Defending Checks and Balances in EU Member States : : Taking Stock of Europe's Actions.

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Superior document:Beiträge Zum Ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht Series ; v.298
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Place / Publishing House:Berlin, Heidelberg : : Springer Berlin / Heidelberg,, 2021.
©2021.
Year of Publication:2021
Edition:1st ed.
Language:English
Series:Beiträge Zum Ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht Series
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spelling von Bogdandy, Armin.
Defending Checks and Balances in EU Member States : Taking Stock of Europe's Actions.
1st ed.
Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2021.
©2021.
1 online resource (478 pages)
text txt rdacontent
computer c rdamedia
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Beiträge Zum Ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht Series ; v.298
Defending Checks and Balances in EU Member States -- Preface -- Contents -- Part I: Understanding the Development in EU Member States -- Not on Bread Alone Doth Man Liveth (Deut. 8:3 -- Mat 4:4): Some Iconoclastic Views on Populism, Democracy, the Rule of Law and t... -- 1 Populism -- 2 What of the Disillusionment with Liberal Democracy? -- 3 Poland -- Reference -- Constitutional Crisis in Poland 2015-2016 in the Light of the Rule of Law Principle -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Facts and Law -- 3 Controversies Concerning Three Constitutional Judges -- 4 The Rule of Law and the Principle of Legality -- 5 Constitutional Tribunalś Scope of Competence -- 6 Legal Effects of the K 34/15 Judgment -- 7 May the Constitutional Tribunal Bypass an Act of Parliament? -- 8 Presumption of Legality of Acts Issued by State Bodies -- 9 Closing Remarks. The Crisis of Procedures -- References -- Hungaryś Latest Experiences with Article 2 TEU: The Need for `Informed ́EU Sanctions -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Big Picture: Targeted Legislation and Constitutional Malfunctions -- 2.1 Lex Friends and Lex Enemies -- 2.1.1 Turning the Data Protection Ombudsman into an Authority Influenced by the Government -- 2.1.2 Sending Judges into Retirement -- 2.1.3 Labelling Foreign Funded NGOs -- 2.1.4 Targeting the `Soros University ́-- 2.1.5 `Stopping Soros ́(and Migration) -- 2.1.6 The System of Lex Friends and Lex Enemies: The Fundamental Challenge to the Rule of Law in Hungary -- 2.2 Unrestrained Constitutional Amendments -- 2.3 The Constitutional Court: Still a Counterbalance or, Already an Ally of the Government? -- 2.3.1 Filling the Court with Fidesz-Loyalist Judges -- 2.3.2 Limiting Constitutional Review in Important Cases -- 2.3.3 New Strategies of the Constitutional Court: Shifting Away from the Control of the Legislative.
3 Why Infringement Procedures Are Ineffective in the Case of Hungary -- 3.1 CJEU Judgments Being Fully or Partly Ignored -- 3.2 Infringement Cases Regarding the NGO Law and the Lex CEU -- 4 Making a Try with Article 7: The Sargentini Report on Hungary -- 4.1 Getting Lost in Details, Missing the Bigger Picture -- 4.2 Limited Political Relevance -- 5 How to Take `Informed ́Measures in Defence of the Unionś Values? -- 5.1 Measuring, Buying or Monitoring the Rule of Law? -- 5.2 How to Indicate Overlapping Systemic Rule of Law Deficiencies? -- 6 Conclusion -- References -- Part II: European Action -- Towards a Tyranny of Values? -- 1 What Is at Stake -- 2 The Principles in Abstract -- 2.1 Options -- 2.2 Grounds Against Defending the Unionś Values -- 2.3 Grounds in Favour of Defending the Unionś Values -- 3 The Principles Applied -- 3.1 The Toolbox -- 3.2 Questions of Competence -- 3.2.1 Article 7 TEU in the Order of Competences -- 3.2.2 Instruments of Secondary Law -- 3.2.3 The Justiciability of the Values -- 3.3 Procedure -- 3.4 Material Standards -- 3.4.1 Red Lines -- 3.4.2 The Comprehensive and Collective Assessment -- 3.4.3 On the Concreteness of the Risk -- 3.5 Control -- 4 Towards a Tyranny of Values? -- References -- The Rule of Law As a Value in the Sense of Article 2 TEU: What Does It Mean and Imply? -- 1 Dangers for the Rule of Law in the Union -- 2 Origins As a Principle of Union Constitutional Law -- 3 No Homogeneity as Regards the Rule of Law in the Union -- 4 Normative Character of the Union Rule of Law -- 4.1 Rule of Law As Value and Principle -- 4.2 Binding Legal Norm -- 4.3 Operational Legal Norm -- 5 The Rule of Law As a Legal Concept -- 5.1 Determining the Content of the Rule of Law -- 5.2 The European Tradition of the Rule of Law -- 5.3 Formal and Material Aspects of the Rule of Law -- 6 The Rule of Law in the Unionś Practice.
