Emerging Threats of Synthetic Biology and Biotechnology : : Addressing Security and Resilience Issues.
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| Superior document: | NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security Series |
|---|---|
| : | |
| TeilnehmendeR: | |
| Place / Publishing House: | Dordrecht : : Springer Netherlands,, 2021. ©2021. |
| Year of Publication: | 2021 |
| Edition: | 1st ed. |
| Language: | English |
| Series: | NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security Series
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| Online Access: | |
| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (233 pages) |
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Table of Contents:
- Intro
- Disclaimer
- Acknowledgments
- Contents
- About the Editors
- Chapter 1: Biosecurity for Synthetic Biology and Emerging Biotechnologies: Critical Challenges for Governance
- 1.1 An Introduction to the Dual-Use Nature of Emerging Biotechnology
- 1.2 History
- 1.3 Effective Governance and Policy for Biosecurity
- 1.4 Conclusion
- References
- Chapter 2: Emerging Biosecurity Threats and Responses: A Review of Published and Gray Literature
- 2.1 Introduction
- 2.2 Methods
- 2.3 Results and Discussion
- 2.3.1 US and EU Governmental Frameworks
- 2.3.1.1 US Framework
- 2.3.1.2 EU Framework
- 2.3.2 Threats Identified in the Literature
- 2.3.3 Responses Identified in the Literature
- 2.4 Conclusion
- References
- Chapter 3: Opportunities, Challenges, and Future Considerations for Top-Down Governance for Biosecurity and Synthetic Biology
- 3.1 Introduction
- 3.2 Understanding the Scope and Limitations of Top-Down Governance for Biosecurity and Synthetic Biology
- 3.2.1 International Instruments for Biosecurity
- 3.2.1.1 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
- 3.2.1.2 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
- 3.2.1.3 Australia Group, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 and Others
- 3.2.2 National Implementation
- 3.2.2.1 Hard Law vs. Soft Law
- 3.2.2.2 Biosafety vs. Biosecurity, GMOs vs. Synthetic Biology
- 3.2.2.3 National Implementation: An Inevitable Patchwork
- 3.3 Key Novelties and Tensions Introduced by Synthetic Biology
- 3.3.1 Convergence
- 3.3.2 Democratization
- 3.3.3 Intangibility
- 3.4 Conclusions and Recommendations
- References
- Chapter 4: Biological Standards and Biosecurity: The Unexplored Link
- 4.1 Standards in Biology
- 4.2 Implications of Standards in Biosecurity in Terms of Risks
- 4.3 Universality
- 4.4 Chassis and Trojan Horses
- 4.5 Breaking Down the Species Barrier.
- 4.6 Standards as Social Constructs
- 4.7 Final Remarks and Open Questions
- References
- Chapter 5: Responsible Governance of Biosecurity in Armenia
- 5.1 Introduction
- 5.2 Capacity Building in Dual Use Export Control in TI Partner Countries
- 5.3 Legal Framework Governing Dual Use Life Sciences and Biosecurity
- 5.3.1 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare - Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925
- 5.3.2 The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction
- 5.3.3 United Nation Security Council Resolution No. 1540 (UNSCR 1540)
- 5.3.4 National Laws and Law Enforcement
- 5.4 Ethics of Dual Use Life Sciences
- 5.5 Case Study Life Sciences and Biosecurity in Armenia
- 5.6 Dual Use Life Sciences in Armenia
- 5.7 Discussing Ethical Dilemmas
- 5.8 Conclusions and Recommendations
- References
- Chapter 6: Addressing Emerging Synthetic Biology Threats: The Role of Education and Outreach in Fostering Effective Bottom-Up Grassroots Governance
- 6.1 Introduction
- 6.2 Structure of the Synthetic Biology Community
- 6.3 Perceptions of Risks Within the Synthetic Biology Community
- 6.4 Enhancing Stakeholder Interaction in the Field of Biosafety and Biosecurity
- 6.5 Conclusion
- Chapter 7: Cyberbiosecurity and Public Health in the Age of COVID-19
- 7.1 Introduction
- 7.2 Privacy of Contact Tracing Data
- 7.3 Protecting Public Health and Disease Surveillance Data
- 7.4 Integrity and Validation of Self-Administered Testing
- 7.5 Integrity of Public Bioinformatic Databases
- 7.6 Defending Against Cyberattacks on Laboratory Devices
- 7.7 Protection of Intellectual Property
- 7.8 Discussion.
- Chapter 8: Synthetic Biology Brings New Challenges to Managing Biosecurity and Biosafety
- 8.1 Resilience as a Complimentary Philosophical Framework to Managing Potential Biohazards
- 8.2 COVID-19 Pandemic as a Call to Action for Resilience in Biosafety and Biosecurity
- 8.3 A Domain-Based Resilience Framework to Adapt to Biosecurity and Biosafety
- 8.3.1 Physical Domain
- 8.3.2 Information Domain
- 8.3.3 Cognitive Domain
- 8.3.4 Social Domain
- 8.4 Discussion
- References
- Chapter 9: Emerging Biotechnology and Information Hazards
- 9.1 What Is an Information Hazard?
