Security of Ubiquitous Computing Systems : : Selected Topics.

Security of Ubiquitous Computing Systems : : Selected Topics.

Show other versions (1)
Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
:
Avoine, Gildas.
TeilnehmendeR:
Hernandez-Castro, Julio.
Place / Publishing House:Cham : : Springer International Publishing AG,, 2021.
Ã2021.
Year of Publication:2021
Edition:1st ed.
Language:English
Online Access:
Physical Description:1 online resource (268 pages)
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Table of Contents:
  • Intro
  • Preface
  • From the Cryptacus Project to the Cryptacus Book
  • Book Contents
  • Acknowledgements
  • Contents
  • Contributors
  • Part I Introduction
  • 1 Emerging Security Challenges for Ubiquitous Devices
  • 1.1 Introduction
  • 1.2 Malicious Devices and Watchdog Concept
  • 1.2.1 Attacks by Malicious Devices
  • 1.2.2 Active Watchdog Concept
  • 1.2.3 Solution Strategy
  • 1.2.3.1 Commitments: Problems with Solutions Based on Hash Functions
  • 1.2.3.2 Commitments Based on Symmetric Encryption
  • 1.2.3.3 Encrypted Random Challenge
  • 1.2.3.4 Answers to Challenges
  • 1.2.3.5 Distance Bounding Protocols
  • 1.3 Privacy
  • 1.3.1 Symmetric Protocols and Deniability
  • 1.3.2 Identity Hiding with Random Key Predistribution
  • 1.3.2.1 Key Discovery with a Bloom Filter
  • 1.3.2.2 Multiple Shared Keys
  • 1.3.2.3 Epoch Keys
  • 1.3.3 Overloading Identifiers
  • 1.3.4 Pairwise Keys Evolution
  • 1.3.5 Transmission with Errors
  • 1.4 Conclusion and Future Directions
  • Part II Lightweight Cryptographic Primitives
  • 2 Catalog and Illustrative Examples of Lightweight Cryptographic Primitives
  • 2.1 Introduction
  • 2.2 Catalog of Lightweight Cryptographic Primitives
  • 2.2.1 Block Ciphers
  • 2.2.2 Stream Ciphers
  • 2.2.3 Hash Functions
  • 2.2.4 Message Authentication Codes
  • 2.2.5 Authenticated Encryption Schemes
  • 2.3 Illustrative Issues in Security Evaluation of Certain Encryption Schemes
  • 2.3.1 Reconsidering TMD Tradeoff Attacks for Lightweight Stream Cipher Designs
  • 2.3.2 Guess-and-Determine Based Cryptanalysis Employing Dedicated TMD-TO
  • 2.3.2.1 Generic Approach
  • 2.3.2.2 Summary of Cryptanalysis of Grain-v1 Employing Guess-and-Determine and Dedicated TMD-TO Approaches
  • 3 Selected Design and Analysis Techniques for Contemporary Symmetric Encryption
  • 3.1 Introduction
  • 3.2 Keystream Generators with Keyed Update Functions.
  • 3.2.1 Design Approach
  • 3.2.2 On Continuously Accessing the Key
  • 3.2.3 The Stream Ciphers Sprout and Plantlet
  • 3.3 A Generic Attack Against Certain Keystream Generators with Keyed Update Functions
  • 3.4 Randomized Encryption Employing Homophonic Coding
  • 3.4.1 Background
  • 3.4.2 Encryption and Decryption
  • 3.4.3 Security Evaluation
  • 3.5 Conclusion and Future Directions
  • 4 An Account of the ISO/IEC Standardization of the Simon and Speck Block Cipher Families
  • 4.1 Introduction
  • 4.2 Simon and Speck
  • 4.2.1 Simon
  • 4.2.2 Speck
  • 4.3 Simon and Speck's ``Design Rationale''
  • 4.3.1 Lack of New Information
  • 4.3.2 Choice of the Number of Rounds
  • 4.3.3 Misquoting Existing Work
  • 4.4 The ISO/IEC JTC 1 Standardization Process
  • 4.5 The Standardization Process of Simon and Speck in ISO/IEC 29192-2
  • Part III Authentication Protocols
  • 5 ePassport and eID Technologies
  • 5.1 Application Scenarios
  • 5.1.1 Remote vs. Local Use
  • 5.1.2 Actors and Scenarios
  • 5.1.3 Goals of Protocol Execution
  • 5.2 Threats and Security Requirements
  • 5.2.1 Assets
  • 5.2.2 Threats
  • 5.3 Cryptographic Protocols for eIDs
  • 5.3.1 Preventing eID Forgeries
  • 5.3.2 Enforcing Owner's Consent
  • 5.3.3 EID Authentication and Preventing Cloning
  • 5.3.4 Authenticating the Terminal and Its Rights
  • 5.3.5 Proof of Interaction
  • 5.3.6 Passive Tracing
  • 5.3.7 Eavesdropping
  • Summary
  • 5.4 PKI
  • 5.5 Challenges for eID Systems
  • 5.6 Future Directions
  • 6 Ultra-lightweight Authentication
  • 6.1 Introduction
  • 6.1.1 A Fully Connected World of Small Devices
  • 6.1.2 Authentication: Protocol Classification and Physical Constraints
  • 6.1.3 Design Challenges
  • 6.1.4 Organization of the Chapter
  • 6.2 Ultra-lightweight Authentication Protocols
  • 6.3 Weaknesses and Pitfalls
  • 6.3.1 Poor Diffusion and Linearity
  • 6.3.2 Poor Message Composition.
