almost Nuclear: Introducing the Nuclear Latency Dataset
• 2.3.3 Research on Weapons of Mass Destruction: What Do We Know?
• 2.4 Major Weapon Systems
• 2.4.1 The Gravity of Arms
• 2.4.2 Arming the Embargoed
• 2.4.3 Arms Production, National Defence Spending and Arms Trade
• 2.4.4 Trading Arms and the Demand for Military Expenditure
• 2.4.5 Arm Your Friends and Save on Defence?
• 2.4.6 Network Interdependencies and the Evolution of the International Arms Trade
• 2.4.7 Research into Major Weapon Systems: What Do We Know?
• 2.5 Small Arms and Light Weapons
• 2.5.1 Weaponomics, the Economics of Small Arms
• 2.5.2 Research into Small Arms and Light Weapons: What Do We Know?
• 2.6 Dual-Use Goods
• 2.6.1 Exporting Weapons of Mass Destruction?
• 2.6.2 Taking a Walk on the Supply Side: The Determinants of Civil Nuclear Cooperation
• 2.6.3 Research into Dual-Use Goods: What Do We Know?
• 2.7 Analysis
• 2.8 Conclusion: An Agenda for Research
• References
• 3 Export Control Regimes-Present-Day Challenges and Opportunities
• 3.1 Introduction
• 3.2 Export Control Regimes
• 3.2.1 The Coordinating Committee for the Multilateral Export Controls
• 3.2.2 Regimes and Treaties
• 3.2.3 Characteristics Regimes.
• 3.2.4 National Implementation and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540
• 3.3 Challenges and Opportunities
• 3.3.1 Structural Challenges
• 3.3.2 Recent Challenges
• 3.3.3 Opportunities
• 3.4 Discussion and Conclusion
• References
• 4 Case: Non-compliance at Fokker Services
• 4.1 Introduction
• 4.2 Scanning
• 4.2.1 Macro-level: Sanctions and World-Wide Competition
• 4.2.2 Meso-level: Intentional Non-compliant Behaviour
• 4.2.3 Micro-level: Deliberate Evasion of Regulation
• 4.2.4 Aftermath
• 4.3 Analysis
• 4.3.1 Tone at the Top
• 4.3.2 Absence of a Compliance Programme
• 4.3.3 Role of Middle Management and the Maintenance and Export Department
• 4.3.4 Conclusion
• 4.4 Response
• 4.4.1 Short-Term Response
• 4.4.2 Long-Term Response
• 4.5 Assessment
• References
• 5 International Export Control Law-Mapping the Field
• 5.1 Introduction
• 5.2 Export Control Law in General and Terminology
• 5.3 International Law
• 5.3.1 The Law of Armed Conflict
• 5.3.2 The Law of Arms Control
• 5.3.3 Sanctions Law
• 5.3.4 Human Rights Law
• 5.4 Synthesis and Conclusion
• References
• 6 Exploring the Multifaceted Relationship of Compliance and Integrity-The Case of the Defence Industry
• 6.1 Introduction
• 6.2 The Concepts of Compliance and Integrity
• 6.2.1 Compliance
• 6.2.2 Integrity
• 6.3 Comparing Compliance with Integrity
• 6.4 The Relationship Between Compliance and Integrity
• 6.4.1 Compliance as a Part of Integrity (and Vice Versa)
• 6.4.2 Integrity Versus Compliance
• 6.4.3 Integrity Beyond Compliance
• 6.5 Conclusion
• References
• 7 Do Sanctions Cause Economic Growth Collapses?
• 7.1 Introduction
• 7.2 The Economic Impact of Sanctions
• 7.2.1 Sanction Process
• 7.2.2 Economic Impact of Sanctions
• 7.3 Data and Methodology
• 7.3.1 Growth Collapses and Sanction Data
• 7.3.2 Empirical Model.
• 7.4 Results
• 7.4.1 Imposition and Threats
• 7.4.2 Different Types of Sanctions
• 7.5 Conclusions
• References
• 8 Datasets for Combat Aircraft
• 8.1 Introduction
• 8.2 Methodology
• 8.3 Results
• 8.3.1 United Nations: UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA)
• 8.3.2 United Nations: Arms Trade Treaty Annual Reports
• 8.3.3 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE): Arms Reports Following the Vienna Document and the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe
• 8.3.4 European Union (EU): Arms Exports Reports
• 8.3.5 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI): Arms Transfers Database
• 8.3.6 Centre for Analysis of World Arms Trade (CAWAT) Центр Анализа Мировой Торговли Оружием (ЦАМТО)]: World Arms Trade Statistics
• 8.3.7 International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS): Military Balance
• 8.3.8 IHS Markit: Jane's Publications
• 8.3.9 Informa: Aviation Week Network
• 8.3.10 RELX: Cirium
• 8.3.11 Rheinische Post: Flight Global World Air Forces Reports
• 8.3.12 Forecast International: Military Information Library
• 8.3.13 TEAL GROUP: Military Information Library
• 8.3.14 Simplify Compliance: Military Periscope Datasets
• 8.3.15 GlobalData: ADS Solution/Strategic Defense Intelligence Database
• 8.3.16 Frost &amp
• Sullivan: Aerospace and Defense Content
• 8.4 Analysis
• 8.4.1 Data Providers
• 8.4.2 Type of Data Collected
• 8.4.3 Accessibility: Language
• 8.4.4 Accessibility: Formats
• 8.4.5 Accessibility: Price
• 8.4.6 Time Frame Addressed
• 8.4.7 Actors
• 8.4.8 Weapon System Detail
• 8.4.9 Financial Information Provided
• 8.5 Conclusion
• References
• 9 Does Legal Origin Matter for Arms Control Treaty Ratification?
