Complications and Quandaries in the ICT Sector : : Standard Essential Patents and Competition Issues.

• Author: Bharadwaj, Ashish.
• TeilnehmendeR: Devaiah, Vishwas H.; Gupta, Indranath.
• Place / Publishing House: Singapore : : Springer Singapore Pte. Limited,, 2017.; Ã2018.
• Year of Publication: 2017
• Edition: 1st ed.
• Language: English
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (218 pages)

Table of Contents

• Intro
• Acknowledgements
• Contents
• Editors and Contributors
• Introduction
• 1 National Disparities and Standards Essential Patents: Considerations for India
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Standards and the International Standard-Setting Landscape
• 3 Firm-Level Participation in Standard-Setting
• 4 Patents and Standards
• 4.1 Patenting Standards
• 4.2 SSO Patent Policies
• 5 Impact of Patents on International Participation in Standard-Setting
• 5.1 Patenting by SSO Participants
• 5.2 Patent Licensing Dynamics
• 6 Potential Responses
• 6.1 Embrace the Status Quo
• 6.2 Adopt Protectionist Measures
• 6.3 Increase Patenting by Local Firms
• 6.4 Benefits of Increased SSO Participation by Local Firms
• 6.5 Incentivizing Increased SSO Participation
• 6.6 Applications in India
• 7 Conclusion
• 2 FRAND Commitments and Royalties for Standard Essential Patents
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Industry Standards
• 3 Standard Setting Organizations and Standard Essential Patent Licensing
• 4 SSO Licensing Policies and FRAND Commitments
• 5 FRAND Terms Determination and Recent U.S. Court Decisions
• 5.1 FRAND Commitments Are Binding
• 5.2 Additional Requirements for FRAND Analysis
• 6 Impact of FRAND on Patent Royalties
• 7 Federal Circuit Ruling on CSIRO and the Relevance of FRAND Commitments
• 8 Conclusion
• 3 The Policy Implications of Licensing Standard Essential FRAND-Committed Patents in Bundles
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Important Economic Principles
• 2.1 The Single Rent Theorem
• 2.2 The Economic Literature on Bundling
• 3 Tying and Bundling with FRAND-Committed Patents
• 3.1 Patent Holders with Licensing Options Outside of the Standard-An Alternative Interpretation of B and S
• 3.2 Licensing FRAND-Committed and Non-FRAND-Committed Patents Together
• 4 Policy Implications.
• 4 Calculating FRAND Licensing Fees: A Proposal of Basic Pro-competitive Criteria
• 1 Introduction
• 2 First Step: Precise Identification of, and Fees' Strictly Proportional to, the Technology to Be Effectively Adopted by the Willing Licensees
• 3 Second Step: Royalties Determination Ex ante, i.e., Taking into Account the Value of the Patent Prior to the Standard Setting
• 4 Third Step: Looking at the Overall Licensing Scenario and Royalty Stacking Issues
• 5 Fourth Step: Dynamic Approach to FRAND Royalties' Determination
• 6 Conclusion
• 5 Selected Issues in SEP Licensing in Europe: The Antitrust Perspective
• 1 Introduction
• 2 The Standardization Process, Its Benefits and the Risks for Competition
• 3 The FRAND Commitment
• 4 Portfolio Licensing
• 4.1 Patent Law Issues
• 4.2 EU Competition Law Issues
• 4.3 Component-Level Licensing
• 5 SEP Transfers and PAEs
• 5.1 Potential Issues
• 6 Competition, Intellectual Property Rights and Collaboratively Set Standards: Federal Trade Commission Advocacy and Enforcement
• 1 Introduction
• 1.1 The FTC's Tools to Promote Innovation and Competition
• 1.2 The Intersection of Intellectual Property Law and Antitrust Law
• 2 FTC Policy Reports Discuss Economic Issues Raised by Collaborative Standard Setting
• 3 The FTC's Enforcement and Advocacy Regarding Standardization in the 1980s
• 3.1 American Society of Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel Corporation
• 3.2 In re American Society of Sanitary Engineering
• 3.3 Allied Tube &amp
• Conduit Corporation v. Indian Head, Inc.
• 4 The FTC's Enforcement Regarding Standard Setting Conduct Involving Patented Technologies
• 4.1 In re Dell Computer Corporation
• 4.2 In re Union Oil Company of California
• 4.3 In re Rambus, Incorporated
• 4.4 In re Negotiated Data Solutions.
• 5 The FTC's Enforcement and Advocacy Regarding the Voluntary FRAND Commitment
• 5.1 The Interpretation of the FRAND Commitment
• 5.2 Competition Advocacy Regarding Remedies for Infringement of a FRAND-Encumbered Patent
• 5.3 Enforcement Actions Regarding Seeking Injunctive Relief on FRAND-Encumbered Patents
• 5.3.1 In re Robert Bosch GmbH
• 5.3.2 In re Google, Inc. and Motorola Mobility, Inc.
• 6 Conclusion
• 7 Standard Setting Organizations and Competition Laws: Lessons and Suggestions from the United States
• 1 Introduction
• 2 The Holdup Problem
• 2.1 Disclosure of Standard-Essential Patents
• 2.2 RAND Commitments
• 3 Do U.S. Antitrust Laws Require Vague Royalty Commitments?
• 3.1 Relevant Antitrust Principles
• 3.2 The Standards Development Organization Advancement Act
• 3.3 Statements of Antitrust Enforcers
• 3.4 Required Disclosure of License Demands
• 4 Recommendations
• 4.1 Mandatory Disclosures
• 4.2 Precautions
• 5 Conclusion
• 8 FRAND in India
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Hold-Up and Hold-Out
• 3 U.S. and EU Law on Injunctive Relief for FRAND-Assured SEPs
• 4 The Case Against Special Legislation or Amendments to Regulate FRAND Licensing
• 5 The Dangers of Adopting a One-Size-Fits-All Template for SDOs
• 6 Problems with Regulating Royalty Rates or Prohibiting "Excessive Pricing"
• 7 Non-disclosure Agreements and Transparency
• 8 Settlement and Remedies for Disputes Involving FRAND-Assured SEPs
• 9 Conclusion
• 9 CCI's Investigation of Abuse of Dominance: Adjudicatory Traits in Prima Facie Opinion
• 1 Introduction
• 2 CCI v Ericsson: The Jurisdiction of CCI Upheld by Delhi High Court
• 3 Initial Investigation Orders by CCI
• 3.1 Abuse of Dominance Investigation Under the Competition Act
• 3.2 Prima Facie Order of Investigation: Guidelines from Non-ICT Cases.
• 4 The Practice Followed by CCI in Prima Facie Orders and the ICT Sector
• 5 Information Considered at the Prima Facie Stage in ICT Sector
• 6 Conclusion.