Managing the Complexity of Critical Infrastructures : : A Modelling and Simulation Approach.

• Superior document: Studies in Systems, Decision and Control Series ; v.90
• Author: Setola, Roberto.
• TeilnehmendeR: Rosato, Vittorio.; Kyriakides, Elias.; Rome, Erich.
• Place / Publishing House: Cham : : Springer International Publishing AG,, 2017.; ©2016.
• Year of Publication: 2017
• Edition: 1st ed.
• Language: English
• Series: Studies in Systems, Decision and Control Series
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (300 pages)

Table of Contents

• Intro
• Preface
• Contents
• 1 Critical Infrastructures, Protection and Resilience
• Abstract
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Importance of Protection and Resilience
• 3 Government Initiatives: Policies and Research
• 3.1 The US Approach
• 3.2 Initiatives in Europe
• 3.3 The Australian Approach
• 4 CI Resilience
• 5 Conclusion
• Acknowledgement and Disclaimer
• References
• 2 Modelling Dependencies Between Critical Infrastructures
• Abstract
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Why Are Dependencies Important?
• 3 Dependencies and Interdependencies
• 4 Dependency Modeling Approaches
• 5 Holistic Approaches
• 6 Networked Based Approaches
• 7 Conclusions
• Acknowledgement and Disclaimer
• References
• 3 Critical Infrastructure Disruption Scenarios Analyses via Simulation
• Abstract
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Scenarios Simulation
• 2.1 Types of Models
• 2.2 Scenarios' Basic Elements
• 2.3 Identification and Specification of Threats and Consequences
• 2.4 Modelling and Simulation of Threats and Consequences
• 2.5 Modelling and Simulation of CIs' Cascade of Disruptions
• 2.5.1 Vulnerability
• 2.5.2 CI Dependency
• 2.5.3 Integrating Vulnerability and Dependency
• 2.6 Cascading of Disruptions
• 2.7 The Story Time-Line
• 3 A Hypothetical Crisis Scenario
• 3.1 Crisis Scenario Description
• 3.2 Identification and Specification of the Threat
• 3.3 Identification and Specification of the CIs and Their Vulnerability
• 3.4 Specification of the CIs Dependency
• 3.5 Definition of the Cascade of Disruptions
• 3.6 Definition of the Crisis Management Target
• 3.7 The Consequence to Mitigate or to Dump
• 3.8 Scenario Assessment: Simulation and Analysis
• 3.8.1 Whey the Unstressed Case?
• 3.8.2 Unstressed Case
• 3.8.3 Stressed Case
• 4 Conclusions
• Acknowledgement and Disclaimer
• References
• 4 Physical Simulators of Critical Infrastructures.
• Abstract
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Power Systems
• 2.1 DIgSILENT PowerFactory
• 2.2 SIEMENS PSS® E
• 2.3 SIEMENS PSS® SINCAL
• 2.4 SIEMENS PSS® NETOMAC
• 2.5 MATLAB® Simulink®
• 2.6 PowerWorld Simulator
• 2.7 PSCAD™ EMTDC™
• 2.8 EMTP-RV
• 3 Telecommunication Networks
• 3.1 ns-2
• 3.2 Other Simulators
• 4 Water Networks and Urban Drainage
• 4.1 Design Phase
• 4.2 Construction and Commissioning Phase
• 4.3 Operation and Maintenance (O&amp
• M) Phase
• 5 Transportation Systems
• 6 Conclusions
• Acknowledgement and Disclaimer
• References
• 5 Phenomenological Simulators of Critical Infrastructures
• Abstract
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Phenomenological Approaches
• 2.1 Leontief I/O Models
• 2.1.1 ENEA Extended Leontief Models
• 2.2 System Dynamics
• 2.3 i2SIM
• 3 Topological Analysis
• 4 A CI MA&amp
• S Platform for Complex and Large Scenarios
• 5 Conclusion
• Acknowledgement and Disclaimer
• References
• 6 Federated Simulations
• Abstract
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Distributed Simulation
• 2.1 Introduction
• 2.2 Levels of Interoperability
• 2.3 Approach for Coupling Simulation Models
• 3 Overview of the High Level Architecture
• 3.1 Introduction
• 3.2 Framework and Rules
• 3.3 Interface Specification
• 3.4 Object Model Template Specification
• 3.5 HLA RTI Implementations
• 4 Distributed Simulation Environment Development
• 5 Federation Agreements Template
• 6 Summary
• Acknowledgement and Disclaimer
• References
• 7 Cyber Threats Impacting Critical Infrastructures
• Abstract
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Goals and Challenges