• 9.1 Introduction
• 9.2 Legal Origin and Arms Control Treaties
• 9.3 Data and Methodology
• 9.3.1 Treaties and Legal Origin Data
• 9.3.2 Empirical Model
• 9.4 Results.
• 9.5 Conclusion
• References
• 10 Case: Sharing Parts and Services Among NATO Members
• 10.1 Introduction
• 10.2 Scanning
• 10.3 Analysis
• 10.3.1 Macro-level: Fragmentation of the Arms Export Control Laws and Regulations
• 10.3.2 Meso-level: No Institutionalised Compliance Culture Within the NATO
• 10.3.3 Micro-level: Operational Readiness Versus Compliance
• 10.4 Response
• 10.4.1 Leadership Commitment to the Implementation of the Arms Export Controls
• 10.4.2 The NSPA as the Leading NATO Agency to Create a Culture of Compliance
• 10.4.3 Common Agreement on the Basic Rules of Arms Export Controls
• 10.4.4 Formalization of the Implementation of Arms Export Control via STANAGs
• 10.4.5 Periodic Arms Export Controls Training to Member States' Personnel
• 10.5 Assessment
• References
• 11 Limits on the Extraterritoriality of United States Export Control and Sanctions Legislation
• 11.1 Introduction
• 11.2 Jurisdiction of a State
• 11.2.1 Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
• 11.2.2 Principles of Jurisdiction
• 11.3 United States Export Control Legislation
• 11.3.1 Dual-Use Export Controls
• 11.3.2 Military Export Controls
• 11.3.3 US Economic Sanctions
• 11.4 Analysis
• 11.4.1 Export Controls
• 11.4.2 Sanctions
• 11.5 Synthesis and Conclusion
• References
• 12 Contract-Boundary-Spanning Governance Initiatives in the International Defense Supply Chain of the F-35 Program
• 12.1 Introduction
• 12.2 Theory
• 12.2.1 Transaction Level: Governance as Bilateral Linking
• 12.2.2 Chain Level: Contract-Boundary-Spanning Governance Mechanisms
• 12.2.3 Theoretical Framework
• 12.3 Methodology
• 12.4 Results
• 12.4.1 Perceived Supply Chain Governance
• 12.4.2 An Interpretation of the Memoranda of Understanding
• 12.5 Conclusions and Discussion
• 12.6 Appendix: Export-Related Articles from the PSFD MOU
• References.
• 13 Effectiveness of Arms Control: The Case of Saudi Arabia
• 13.1 Introduction
• 13.2 A Dashboard for Analyzing the Effectiveness of Arms Embargoes
• 13.3 Research Methods
• 13.4 Results
• 13.4.1 Level-1 Effectiveness: Influencing the Behavior of Saudi Arabia
• 13.4.2 Level-2 Effectiveness: The Volume of Weapon Imports into Saudi Arabia
• 13.4.3 Level-3 Effectiveness: The Volume of Arms Exports to Saudi Arabia per Country
• 13.4.4 Level-4 Effectiveness: The Political Will to Implement an Arms Embargo
• 13.5 Conclusions
• References
• 14 Case: Dronebuster
• Handling Non-compliance to ITAR
• 14.1 Introduction
• 14.2 Scanning
• 14.3 Analysis
• 14.3.1 Macro-level: Export Control Laws and Regulations for the MoD
• 14.3.2 Meso-level: The EUMS Army
• 14.3.3 Micro-level: Awareness of Individuals
• 14.4 Response
• 14.5 Assessment
• References
• 15 Developing an Adequate Internal Compliance Program for the Royal Netherlands Air Force Command
• 15.1 Introduction
• 15.2 Setting the Scene
• 15.2.1 Historical Context
• 15.2.2 PESTL Analysis
• 15.3 The Development of an Internal Compliance Program
• 15.3.1 The Need for an Internal Compliance Program
• 15.3.2 Legal Framework
• 15.3.3 Internal Compliance Program Frameworks and Guidelines
• 15.3.4 The Internal Compliance Program of the Royal Netherlands Air Force Command
• 15.4 Conclusion
• 15.4.1 Summary
• 15.4.2 Consideration
• References
• 16 Arms Exports and Export Control of the Dutch Republic 1585-1621
• 16.1 Introduction
• 16.2 Regulation of Arms Exports
• 16.3 Extent of Exports
• 16.4 Products
• 16.5 Government Arsenals
• 16.6 Trade with the Enemy
• 16.7 Exports to France
• 16.8 Entrepreneurs
• 16.9 Conclusion
• References.