- 9.2 When Do Information Hazards Matter?
- 9.3 How Might Information Hazards Be Governed?
- 9.4 Information Hazards: Where Do We Go from Here?
- References
- Chapter 10: Technical Aspects of Biosecurity: Screening Guidance, Attribution, and Traceability
- 10.1 Introduction
- 10.2 Current Technology
- 10.2.1 DNA Sequence Screening
- 10.2.1.1 State-of-the-Art
- 10.2.1.2 Next-Generation Tool Development
- 10.2.2 Attribution and Traceability
- 10.2.3 Gaps in Existing Biosecurity Technology Framework
- 10.3 Imminent Opportunities for Technology Development
- 10.3.1 Biological Threat Prevention
- 10.3.1.1 Design
- Specification
- Design Tools
- Selecting Chassis
- Tools to Enhance Tracking of Users and Research
- 10.3.1.2 Build
- Who Should Be Screening Synthesis Production in the Future?
- A Stratified White List Approach for DNA Synthesis Production
- Functional Equivalence of Sequences
- DNA Assembly and Smaller DNA Synthesis Providers
- Attribution and Tracing
- 10.3.1.3 Test
- Physical Containment
- Biology-Based Containment
- Horizontal Gene Transfer
- 10.3.1.4 Economic Drivers
- 10.3.2 Detection of Biological Threats
- 10.3.2.1 Diagnostics
- 10.3.2.2 Surveillance
- 10.3.3 Threat Response and Countermeasures.
- 10.4 Long-Term Opportunities for Technology Development
- 10.4.1 Implications for Adaptive Risk Management Framework
- 10.4.2 Imagining the Far Future
- Chapter 11: The Soil Habitat and Considerations for Synthetic Biology
- 11.1 The Soil System
- 11.1.1 Soil Properties
- 11.1.2 Life in Soil
- 11.2 Fitness of Genetically-Altered Organisms
- 11.2.1 Fitness of Domesticated Microorganisms
- 11.3 Considerations for Survival in Soil
- 11.3.1 Soil Conditions Influence Growth
- 11.3.2 Microbial Adaptations
- 11.3.3 Fitness of Microorganisms in Soil
- 11.4 Conclusions
- References
- Chapter 12: Foresight in Synthetic Biology and Biotechnology Threats
- 12.1 Introduction
- 12.1.1 Foresight Terminology
- 12.1.2 Examples of Foresight for Biological Threats
- 12.2 Foresight Methods
- 12.2.1 General Approach
- 12.2.2 Delphi Method
- 12.2.2.1 Strengths
- 12.2.2.2 Limitations
- 12.2.3 Horizon Scanning
- 12.2.3.1 Strengths
- 12.2.3.2 Limitations
- 12.2.4 Scenario Analysis
- 12.2.4.1 Strengths
- 12.2.4.2 Limitations
- 12.3 Foresight Questions
- 12.3.1 Approach to Choosing Questions
- 12.3.2 Questions for Synthetic Biology Threats
- 12.4 Recommendations
- 12.4.1 Foresight Process Design
- 12.4.2 Synthetic Biology Considerations
- 12.5 Conclusion
- References
- Chapter 13: Predicting Biosecurity Threats: Deployment and Detection of Biological Weapons
- 13.1 Methods of Deployment
- 13.2 Targets
- 13.2.1 Humans
- 13.2.2 Agriculture
- 13.2.3 Technology
- 13.2.4 The Environment
- 13.3 Screening Techniques
- 13.3.1 Pre-deployment: Gene Synthesis
- 13.3.2 Post-deployment: Pathogen Detection
- 13.4 Conclusion
- Literature Cited
- Chapter 14: Promoting Effective Biosecurity Governance: Using Tripwires to Anticipate and Ameliorate Potentially Harmful Development Trends
- 14.1 Introduction
- 14.2 Biological Weapons in History.
- 14.3 Promoting Responsible Research in Modern Biotechnology: Tripwires as a Framework to Understand Red-Team Capacity and Intent for Nefarious Deployment of Technology
- 14.3.1 Regime Characteristics that Could Lead to Synthetic Biology Weapons Development and Their Tripwires
- 14.3.1.1 Stage 1a. Bottom-Up Initiative: Independent Actors Indicate Interest in Synthetic Biology
- 14.3.1.2 Stage 1b. Top-Down Initiative: Regime Indicates Interest in Synthetic Biology
- 14.3.1.3 Stage 2. Achievement of Scientific, Technological, and Engineering Capacity for Synthetic Biology
- 14.3.1.4 Stage 3a. Active Development of Synthetic Biology Weapons
- 14.3.1.5 Stage 3b. Acquisition of Synthetic Biology Weapons from an External Source
- 14.3.1.6 Stage 4. Deployment of Synthetic Biology Weapons
- 14.3.2 Key Enabling Technologies and Technological Tripwires
- 14.4 Conclusion
- References.