  • 6.3.3 Biased Output
  • 6.3.4 Rotations
  • 6.3.5 Vulnerability to Knowledge Accumulation
  • 6.3.6 Dubious Proofs of Security: Randomness Tests and Automated Provers
  • 6.4 Towards a Sound Approach
  • 6.4.1 State of the Literature
  • 6.4.2 Promising Avenues
  • 6.4.3 The Reductionist Approach
  • 6.5 Conclusions
  • 7 From Relay Attacks to Distance-Bounding Protocols
  • 7.1 An Introduction to Relay Attacks and Distance Bounding
  • 7.1.1 Relay Attacks
  • 7.1.2 Distance Bounding
  • 7.1.3 Other Relay-Countermeasures
  • 7.2 Relay Attacks in Practice
  • 7.2.1 Basic Relay Strategies
  • 7.2.1.1 Purpose-Built Relays
  • 7.2.1.2 Off-the-Shelf Relays
  • 7.2.2 Advanced Relay Strategies
  • 7.2.2.1 Early Send and Late Commit
  • 7.2.2.2 Speeding Up the Prover's Response
  • 7.3 Canonical Distance-Bounding Protocols
  • 7.3.1 General Structure
  • 7.3.2 The Hancke-Kuhn Protocol
  • 7.3.3 The Brands-Chaum Protocol
  • 7.4 Distance-Bounding Threat Model and Its Formal Treatments
  • 7.4.1 Main Threat-Model
  • 7.4.1.1 Mafia Fraud (MF) [178]
  • 7.4.1.2 Distance Fraud (DF) [113]
  • 7.4.1.3 Distance Hijacking (DH) [160]
  • 7.4.1.4 Terrorist Fraud (TF) [178]
  • 7.4.2 Provable Security and Formal Verification
  • 7.4.2.1 Symbolic Verification
  • 7.4.2.2 Provable Security
  • 7.4.2.3 Provably-(in)Secure Protocols
  • 7.5 Distance-Bounding Protocols in Practice
  • 7.5.1 NXP's Mifare Technology
  • 7.5.2 3DB Technology
  • 7.5.3 Relay-Resistance in EMV
  • 7.6 Current Challenges in Distance Bounding
  • 7.6.1 Theory vs. Practice
  • 7.6.2 Application-Aware DB
  • 7.6.3 Specialist Implementations and Slow Adoption
  • Part IV Hardware Implementation and Systems
  • 8 It Started with Templates: The Future of Profiling in Side-Channel Analysis
  • 8.1 Introduction
  • 8.2 Profiled Side-Channel Attacks
  • 8.2.1 Definition of Profiling Attacks
  • 8.2.2 Data Preprocessing
  • 8.2.3 Feature Engineering.
