The EU and China in African Authoritarian Regimes : : Domestic Politics and Governance Reforms.

The EU and China in African Authoritarian Regimes : : Domestic Politics and Governance Reforms.

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Superior document:Governance and Limited Statehood Series
:
Hackenesch, Christine.
Place / Publishing House:Cham : : Springer International Publishing AG,, 2018.
©2018.
Year of Publication:2018
Edition:1st ed.
Language:English
Series:Governance and Limited Statehood Series
Online Access:
Physical Description:1 online resource (273 pages)
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Table of Contents:
  • Intro
  • Acknowledgements
  • Contents
  • Acronyms
  • List of Figures
  • List of Tables
  • Chapter 1: Introduction
  • 1.1 EU Good Governance Strategies Face Two Challenges: The Predominance of African Dominant Party Systems and China's Rise in Africa
  • EU Good Governance Strategies in Sub-Saharan Africa
  • The 'New Authoritarianism' in Africa: Dominant Party Systems
  • China's Rise in Africa
  • 1.2 Different Parts of the Same Elephant? Researching EU Good Governance Strategies and China's Engagement in Africa
  • Why Should We Focus on African Governments' Strategies?
  • 1.3 Why Angola, Ethiopia and Rwanda?
  • Three Dominant Party Regimes
  • In a Nutshell: Angola's, Ethiopia's and Rwanda's Responsiveness
  • 1.4 Structure of the Book
  • Chapter 2: The Initial Puzzle: Why Governments in Dominant Party Systems Engage with the EU on Good Governance Reform, or Not
  • 2.1 The EU's Strategies to Promote Governance Reforms
  • The EU's Approach: Content and Channels
  • The EU's Instruments: Cooperative or Confrontational Strategy?
  • 2.2 African Governments' Responsiveness
  • Interaction Effects: EU Good Governance Strategies and African Governments' Responsiveness
  • 2.3 Survival Strategies of Governments in Dominant party Regimes
  • Survival Strategies
  • The Foundation of Political Survival: Strengthening the Party or the State
  • Managing Political Survival: Effectively Controlling Arenas of Contestation Such as Elections, Parliaments and Courts
  • Managing Political Survival: Opening and Closing Political Spaces
  • Structural and Situational Factors That Impact on the Choice of Survival Strategies
  • EU Good Governance Strategies Meet Dominant Party Regimes
  • Building Effective States
  • Managing Arenas of Political Contestation
  • Opening or Closing Political Spaces
  • 2.4 African Economic Dependence on the EU.
  • Dependence on Aid and Other Official Flows
  • Dependence on Trade and Investments
  • 2.5 The Rise of China: What Effect?
  • Cooperating with China: Reducing Economic Dependence on the EU?
  • China: Alternative Support for Survival Strategies?
  • 2.6 Map of the Puzzle: Explaining African Governments' Responsiveness
  • Chapter 3: Rwanda
  • 3.1 Structural Factors Shaping Rwanda's Survival Strategies
  • 3.2 Rwanda Reluctantly Engaged with the EU in the Early 2000s
  • The EU's Good Governance Strategies Between 2000 and 2005
  • The EU's Approach: Promoting Democratic Government
  • The EU's Instruments: Cooperative-Critical
  • The Rwandan Government's Responsiveness: Reluctant Engagement
  • Rwanda's Responsiveness: Political Dialogue and Aid Policy Dialogues
  • Rwanda's Responsiveness: Positive Conditionality and Governance Aid
  • The Rwandan Government's Survival Strategies
  • Strong Domestic Opposition and Threats to Regime Survival
  • Survival Strategies: Building the Foundation for State Reform, Managing Arenas of Contestation and Using Low-intensity Coercion
  • Rwanda: Strongly Aid Dependent on the EU in the Early 2000s
  • China: No Alternative Cooperation Partner in the Early 2000s
  • 3.3 Rwanda Proactively Engaging with the EU in the Late 2000s Despite China Looming
  • The EU's Good Governance Strategies Between 2006 and 2011
  • The EU's Approach: Promoting Democratic Government
  • The EU's Instruments: Cooperative-Rewarding
  • The Rwandan Government's Responsiveness: (Pro)Active Engagement
  • Rwanda's Responsiveness: Political and Aid Policy Dialogues
  • Rwanda's Responsiveness: Positive Conditionality
  • Rwanda's Responsiveness: Governance Aid
  • The Rwandan Government's Survival Strategies
  • A Period of Regime Stability with Few Threats to Regime Survival.
  • Survival Strategies I: Strengthening the Effectiveness of Government Institutions to Improve Public Goods Provision
  • Survival Strategies II: Using Arenas of Contestation and Low-intensity Coercion to Prevent Challenges from the Opposition
  • Rwanda's Economic Dependence on the EU
  • China: Becoming More Important, But No Alternative Cooperation Partner (Yet)
  • China: More Important, But No Alternative Economic Cooperation Partner
  • Chinese 'Model' Attractive, But Little Chinese Support for Rwanda's Survival Strategies
  • 3.4 A U-turn in the EU's Strategies in 2012 But Little Change in Rwanda's Responsiveness
  • Rwanda's Survival Strategies and Economic Dependence on the EU