6.1 Rule of Law As Described in the Commission Framework -- 6.2 Rule of Law in the Case Law of the CJEU -- 7 Essence of the Union Rule of Law -- References -- Article 7: A Commentary on a Much Talked-About `Dead ́Provision -- 1 Introduction -- 2 A Brief Context of Coping with Rule of Law Backsliding -- 3 Background of Art. 7 TEU -- 4 The Scope of Application of Art. 7 TEU -- 4.1 Clear Risk of a Serious Breach (Procedure No. 1) -- 4.2 Stating the Existence of a Serious Breach (Procedure No. 2) -- 4.3 Suspension of Rights and Revocation of Sanctions (Procedure No. 3) -- 4.4 Procedural Requirements Specific to Article 7 TEU -- 5 (Utopian) Scenarios for the Future: No Room for Art. 7 -- 5.1 Thinking Short-Term: Scenario No. 1: Cutting the Funds -- 5.2 Thinking Mid-Term: Scenario No. 2: Overwhelming Ad Hoc Political Pressure -- 5.3 Thinking Long-Term: Scenario No. 3: A Multi-Speed Union -- 6 A Realistic Scenario for the Future: No Room for Art. 7 -- References -- The Responsibility of Courts in Maintaining the Rule of Law: Two Tales of Consequential Judicial Self-Restraint -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Narrowing the Charterś Applicability: Article 51 (1) CFR -- 2.1 Siragusa, Hernndez: Context and Consequences -- 2.2 Consequences of the Restrictive Interpretation of 51 (1) CFR Until 2017 in Hungary -- 2.2.1 The Media Law -- 2.2.2 The Forced Retirement of Justices -- 2.2.3 The Removal of the Data Protection Commissioner -- 2.3 Article 19 (1) TEU as a Partial Supplement for a Broad Interpretation of Article 51 (1) -- 2.4 Revival of ERT? -- 3 Unused Means to Control the Constitution Making Power -- 3.1 The Convolution of Pouvoir Constituant and Pouvoir Constitué -- 3.2 Limits of the Constitution Making Power -- 3.2.1 Constitutional Identity -- 3.2.2 International Law as a Standard of Interpretation of Constitutional Provisions.
3.2.3 International Law as a Standard of Legality of the Constitution -- 3.3 The European Convention on Human Rights as a Standard of Review by the Constitutional Court -- 4 Conclusions -- References -- Suspending Horizontal Solange: A Decentralized Instrument for Protecting Mutual Trust and the European Rule of Law -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Mutual Trust: The Path Towards Becoming a Founding Constitutional Principle of the EU -- 2.1 Mutual Trust: Initial Steps -- 2.2 Mutual Trust: A Horizontal Principle of Cooperation Among the Member States ́Judiciaries -- 2.3 Mutual Trust: A Constitutional Principle -- 3 The Rule of Law and the Jurisprudence of the CJEU -- 4 Mutual Trust and Its Exceptions -- 4.1 Political Versus Judicial Determination -- 4.2 Judicial Determination of Systemic Deficiencies -- 4.2.1 Substantive Matters -- 4.2.2 Institutional Aspects -- 4.3 Individual Examination -- 4.4 A Horizontal Solange Doctrine -- 5 Conclusion -- References -- Books and Journals -- Ascertaining the `Guarantee of Guarantees:́ Recent Developments Regarding the Infringement Procedure in the EUś Rule of Law C... -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Rule of Law Crisis in Court: The Commission Infringement Cases Against Poland -- 2.1 The `Independence of the Supreme Court Case:́ C-619/18 -- 2.1.1 Combined Interim Relief and Expedited Procedure -- 2.1.1.1 Procedural Novelties -- 2.1.1.2 The Application for Interim Relief and the Courtś Two Subsequent Orders -- 2.1.1.3 The Application to Expedite the Procedure -- 2.1.2 Opinion -- 2.1.3 Judgment -- 2.2 The `Case on the Independence of the Ordinary Courts:́ C-192/18 -- 2.2.1 Opinion -- 2.2.2 Judgment -- 3 Context of the Judgments: The Commission Communications of April and July 2019 -- 4 Conclusions -- References (Primary Sources, Links and Jurisprudence Omitted).
Defending Union Values in Judicial Proceedings. On How to Turn Article 2 TEU into a Judicially Applicable Provision -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Uncertainties Surrounding the Judicial Application of Article 2 TEU -- 2.1 Nature: Do Article 2 TEU Values Have Any Legal Effect? -- 2.2 Direct Effect: Are Article 2 TEU Values Directly Applicable? -- 2.3 Jurisdiction: Does the Court Have Competence to Review the Member States ́Value Compliance? -- 3 Turning Article 2 TEU into a Judicially Applicable Provision -- 3.1 The Groundbreaking Judgment in ASJP -- 3.2 First Rationale: Securing the Functioning of the EUś Judicial System -- 3.3 Second Rationale: Operationalizing the Values in Article 2 TEU -- 4 Anticipating Objections and Advancing Rejoinders -- 4.1 Framing Possible Objections -- 4.2 Methodologically Unsound? -- 4.3 Pretext for a Power Grab? -- 5 Conclusion -- References -- Suspension of EU Funds Paid to Member States Breaching the Rule of Law: Is the Commissionś Proposal Legal? -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Conditionality Mechanism in EU Law -- 2.1 The Conditionality Mechanism in EU Internal and External Relations -- 2.2 The Financial Conditionality Mechanisms in EU Secondary Law on EU Funds -- 3 The Conditionality Mechanism Applied for Breaches of the Rule of Law -- 3.1 The Notion of `the Rule of Law ́-- 3.2 The Notion `Generalised Deficiency As Regards the Rule of Law in a Member State ́-- 3.2.1 The Principle of Sound Financial Management (Article 317 TFEU) -- 3.2.2 Protection of the Financial Interests of the Union (Article 325 TFEU) -- 3.2.3 Types of Generalised Deficiency As Regards the Rule of Law -- 4 Measures Applied Under the Conditionality Mechanism -- 5 The Procedure for Adoption of a Decision Applying the Conditionality Mechanism -- 5.1 Initiation of the Procedure -- 5.2 Who Adopts the Decision? -- 5.3 Voting in the Council by Reverse QMV.