• 2.1 Cyber World and Real Impact-Selected Case Studies
• 2.2 The Coordinated Cyber Attack-Ukrainian Case
• 2.3 Hybrid Conflicts
• 3 Cyber Threats Taxonomies
• 4 CIP Cyber-Physical Security Life-Cycle Models
• 4.1 Pre-crisis Phase
• 4.1.1 Prevention and Proactive Response.
• 4.1.2 Threat Detection
• 4.2 Crisis Phase
• 4.3 Post-crisis Phase
• 5 Modelling Cyber Security Aspects
• 5.1 Network Modelling
• 5.2 Cyber Risk Assessment
• 5.3 System Behaviour and Attacks Modelling
• 6 Ongoing Efforts
• 6.1 H2020 Work Program View on CPS Aspects
• 6.2 Security Standards for Critical Infrastructures
• 7 Conclusions
• Acknowledgement and Disclaimer
• References
• 8 Verification and Validation for CIPRNet
• Abstract
• 1 Do V&amp
• V If There Is Risk Involved
• 1.1 Modelling and Simulation
• 1.2 Verification and Validation
• 1.3 But How to Do V&amp
• V, and How Much?
• 2 Do V&amp
• V in a Structured Way to Be More Effective and Efficient
• 2.1 Conceptual Framework
• 2.1.1 Links to Systems Engineering
• 2.1.2 M&amp
• S-Based Problem Solving Approach
• 2.1.3 V&amp
• V Problem Solving Approach
• 2.1.4 Acceptance Recommendation, Acceptability Criteria and Evidential Quality
• 2.1.5 V&amp
• V Argumentation Approach: Structured Reasoning with Arguments
• 2.1.6 V&amp
• V Organizational and Management Approach
• 2.1.7 V&amp
• V Levels of Independence: Acceptance, Certification and Accreditation
• 2.1.8 V&amp
• V Information and Knowledge Management
• 2.2 Implementation Framework
• 2.3 Tailoring Framework
• 2.3.1 Risk Decomposition and Tailoring by Balancing
• 2.4 Why Is This Structured Approach so Much More Effective and Efficient
• 3 Choose the Appropriate Verification and Validation Technique
• 4 Conclusion
• Acknowledgement and Disclaimer
• References
• 9 Design of DSS for Supporting Preparedness to and Management of Anomalous Situations in Complex Scenarios
• Abstract
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Design Study
• 3 Database
• 4 Dynamic Data
• 5 Damage Scenario Builder
• 6 Impact Scenario
• 7 RecSIM
• 8 Consequence Analysis
• 9 SAW Indices Estimate.
• 9.1 SAW Indices Estimate for the Citizens Sector
• 9.2 SAW Indices Estimate for the Economic Activities Sector
• 10 Other Operation Modes and Future Work
• 11 Conclusions
• Acknowledgement and Disclaimer
• Appendix 1
• Appendix 2
• References
• 10 The Use of What-If Analysis to Improve the Management of Crisis Situations
• Abstract
• 1 Introduction-Role of Critical Infrastructures in Civil Crisis and Disaster Situations
• 2 State of the Art: Critical Review of Literature on What-If Analysis and Federated Modelling and Simulation
• 3 What-If Analysis-A New Capability for Training Crisis Management Staff
• 4 Scenarios for Training
• 5 CIPRTrainer
• 5.1 System Description
• 5.1.1 Design Engine
• 5.1.2 Training Engine
• 5.2 Federated Modelling and Simulation
• 5.2.1 Building CI Simulation Models
• 5.2.2 The Federated Simulation System
• 6 Impact and Consequence Analysis for the Global Assessment of Damages
• 6.1 Goal of the CA
• 6.2 General CA Concept
• 6.3 Geographical Dimension of the Analysis
• 6.4 Determining Impacts
• 6.5 Evaluating Consequences
• 7 Using CIPRTrainer
• 7.1 User Roles
• 7.2 Trainee Module
• 8 Example of a Training Session
• 9 Outlook
• 10 Conclusion
• Acknowledgement and Disclaimer
• References
• 11 Model Coupling with OpenMI Introduction of Basic Concepts
• Abstract
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Model Coupling and Conjunctive Modelling
• 2.1 What Is a Model?
• 2.2 What Is Conjunctive Modelling?
• 2.3 Task
• 3 The OpenMI Standard
• 3.1 Introduction
• 3.2 OpenMI Composition Components
• 3.3 Connections
• 3.4 Making (Legacy) Code OpenMI Compliant
• 3.5 Example Cases of Conjunctive Modelling with OpenMI
• 4 Example: Coupled Flow Simulation and Control
• 4.1 Study Area and Modelling Objective
• 4.2 Approach
• 4.3 The SOBEK Open Channel Flow Model
• 4.4 The RTC-Tools Real-Time Control Model.
• 4.5 Coupling with OpenMI
• 4.6 Coupled Simulation and Simulation Results
• Acknowledgement and Disclaimer
• References.