  • Signs of a Gradual Change in China's Policy Towards Rwanda?
  • Outlook: What Prospects for Strengthening Economic Cooperation with China?
  • 3.5 Conclusions
  • 2000-2005: Why Was Rwanda Reluctant to Engage with the EU in Governance Reforms?
  • 2006-2011: Why Did Rwanda Increasingly (Pro)actively Engage?
  • The 2012 Crisis and Its Aftermath: Why Has Rwanda Continued to Engage?
  • What If…?
  • Outlook
  • Chapter 4: Ethiopia
  • 4.1 Structural Factors Shaping Ethiopia's Survival Strategies
  • 4.2 Ethiopia Reluctantly Engaging with the EU in the Early 2000s
  • The EU' Good Governance Strategies Between 2000 and 2005
  • The EU's Approach: Promoting Democratic Government
  • The EU's Instruments: Cooperative-Critical
  • The Ethiopian Government's Responsiveness: Reluctant Engagement Between 2000 and 2005
  • Ethiopia's Responsiveness: Political and Aid Policy Dialogues
  • Ethiopia's Responsiveness: Positive Conditionality and Governance Aid
  • The Ethiopian Government's Survival Strategies
  • Strong Threats to Regime Survival: A Split in the Ruling Elite
  • Survival Strategies I: Subordinating the Party to the State.
  • Survival Strategies II: Managing Arenas of Contestation and Low-­Intensity Coercion
  • Ethiopia's Economic Dependence on the EU Between 2000 and 2005
  • China: Limited Engagement Between 2000 and 2005
  • 4.3 The 2005 Election Crisis: A Turning Point in EU-Ethiopia relations
  • The EU's Good Governance Strategy
  • The Ethiopian Government's Response: Indifference
  • The Costs and Benefits for Ethiopia of Ceasing to Engage with the EU
  • China's Support During the 2005 Election Crisis: Reducing Donor Pressure
  • 4.4 Ethiopia Reluctantly Engaging with the EU in the Late 2000s Despite China's Strong Presence
  • EU Good Governance Strategies and Ethiopia's Responsiveness
  • The EU's Approach: Promoting Democratic Governance
  • The EU's Instruments: Cooperative-Critical
  • Ethiopia's Responsiveness Between 2006 and 2010: Reluctant Engagement
  • Ethiopia's Responsiveness: Political Dialogue
  • Ethiopia's Responsiveness: Aid Policy Dialogues
  • Ethiopia's Responsiveness: Positive Conditionality and Governance Aid
  • The Ethiopian Government's Survival Strategies
  • Survival Strategies I: Subordinating the State to the Party
  • Survival Strategies II: Managing Arenas of Contestation and Using Low-Intensity Coercion
  • Ethiopia's Economic Dependence on the EU
  • China: Alternative Cooperation Partner Since 2006
  • China: Becoming an Alternative Economic Cooperation Partner
  • Attractiveness of the China 'Model' and Support for Survival Strategies
  • Party-to-Party Relations
  • 4.5 Brief Breeze of Change in EU-Ethiopia Cooperation Between 2011 and 2014
  • 4.6 Conclusions
  • Why Has Ethiopia Only Reluctantly Engaged in Governance Reforms Between 2000 and 2005?
  • The 2005 Elections: Cooperating with the EU on Governance Reforms Threatens Regime Survival
  • Why Ethiopia Continued to Reluctantly Engage Between 2006 and the 2010 Elections.
  • Why Has Ethiopia Again Become More Forthcoming to Engage Between 2011 and 2014?
  • What If…?
  • Outlook
  • Chapter 5: Angola
  • 5.1 Structural Factors Shaping Angola's Survival Strategies
  • 5.2 Angola Reluctantly Engaging in Governance Reforms in the Early 2000s Despite China Emerging
  • The EU's Good Governance Strategies Between 2000 and 2005
  • The EU's Approach: Promoting Democratic Government
  • The EU's Instruments: Cooperative-Critical
  • 2000-2005: Angola Started to Very Reluctantly Engage
  • Angola's Responsiveness: Political and Aid Policy Dialogues
  • Angola's Responsiveness: Governance Aid and Positive Conditionality
  • The Angolan Government's Survival Strategies
  • Little Domestic Opposition and Challenge to Regime Survival
  • Using State Institutions and the Party for Cooptation
  • Managing Arenas of Contestation: Elections
  • Angola's Economic Dependence on the EU
  • China: Becoming an Alternative Economic Cooperation Partner
  • 5.3 The Late 2000s: Angola Largely Indifferent Towards EU Demands to Engage on Governance Reforms Even Though the EU Narrows Its Strategies
  • EU Good Governance Strategies and Angola's Responsiveness
  • The EU's Approach: Promoting Effective Government
  • The EU's Instruments: Cooperative Strategy
  • Angola Remained Largely Indifferent to Demands for Cooperation from 2006 to 2014
  • Angola's Responsiveness: Political and Aid Policy Dialogues
  • Angola's Responsiveness: Governance Aid and Positive Conditionality
  • The Angolan Government's Survival Strategies
  • Mounting Opposition from Outside and Within the Ruling Elite
  • Boosting the Ruling Party as a Vehicle for Cooptation
  • Using Formal and Informal State Institutions for Cooptation Rather than Provision of Public Services
  • Low-intensity Coercion and Managing Arenas of Contestation
  • Angola's Economic Dependence on the EU.
  • China: Alternative Economic Cooperation Partner.

Similar Items