5.4 Decision Lifting the Measures.
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Electronic books.
Bogdanowicz, Piotr.
Canor, Iris.
Grabenwarter, Christoph.
Taborowski, Maciej.
Schmidt, Matthias.
Print version: von Bogdandy, Armin Defending Checks and Balances in EU Member States Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin / Heidelberg,c2021 9783662623169
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author von Bogdandy, Armin.
spellingShingle von Bogdandy, Armin.
Defending Checks and Balances in EU Member States : Taking Stock of Europe's Actions.
Beiträge Zum Ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht Series ;
Defending Checks and Balances in EU Member States -- Preface -- Contents -- Part I: Understanding the Development in EU Member States -- Not on Bread Alone Doth Man Liveth (Deut. 8:3 -- Mat 4:4): Some Iconoclastic Views on Populism, Democracy, the Rule of Law and t... -- 1 Populism -- 2 What of the Disillusionment with Liberal Democracy? -- 3 Poland -- Reference -- Constitutional Crisis in Poland 2015-2016 in the Light of the Rule of Law Principle -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Facts and Law -- 3 Controversies Concerning Three Constitutional Judges -- 4 The Rule of Law and the Principle of Legality -- 5 Constitutional Tribunalś Scope of Competence -- 6 Legal Effects of the K 34/15 Judgment -- 7 May the Constitutional Tribunal Bypass an Act of Parliament? -- 8 Presumption of Legality of Acts Issued by State Bodies -- 9 Closing Remarks. The Crisis of Procedures -- References -- Hungaryś Latest Experiences with Article 2 TEU: The Need for `Informed ́EU Sanctions -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Big Picture: Targeted Legislation and Constitutional Malfunctions -- 2.1 Lex Friends and Lex Enemies -- 2.1.1 Turning the Data Protection Ombudsman into an Authority Influenced by the Government -- 2.1.2 Sending Judges into Retirement -- 2.1.3 Labelling Foreign Funded NGOs -- 2.1.4 Targeting the `Soros University ́-- 2.1.5 `Stopping Soros ́(and Migration) -- 2.1.6 The System of Lex Friends and Lex Enemies: The Fundamental Challenge to the Rule of Law in Hungary -- 2.2 Unrestrained Constitutional Amendments -- 2.3 The Constitutional Court: Still a Counterbalance or, Already an Ally of the Government? -- 2.3.1 Filling the Court with Fidesz-Loyalist Judges -- 2.3.2 Limiting Constitutional Review in Important Cases -- 2.3.3 New Strategies of the Constitutional Court: Shifting Away from the Control of the Legislative.
3 Why Infringement Procedures Are Ineffective in the Case of Hungary -- 3.1 CJEU Judgments Being Fully or Partly Ignored -- 3.2 Infringement Cases Regarding the NGO Law and the Lex CEU -- 4 Making a Try with Article 7: The Sargentini Report on Hungary -- 4.1 Getting Lost in Details, Missing the Bigger Picture -- 4.2 Limited Political Relevance -- 5 How to Take `Informed ́Measures in Defence of the Unionś Values? -- 5.1 Measuring, Buying or Monitoring the Rule of Law? -- 5.2 How to Indicate Overlapping Systemic Rule of Law Deficiencies? -- 6 Conclusion -- References -- Part II: European Action -- Towards a Tyranny of Values? -- 1 What Is at Stake -- 2 The Principles in Abstract -- 2.1 Options -- 2.2 Grounds Against Defending the Unionś Values -- 2.3 Grounds in Favour of Defending the Unionś Values -- 3 The Principles Applied -- 3.1 The Toolbox -- 3.2 Questions of Competence -- 3.2.1 Article 7 TEU in the Order of Competences -- 3.2.2 Instruments of Secondary Law -- 3.2.3 The Justiciability of the Values -- 3.3 Procedure -- 3.4 Material Standards -- 3.4.1 Red Lines -- 3.4.2 The Comprehensive and Collective Assessment -- 3.4.3 On the Concreteness of the Risk -- 3.5 Control -- 4 Towards a Tyranny of Values? -- References -- The Rule of Law As a Value in the Sense of Article 2 TEU: What Does It Mean and Imply? -- 1 Dangers for the Rule of Law in the Union -- 2 Origins As a Principle of Union Constitutional Law -- 3 No Homogeneity as Regards the Rule of Law in the Union -- 4 Normative Character of the Union Rule of Law -- 4.1 Rule of Law As Value and Principle -- 4.2 Binding Legal Norm -- 4.3 Operational Legal Norm -- 5 The Rule of Law As a Legal Concept -- 5.1 Determining the Content of the Rule of Law -- 5.2 The European Tradition of the Rule of Law -- 5.3 Formal and Material Aspects of the Rule of Law -- 6 The Rule of Law in the Unionś Practice.