  • 8.3 Template Attacks
  • 8.3.1 Context of Template Attack
  • 8.3.2 Standard Template Attack
  • 8.3.3 Pooled Template Attack
  • 8.3.4 Stochastic Attack
  • 8.4 Machine Learning-Based Attacks
  • 8.4.1 Conducting Sound Machine Learning Analysis
  • 8.5 Performance Metrics
  • 8.6 Countermeasures Against SCA
  • 8.7 Conclusions
  • 9 Side Channel Assessment Platforms and Tools for Ubiquitous Systems
  • 9.1 Introduction
  • 9.2 Side Channel Attacks, Leakage Assessment Methods and Problems
  • 9.2.1 Side Channel Attack Categories
  • 9.2.2 Leakage Assessment Using t-Test
  • 9.2.3 Practical Considerations in SCA Trace Collection
  • 9.3 Side Channel Attack Trace Collection Platforms
  • 9.3.1 Proposing a Fast Trace Collection Approach Beyond the Traditional Model
  • 9.4 A Use Case of a Flexible and Fast Platform for DUT SCA Evaluation
  • 9.5 Conclusions
  • 10 Challenges in Certifying Small-Scale (IoT) Hardware Random Number Generators
  • 10.1 Introduction
  • 10.2 Certification, Standards, and Testing
  • 10.3 Challenges in Data Collection
  • 10.4 Appropriate Selection of Tests
  • 10.4.1 Randomness Testing Under Data Collection Constraints: Analyzing the DESFire EV1
  • 10.4.2 Identifying Issues with Quantum Random Number Generators
  • 10.5 Conclusion
  • 11 Finding Software Bugs in Embedded Devices
  • 11.1 The Challenges of Embedded Devices and Software
  • 11.1.1 Lack of Transparency
  • 11.1.2 Lack of Control
  • 11.1.3 Lack of Resistance to Attacks
  • 11.1.4 Organization of This Chapter
  • 11.1.5 Classification of Embedded Systems
  • 11.2 Obtaining Firmware and Its Components
  • 11.2.1 Collecting Firmware Packages
  • 11.2.2 Extracting Firmware from Devices
  • 11.2.3 Unpacking Firmware
  • 11.2.4 Firmware Unpacking Frameworks
  • 11.2.5 Modifying and Repacking Firmware
  • 11.3 Static Firmware Analysis
  • 11.3.1 Simple Static Analysis on Firmware Packages.
  • 11.3.1.1 Configuration Analysis
  • 11.3.1.2 Software Version Analysis
  • 11.3.2 Static Code Analysis of Firmware Packages
  • 11.3.2.1 Code Analysis of Embedded Firmware
  • 11.3.2.2 Discovering Backdoors with Static Analysis
  • 11.3.2.3 Example Static Analysis to Discover Code Parsers
  • 11.4 Dynamic Firmware Analysis
  • 11.4.1 Device-Interactive Dynamic Analysis Without Emulation
  • 11.4.2 Device-Interactive Dynamic Analysis with Emulation
  • 11.4.3 Device-Less Dynamic Analysis and Emulation
  • 11.5 Conclusion
  • Part V Privacy and Forensics
  • 12 Privacy-Oriented Analysis of Ubiquitous Computing Systems: A 5-D Approach
  • 12.1 Introduction
  • 12.1.1 Goal and Plan of the Chapter
  • 12.2 Background and Previous Work on Privacy in UCS
  • 12.3 5-D Classification and Analysis of Privacy Risks
  • 12.3.1 Identity Privacy
  • 12.3.2 Query Privacy
  • 12.3.3 Location Privacy
  • 12.3.4 Footprint Privacy
  • 12.3.5 Intelligence Privacy
  • 12.4 Future Trends and Challenges
  • 12.4.1 Privacy by Design
  • 12.4.2 Individual-Centred Privacy
  • 12.4.3 Growing Importance of Legislation
  • 12.5 Conclusions
  • 13 IoT Forensics
  • 13.1 Introduction
  • 13.2 Forensics
  • 13.2.1 Digital Device Forensics
  • 13.2.2 Other Digital Forensics
  • 13.2.3 The Need for IoT Forensics
  • 13.3 Challenges in IoT Forensics
  • 13.3.1 General Issues
  • 13.3.2 Evidence Identification, Collection and Preservation
  • 13.3.3 Evidence Analysis and Correlation
  • 13.3.4 Presentation
  • 13.4 Opportunities of IoT Forensics
  • 13.5 An Example of an IoT Forensics Case
  • 13.6 Research Overview
  • 13.6.1 New Models and Frameworks
  • 13.6.2 Preparation Step with Repository
  • 13.6.3 Real-World Systems
  • 13.7 Conclusion and Future Research Directions
  • References.

Similar Items