6.1 Rule of Law As Described in the Commission Framework -- 6.2 Rule of Law in the Case Law of the CJEU -- 7 Essence of the Union Rule of Law -- References -- Article 7: A Commentary on a Much Talked-About `Dead ́Provision -- 1 Introduction -- 2 A Brief Context of Coping with Rule of Law Backsliding -- 3 Background of Art. 7 TEU -- 4 The Scope of Application of Art. 7 TEU -- 4.1 Clear Risk of a Serious Breach (Procedure No. 1) -- 4.2 Stating the Existence of a Serious Breach (Procedure No. 2) -- 4.3 Suspension of Rights and Revocation of Sanctions (Procedure No. 3) -- 4.4 Procedural Requirements Specific to Article 7 TEU -- 5 (Utopian) Scenarios for the Future: No Room for Art. 7 -- 5.1 Thinking Short-Term: Scenario No. 1: Cutting the Funds -- 5.2 Thinking Mid-Term: Scenario No. 2: Overwhelming Ad Hoc Political Pressure -- 5.3 Thinking Long-Term: Scenario No. 3: A Multi-Speed Union -- 6 A Realistic Scenario for the Future: No Room for Art. 7 -- References -- The Responsibility of Courts in Maintaining the Rule of Law: Two Tales of Consequential Judicial Self-Restraint -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Narrowing the Charterś Applicability: Article 51 (1) CFR -- 2.1 Siragusa, Hernndez: Context and Consequences -- 2.2 Consequences of the Restrictive Interpretation of 51 (1) CFR Until 2017 in Hungary -- 2.2.1 The Media Law -- 2.2.2 The Forced Retirement of Justices -- 2.2.3 The Removal of the Data Protection Commissioner -- 2.3 Article 19 (1) TEU as a Partial Supplement for a Broad Interpretation of Article 51 (1) -- 2.4 Revival of ERT? -- 3 Unused Means to Control the Constitution Making Power -- 3.1 The Convolution of Pouvoir Constituant and Pouvoir Constitué -- 3.2 Limits of the Constitution Making Power -- 3.2.1 Constitutional Identity -- 3.2.2 International Law as a Standard of Interpretation of Constitutional Provisions.
3.2.3 International Law as a Standard of Legality of the Constitution -- 3.3 The European Convention on Human Rights as a Standard of Review by the Constitutional Court -- 4 Conclusions -- References -- Suspending Horizontal Solange: A Decentralized Instrument for Protecting Mutual Trust and the European Rule of Law -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Mutual Trust: The Path Towards Becoming a Founding Constitutional Principle of the EU -- 2.1 Mutual Trust: Initial Steps -- 2.2 Mutual Trust: A Horizontal Principle of Cooperation Among the Member States ́Judiciaries -- 2.3 Mutual Trust: A Constitutional Principle -- 3 The Rule of Law and the Jurisprudence of the CJEU -- 4 Mutual Trust and Its Exceptions -- 4.1 Political Versus Judicial Determination -- 4.2 Judicial Determination of Systemic Deficiencies -- 4.2.1 Substantive Matters -- 4.2.2 Institutional Aspects -- 4.3 Individual Examination -- 4.4 A Horizontal Solange Doctrine -- 5 Conclusion -- References -- Books and Journals -- Ascertaining the `Guarantee of Guarantees:́ Recent Developments Regarding the Infringement Procedure in the EUś Rule of Law C... -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Rule of Law Crisis in Court: The Commission Infringement Cases Against Poland -- 2.1 The `Independence of the Supreme Court Case:́ C-619/18 -- 2.1.1 Combined Interim Relief and Expedited Procedure -- 2.1.1.1 Procedural Novelties -- 2.1.1.2 The Application for Interim Relief and the Courtś Two Subsequent Orders -- 2.1.1.3 The Application to Expedite the Procedure -- 2.1.2 Opinion -- 2.1.3 Judgment -- 2.2 The `Case on the Independence of the Ordinary Courts:́ C-192/18 -- 2.2.1 Opinion -- 2.2.2 Judgment -- 3 Context of the Judgments: The Commission Communications of April and July 2019 -- 4 Conclusions -- References (Primary Sources, Links and Jurisprudence Omitted).
Defending Union Values in Judicial Proceedings. On How to Turn Article 2 TEU into a Judicially Applicable Provision -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Uncertainties Surrounding the Judicial Application of Article 2 TEU -- 2.1 Nature: Do Article 2 TEU Values Have Any Legal Effect? -- 2.2 Direct Effect: Are Article 2 TEU Values Directly Applicable? -- 2.3 Jurisdiction: Does the Court Have Competence to Review the Member States ́Value Compliance? -- 3 Turning Article 2 TEU into a Judicially Applicable Provision -- 3.1 The Groundbreaking Judgment in ASJP -- 3.2 First Rationale: Securing the Functioning of the EUś Judicial System -- 3.3 Second Rationale: Operationalizing the Values in Article 2 TEU -- 4 Anticipating Objections and Advancing Rejoinders -- 4.1 Framing Possible Objections -- 4.2 Methodologically Unsound? -- 4.3 Pretext for a Power Grab? -- 5 Conclusion -- References -- Suspension of EU Funds Paid to Member States Breaching the Rule of Law: Is the Commissionś Proposal Legal? -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Conditionality Mechanism in EU Law -- 2.1 The Conditionality Mechanism in EU Internal and External Relations -- 2.2 The Financial Conditionality Mechanisms in EU Secondary Law on EU Funds -- 3 The Conditionality Mechanism Applied for Breaches of the Rule of Law -- 3.1 The Notion of `the Rule of Law ́-- 3.2 The Notion `Generalised Deficiency As Regards the Rule of Law in a Member State ́-- 3.2.1 The Principle of Sound Financial Management (Article 317 TFEU) -- 3.2.2 Protection of the Financial Interests of the Union (Article 325 TFEU) -- 3.2.3 Types of Generalised Deficiency As Regards the Rule of Law -- 4 Measures Applied Under the Conditionality Mechanism -- 5 The Procedure for Adoption of a Decision Applying the Conditionality Mechanism -- 5.1 Initiation of the Procedure -- 5.2 Who Adopts the Decision? -- 5.3 Voting in the Council by Reverse QMV.
5.4 Decision Lifting the Measures.
author_facet von Bogdandy, Armin.
Bogdanowicz, Piotr.
Canor, Iris.
Grabenwarter, Christoph.
Taborowski, Maciej.
Schmidt, Matthias.
author_variant b a v ba bav
author2 Bogdanowicz, Piotr.
Canor, Iris.
Grabenwarter, Christoph.
Taborowski, Maciej.
Schmidt, Matthias.
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c g cg
m t mt
m s ms
author2_role TeilnehmendeR
TeilnehmendeR
TeilnehmendeR
TeilnehmendeR
TeilnehmendeR
author_sort von Bogdandy, Armin.
title Defending Checks and Balances in EU Member States : Taking Stock of Europe's Actions.
title_sub Taking Stock of Europe's Actions.
title_full Defending Checks and Balances in EU Member States : Taking Stock of Europe's Actions.
title_fullStr Defending Checks and Balances in EU Member States : Taking Stock of Europe's Actions.
title_full_unstemmed Defending Checks and Balances in EU Member States : Taking Stock of Europe's Actions.
title_auth Defending Checks and Balances in EU Member States : Taking Stock of Europe's Actions.
title_new Defending Checks and Balances in EU Member States :
title_sort defending checks and balances in eu member states : taking stock of europe's actions.
series Beiträge Zum Ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht Series ;
series2 Beiträge Zum Ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht Series ;
publisher Springer Berlin / Heidelberg,
publishDate 2021
physical 1 online resource (478 pages)
edition 1st ed.
contents Defending Checks and Balances in EU Member States -- Preface -- Contents -- Part I: Understanding the Development in EU Member States -- Not on Bread Alone Doth Man Liveth (Deut. 8:3 -- Mat 4:4): Some Iconoclastic Views on Populism, Democracy, the Rule of Law and t... -- 1 Populism -- 2 What of the Disillusionment with Liberal Democracy? -- 3 Poland -- Reference -- Constitutional Crisis in Poland 2015-2016 in the Light of the Rule of Law Principle -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Facts and Law -- 3 Controversies Concerning Three Constitutional Judges -- 4 The Rule of Law and the Principle of Legality -- 5 Constitutional Tribunalś Scope of Competence -- 6 Legal Effects of the K 34/15 Judgment -- 7 May the Constitutional Tribunal Bypass an Act of Parliament? -- 8 Presumption of Legality of Acts Issued by State Bodies -- 9 Closing Remarks. The Crisis of Procedures -- References -- Hungaryś Latest Experiences with Article 2 TEU: The Need for `Informed ́EU Sanctions -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Big Picture: Targeted Legislation and Constitutional Malfunctions -- 2.1 Lex Friends and Lex Enemies -- 2.1.1 Turning the Data Protection Ombudsman into an Authority Influenced by the Government -- 2.1.2 Sending Judges into Retirement -- 2.1.3 Labelling Foreign Funded NGOs -- 2.1.4 Targeting the `Soros University ́-- 2.1.5 `Stopping Soros ́(and Migration) -- 2.1.6 The System of Lex Friends and Lex Enemies: The Fundamental Challenge to the Rule of Law in Hungary -- 2.2 Unrestrained Constitutional Amendments -- 2.3 The Constitutional Court: Still a Counterbalance or, Already an Ally of the Government? -- 2.3.1 Filling the Court with Fidesz-Loyalist Judges -- 2.3.2 Limiting Constitutional Review in Important Cases -- 2.3.3 New Strategies of the Constitutional Court: Shifting Away from the Control of the Legislative.
3 Why Infringement Procedures Are Ineffective in the Case of Hungary -- 3.1 CJEU Judgments Being Fully or Partly Ignored -- 3.2 Infringement Cases Regarding the NGO Law and the Lex CEU -- 4 Making a Try with Article 7: The Sargentini Report on Hungary -- 4.1 Getting Lost in Details, Missing the Bigger Picture -- 4.2 Limited Political Relevance -- 5 How to Take `Informed ́Measures in Defence of the Unionś Values? -- 5.1 Measuring, Buying or Monitoring the Rule of Law? -- 5.2 How to Indicate Overlapping Systemic Rule of Law Deficiencies? -- 6 Conclusion -- References -- Part II: European Action -- Towards a Tyranny of Values? -- 1 What Is at Stake -- 2 The Principles in Abstract -- 2.1 Options -- 2.2 Grounds Against Defending the Unionś Values -- 2.3 Grounds in Favour of Defending the Unionś Values -- 3 The Principles Applied -- 3.1 The Toolbox -- 3.2 Questions of Competence -- 3.2.1 Article 7 TEU in the Order of Competences -- 3.2.2 Instruments of Secondary Law -- 3.2.3 The Justiciability of the Values -- 3.3 Procedure -- 3.4 Material Standards -- 3.4.1 Red Lines -- 3.4.2 The Comprehensive and Collective Assessment -- 3.4.3 On the Concreteness of the Risk -- 3.5 Control -- 4 Towards a Tyranny of Values? -- References -- The Rule of Law As a Value in the Sense of Article 2 TEU: What Does It Mean and Imply? -- 1 Dangers for the Rule of Law in the Union -- 2 Origins As a Principle of Union Constitutional Law -- 3 No Homogeneity as Regards the Rule of Law in the Union -- 4 Normative Character of the Union Rule of Law -- 4.1 Rule of Law As Value and Principle -- 4.2 Binding Legal Norm -- 4.3 Operational Legal Norm -- 5 The Rule of Law As a Legal Concept -- 5.1 Determining the Content of the Rule of Law -- 5.2 The European Tradition of the Rule of Law -- 5.3 Formal and Material Aspects of the Rule of Law -- 6 The Rule of Law in the Unionś Practice.
6.1 Rule of Law As Described in the Commission Framework -- 6.2 Rule of Law in the Case Law of the CJEU -- 7 Essence of the Union Rule of Law -- References -- Article 7: A Commentary on a Much Talked-About `Dead ́Provision -- 1 Introduction -- 2 A Brief Context of Coping with Rule of Law Backsliding -- 3 Background of Art. 7 TEU -- 4 The Scope of Application of Art. 7 TEU -- 4.1 Clear Risk of a Serious Breach (Procedure No. 1) -- 4.2 Stating the Existence of a Serious Breach (Procedure No. 2) -- 4.3 Suspension of Rights and Revocation of Sanctions (Procedure No. 3) -- 4.4 Procedural Requirements Specific to Article 7 TEU -- 5 (Utopian) Scenarios for the Future: No Room for Art. 7 -- 5.1 Thinking Short-Term: Scenario No. 1: Cutting the Funds -- 5.2 Thinking Mid-Term: Scenario No. 2: Overwhelming Ad Hoc Political Pressure -- 5.3 Thinking Long-Term: Scenario No. 3: A Multi-Speed Union -- 6 A Realistic Scenario for the Future: No Room for Art. 7 -- References -- The Responsibility of Courts in Maintaining the Rule of Law: Two Tales of Consequential Judicial Self-Restraint -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Narrowing the Charterś Applicability: Article 51 (1) CFR -- 2.1 Siragusa, Hernndez: Context and Consequences -- 2.2 Consequences of the Restrictive Interpretation of 51 (1) CFR Until 2017 in Hungary -- 2.2.1 The Media Law -- 2.2.2 The Forced Retirement of Justices -- 2.2.3 The Removal of the Data Protection Commissioner -- 2.3 Article 19 (1) TEU as a Partial Supplement for a Broad Interpretation of Article 51 (1) -- 2.4 Revival of ERT? -- 3 Unused Means to Control the Constitution Making Power -- 3.1 The Convolution of Pouvoir Constituant and Pouvoir Constitué -- 3.2 Limits of the Constitution Making Power -- 3.2.1 Constitutional Identity -- 3.2.2 International Law as a Standard of Interpretation of Constitutional Provisions.
3.2.3 International Law as a Standard of Legality of the Constitution -- 3.3 The European Convention on Human Rights as a Standard of Review by the Constitutional Court -- 4 Conclusions -- References -- Suspending Horizontal Solange: A Decentralized Instrument for Protecting Mutual Trust and the European Rule of Law -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Mutual Trust: The Path Towards Becoming a Founding Constitutional Principle of the EU -- 2.1 Mutual Trust: Initial Steps -- 2.2 Mutual Trust: A Horizontal Principle of Cooperation Among the Member States ́Judiciaries -- 2.3 Mutual Trust: A Constitutional Principle -- 3 The Rule of Law and the Jurisprudence of the CJEU -- 4 Mutual Trust and Its Exceptions -- 4.1 Political Versus Judicial Determination -- 4.2 Judicial Determination of Systemic Deficiencies -- 4.2.1 Substantive Matters -- 4.2.2 Institutional Aspects -- 4.3 Individual Examination -- 4.4 A Horizontal Solange Doctrine -- 5 Conclusion -- References -- Books and Journals -- Ascertaining the `Guarantee of Guarantees:́ Recent Developments Regarding the Infringement Procedure in the EUś Rule of Law C... -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Rule of Law Crisis in Court: The Commission Infringement Cases Against Poland -- 2.1 The `Independence of the Supreme Court Case:́ C-619/18 -- 2.1.1 Combined Interim Relief and Expedited Procedure -- 2.1.1.1 Procedural Novelties -- 2.1.1.2 The Application for Interim Relief and the Courtś Two Subsequent Orders -- 2.1.1.3 The Application to Expedite the Procedure -- 2.1.2 Opinion -- 2.1.3 Judgment -- 2.2 The `Case on the Independence of the Ordinary Courts:́ C-192/18 -- 2.2.1 Opinion -- 2.2.2 Judgment -- 3 Context of the Judgments: The Commission Communications of April and July 2019 -- 4 Conclusions -- References (Primary Sources, Links and Jurisprudence Omitted).
Defending Union Values in Judicial Proceedings. On How to Turn Article 2 TEU into a Judicially Applicable Provision -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Uncertainties Surrounding the Judicial Application of Article 2 TEU -- 2.1 Nature: Do Article 2 TEU Values Have Any Legal Effect? -- 2.2 Direct Effect: Are Article 2 TEU Values Directly Applicable? -- 2.3 Jurisdiction: Does the Court Have Competence to Review the Member States ́Value Compliance? -- 3 Turning Article 2 TEU into a Judicially Applicable Provision -- 3.1 The Groundbreaking Judgment in ASJP -- 3.2 First Rationale: Securing the Functioning of the EUś Judicial System -- 3.3 Second Rationale: Operationalizing the Values in Article 2 TEU -- 4 Anticipating Objections and Advancing Rejoinders -- 4.1 Framing Possible Objections -- 4.2 Methodologically Unsound? -- 4.3 Pretext for a Power Grab? -- 5 Conclusion -- References -- Suspension of EU Funds Paid to Member States Breaching the Rule of Law: Is the Commissionś Proposal Legal? -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Conditionality Mechanism in EU Law -- 2.1 The Conditionality Mechanism in EU Internal and External Relations -- 2.2 The Financial Conditionality Mechanisms in EU Secondary Law on EU Funds -- 3 The Conditionality Mechanism Applied for Breaches of the Rule of Law -- 3.1 The Notion of `the Rule of Law ́-- 3.2 The Notion `Generalised Deficiency As Regards the Rule of Law in a Member State ́-- 3.2.1 The Principle of Sound Financial Management (Article 317 TFEU) -- 3.2.2 Protection of the Financial Interests of the Union (Article 325 TFEU) -- 3.2.3 Types of Generalised Deficiency As Regards the Rule of Law -- 4 Measures Applied Under the Conditionality Mechanism -- 5 The Procedure for Adoption of a Decision Applying the Conditionality Mechanism -- 5.1 Initiation of the Procedure -- 5.2 Who Adopts the Decision? -- 5.3 Voting in the Council by Reverse QMV.
5.4 Decision Lifting the Measures.
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is_hierarchy_title Defending Checks and Balances in EU Member States : Taking Stock of Europe's Actions.
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fullrecord <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>11252nam a22005173i 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">5006451167</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">MiAaPQ</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20240229073838.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="006">m o d | </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr cnu||||||||</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">240229s2021 xx o ||||0 eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9783662623176</subfield><subfield code="q">(electronic bk.)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="z">9783662623169</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(MiAaPQ)5006451167</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(Au-PeEL)EBL6451167</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)1231606103</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">MiAaPQ</subfield><subfield code="b">eng</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield><subfield code="e">pn</subfield><subfield code="c">MiAaPQ</subfield><subfield code="d">MiAaPQ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">KJE5132-5240</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">von Bogdandy, Armin.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Defending Checks and Balances in EU Member States :</subfield><subfield code="b">Taking Stock of Europe's Actions.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="250" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1st ed.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Berlin, Heidelberg :</subfield><subfield code="b">Springer Berlin / Heidelberg,</subfield><subfield code="c">2021.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="c">©2021.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 online resource (478 pages)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">computer</subfield><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">online resource</subfield><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Beiträge Zum Ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht Series ;</subfield><subfield code="v">v.298</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Defending Checks and Balances in EU Member States -- Preface -- Contents -- Part I: Understanding the Development in EU Member States -- Not on Bread Alone Doth Man Liveth (Deut. 8:3 -- Mat 4:4): Some Iconoclastic Views on Populism, Democracy, the Rule of Law and t... -- 1 Populism -- 2 What of the Disillusionment with Liberal Democracy? -- 3 Poland -- Reference -- Constitutional Crisis in Poland 2015-2016 in the Light of the Rule of Law Principle -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Facts and Law -- 3 Controversies Concerning Three Constitutional Judges -- 4 The Rule of Law and the Principle of Legality -- 5 Constitutional Tribunalś Scope of Competence -- 6 Legal Effects of the K 34/15 Judgment -- 7 May the Constitutional Tribunal Bypass an Act of Parliament? -- 8 Presumption of Legality of Acts Issued by State Bodies -- 9 Closing Remarks. The Crisis of Procedures -- References -- Hungaryś Latest Experiences with Article 2 TEU: The Need for `Informed ́EU Sanctions -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Big Picture: Targeted Legislation and Constitutional Malfunctions -- 2.1 Lex Friends and Lex Enemies -- 2.1.1 Turning the Data Protection Ombudsman into an Authority Influenced by the Government -- 2.1.2 Sending Judges into Retirement -- 2.1.3 Labelling Foreign Funded NGOs -- 2.1.4 Targeting the `Soros University ́-- 2.1.5 `Stopping Soros ́(and Migration) -- 2.1.6 The System of Lex Friends and Lex Enemies: The Fundamental Challenge to the Rule of Law in Hungary -- 2.2 Unrestrained Constitutional Amendments -- 2.3 The Constitutional Court: Still a Counterbalance or, Already an Ally of the Government? -- 2.3.1 Filling the Court with Fidesz-Loyalist Judges -- 2.3.2 Limiting Constitutional Review in Important Cases -- 2.3.3 New Strategies of the Constitutional Court: Shifting Away from the Control of the Legislative.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">3 Why Infringement Procedures Are Ineffective in the Case of Hungary -- 3.1 CJEU Judgments Being Fully or Partly Ignored -- 3.2 Infringement Cases Regarding the NGO Law and the Lex CEU -- 4 Making a Try with Article 7: The Sargentini Report on Hungary -- 4.1 Getting Lost in Details, Missing the Bigger Picture -- 4.2 Limited Political Relevance -- 5 How to Take `Informed ́Measures in Defence of the Unionś Values? -- 5.1 Measuring, Buying or Monitoring the Rule of Law? -- 5.2 How to Indicate Overlapping Systemic Rule of Law Deficiencies? -- 6 Conclusion -- References -- Part II: European Action -- Towards a Tyranny of Values? -- 1 What Is at Stake -- 2 The Principles in Abstract -- 2.1 Options -- 2.2 Grounds Against Defending the Unionś Values -- 2.3 Grounds in Favour of Defending the Unionś Values -- 3 The Principles Applied -- 3.1 The Toolbox -- 3.2 Questions of Competence -- 3.2.1 Article 7 TEU in the Order of Competences -- 3.2.2 Instruments of Secondary Law -- 3.2.3 The Justiciability of the Values -- 3.3 Procedure -- 3.4 Material Standards -- 3.4.1 Red Lines -- 3.4.2 The Comprehensive and Collective Assessment -- 3.4.3 On the Concreteness of the Risk -- 3.5 Control -- 4 Towards a Tyranny of Values? -- References -- The Rule of Law As a Value in the Sense of Article 2 TEU: What Does It Mean and Imply? -- 1 Dangers for the Rule of Law in the Union -- 2 Origins As a Principle of Union Constitutional Law -- 3 No Homogeneity as Regards the Rule of Law in the Union -- 4 Normative Character of the Union Rule of Law -- 4.1 Rule of Law As Value and Principle -- 4.2 Binding Legal Norm -- 4.3 Operational Legal Norm -- 5 The Rule of Law As a Legal Concept -- 5.1 Determining the Content of the Rule of Law -- 5.2 The European Tradition of the Rule of Law -- 5.3 Formal and Material Aspects of the Rule of Law -- 6 The Rule of Law in the Unionś Practice.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">6.1 Rule of Law As Described in the Commission Framework -- 6.2 Rule of Law in the Case Law of the CJEU -- 7 Essence of the Union Rule of Law -- References -- Article 7: A Commentary on a Much Talked-About `Dead ́Provision -- 1 Introduction -- 2 A Brief Context of Coping with Rule of Law Backsliding -- 3 Background of Art. 7 TEU -- 4 The Scope of Application of Art. 7 TEU -- 4.1 Clear Risk of a Serious Breach (Procedure No. 1) -- 4.2 Stating the Existence of a Serious Breach (Procedure No. 2) -- 4.3 Suspension of Rights and Revocation of Sanctions (Procedure No. 3) -- 4.4 Procedural Requirements Specific to Article 7 TEU -- 5 (Utopian) Scenarios for the Future: No Room for Art. 7 -- 5.1 Thinking Short-Term: Scenario No. 1: Cutting the Funds -- 5.2 Thinking Mid-Term: Scenario No. 2: Overwhelming Ad Hoc Political Pressure -- 5.3 Thinking Long-Term: Scenario No. 3: A Multi-Speed Union -- 6 A Realistic Scenario for the Future: No Room for Art. 7 -- References -- The Responsibility of Courts in Maintaining the Rule of Law: Two Tales of Consequential Judicial Self-Restraint -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Narrowing the Charterś Applicability: Article 51 (1) CFR -- 2.1 Siragusa, Hernndez: Context and Consequences -- 2.2 Consequences of the Restrictive Interpretation of 51 (1) CFR Until 2017 in Hungary -- 2.2.1 The Media Law -- 2.2.2 The Forced Retirement of Justices -- 2.2.3 The Removal of the Data Protection Commissioner -- 2.3 Article 19 (1) TEU as a Partial Supplement for a Broad Interpretation of Article 51 (1) -- 2.4 Revival of ERT? -- 3 Unused Means to Control the Constitution Making Power -- 3.1 The Convolution of Pouvoir Constituant and Pouvoir Constitué -- 3.2 Limits of the Constitution Making Power -- 3.2.1 Constitutional Identity -- 3.2.2 International Law as a Standard of Interpretation of Constitutional Provisions.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">3.2.3 International Law as a Standard of Legality of the Constitution -- 3.3 The European Convention on Human Rights as a Standard of Review by the Constitutional Court -- 4 Conclusions -- References -- Suspending Horizontal Solange: A Decentralized Instrument for Protecting Mutual Trust and the European Rule of Law -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Mutual Trust: The Path Towards Becoming a Founding Constitutional Principle of the EU -- 2.1 Mutual Trust: Initial Steps -- 2.2 Mutual Trust: A Horizontal Principle of Cooperation Among the Member States ́Judiciaries -- 2.3 Mutual Trust: A Constitutional Principle -- 3 The Rule of Law and the Jurisprudence of the CJEU -- 4 Mutual Trust and Its Exceptions -- 4.1 Political Versus Judicial Determination -- 4.2 Judicial Determination of Systemic Deficiencies -- 4.2.1 Substantive Matters -- 4.2.2 Institutional Aspects -- 4.3 Individual Examination -- 4.4 A Horizontal Solange Doctrine -- 5 Conclusion -- References -- Books and Journals -- Ascertaining the `Guarantee of Guarantees:́ Recent Developments Regarding the Infringement Procedure in the EUś Rule of Law C... -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Rule of Law Crisis in Court: The Commission Infringement Cases Against Poland -- 2.1 The `Independence of the Supreme Court Case:́ C-619/18 -- 2.1.1 Combined Interim Relief and Expedited Procedure -- 2.1.1.1 Procedural Novelties -- 2.1.1.2 The Application for Interim Relief and the Courtś Two Subsequent Orders -- 2.1.1.3 The Application to Expedite the Procedure -- 2.1.2 Opinion -- 2.1.3 Judgment -- 2.2 The `Case on the Independence of the Ordinary Courts:́ C-192/18 -- 2.2.1 Opinion -- 2.2.2 Judgment -- 3 Context of the Judgments: The Commission Communications of April and July 2019 -- 4 Conclusions -- References (Primary Sources, Links and Jurisprudence Omitted).</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Defending Union Values in Judicial Proceedings. 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Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. 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