Reopening public facilities after a biological attack : a decision making framework / / Committee on Standards and Policies for Decontaminating Public Facilities Affected by Exposure to Harmful Biological Agents: How Clean is Safe?.

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Year of Publication:2005
Language:English
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Physical Description:xiii, 210 p. :; ill.
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id 5003564102
ctrlnum (MiAaPQ)5003564102
(Au-PeEL)EBL3564102
(CaPaEBR)ebr10160717
(OCoLC)70143642
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spelling National Research Council (U.S.). Committee on Standards and Policies for Decontaminating Public Facilities Affected by Exposure to Harmful Biological Agents: How Clean Is Safe?
Reopening public facilities after a biological attack [electronic resource] : a decision making framework / Committee on Standards and Policies for Decontaminating Public Facilities Affected by Exposure to Harmful Biological Agents: How Clean is Safe?.
Washington, D.C. : National Academies Press, c2005.
xiii, 210 p. : ill.
Introduction -- 2001 attacks and cleanup -- Context of the study and charge to the Committee -- Content and structure -- Infectious disease threats -- Ability of microorganisms to infect people -- Infectious disease as a weapon -- Agents of concern to national security and public health -- Biological agents considered in this report -- Policy precedents in decontamination -- Microbial decontamination in food and water supplies -- Biosafety in microbiological and biomedical laboratories -- Environmental infection control in health care facilities -- Decontamination of U.S. Army Biological Warfare laboratories -- Development of Superfund and remediation plans -- Remediation experiences in the U.S. nuclear weapons complex -- Anthrax decontamination after the 2001 attacks: social and political context -- Uncertain science, certain social division -- Case study selection -- Framework for event management -- Hazard identification and assessment -- Identification of the agent -- Evaluating the state of the agent -- Evaluating the state of the contaminated building -- Factors influencing exposure to harmful biological agents in indoor environments -- Exposure -- Sources -- Building design and operations -- Heating, ventilating, and air conditioning systems -- Transport and fate of harmful biological agents -- Deposition -- Resuspension -- Preparing and operating buildings for a bioterrorism attack and subsequent operation -- Analyzing health risks -- Assessment of risks posed by a biological hazard -- Dose-response: principles and uncertainties -- Sampling strategies and technologies -- Sampling and identification -- General sampling plan for quantifying the extent of cleanup -- Decontamination practices and principles -- Processes for decontamination of harmful biological agents and other response options --Decontamination of harmful biological agents by chemical and physical methods -- Examples of decontamination: Hart Senate Office Building and American Media International Building
Safe reoccupation of a facility -- Planning for biological agent attack -- Buildings declared contaminated -- Harmful biological agents in a public facility: the airport scenario -- Planning can make a major difference --All findings and recommendations -- Other relevant case studies -- Were the 2001 anthrax exposures consistent with dose-response: the case of the AMI building.
Also available on the World Wide Web. Viewed: 09/08/2005.
Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest, 2016. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest affiliated libraries.
Bioterrorism.
Emergency management United States.
Civil defense United States.
Electronic books.
ProQuest (Firm)
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oeawat/detail.action?docID=3564102 Click to View
language English
format Electronic
eBook
author2 ProQuest (Firm)
author_facet ProQuest (Firm)
National Research Council (U.S.). Committee on Standards and Policies for Decontaminating Public Facilities Affected by Exposure to Harmful Biological Agents: How Clean Is Safe?
ProQuest (Firm)
author2_role TeilnehmendeR
author_corporate National Research Council (U.S.). Committee on Standards and Policies for Decontaminating Public Facilities Affected by Exposure to Harmful Biological Agents: How Clean Is Safe?
ProQuest (Firm)
author_sort National Research Council (U.S.). Committee on Standards and Policies for Decontaminating Public Facilities Affected by Exposure to Harmful Biological Agents: How Clean Is Safe?
title Reopening public facilities after a biological attack a decision making framework /
spellingShingle Reopening public facilities after a biological attack a decision making framework /
Introduction -- 2001 attacks and cleanup -- Context of the study and charge to the Committee -- Content and structure -- Infectious disease threats -- Ability of microorganisms to infect people -- Infectious disease as a weapon -- Agents of concern to national security and public health -- Biological agents considered in this report -- Policy precedents in decontamination -- Microbial decontamination in food and water supplies -- Biosafety in microbiological and biomedical laboratories -- Environmental infection control in health care facilities -- Decontamination of U.S. Army Biological Warfare laboratories -- Development of Superfund and remediation plans -- Remediation experiences in the U.S. nuclear weapons complex -- Anthrax decontamination after the 2001 attacks: social and political context -- Uncertain science, certain social division -- Case study selection -- Framework for event management -- Hazard identification and assessment -- Identification of the agent -- Evaluating the state of the agent -- Evaluating the state of the contaminated building -- Factors influencing exposure to harmful biological agents in indoor environments -- Exposure -- Sources -- Building design and operations -- Heating, ventilating, and air conditioning systems -- Transport and fate of harmful biological agents -- Deposition -- Resuspension -- Preparing and operating buildings for a bioterrorism attack and subsequent operation -- Analyzing health risks -- Assessment of risks posed by a biological hazard -- Dose-response: principles and uncertainties -- Sampling strategies and technologies -- Sampling and identification -- General sampling plan for quantifying the extent of cleanup -- Decontamination practices and principles -- Processes for decontamination of harmful biological agents and other response options --Decontamination of harmful biological agents by chemical and physical methods -- Examples of decontamination: Hart Senate Office Building and American Media International Building
Safe reoccupation of a facility -- Planning for biological agent attack -- Buildings declared contaminated -- Harmful biological agents in a public facility: the airport scenario -- Planning can make a major difference --All findings and recommendations -- Other relevant case studies -- Were the 2001 anthrax exposures consistent with dose-response: the case of the AMI building.
title_sub a decision making framework /
title_full Reopening public facilities after a biological attack [electronic resource] : a decision making framework / Committee on Standards and Policies for Decontaminating Public Facilities Affected by Exposure to Harmful Biological Agents: How Clean is Safe?.
title_fullStr Reopening public facilities after a biological attack [electronic resource] : a decision making framework / Committee on Standards and Policies for Decontaminating Public Facilities Affected by Exposure to Harmful Biological Agents: How Clean is Safe?.
title_full_unstemmed Reopening public facilities after a biological attack [electronic resource] : a decision making framework / Committee on Standards and Policies for Decontaminating Public Facilities Affected by Exposure to Harmful Biological Agents: How Clean is Safe?.
title_auth Reopening public facilities after a biological attack a decision making framework /
title_new Reopening public facilities after a biological attack
title_sort reopening public facilities after a biological attack a decision making framework /
publisher National Academies Press,
publishDate 2005
physical xiii, 210 p. : ill.
Also available on the World Wide Web. Viewed: 09/08/2005.
contents Introduction -- 2001 attacks and cleanup -- Context of the study and charge to the Committee -- Content and structure -- Infectious disease threats -- Ability of microorganisms to infect people -- Infectious disease as a weapon -- Agents of concern to national security and public health -- Biological agents considered in this report -- Policy precedents in decontamination -- Microbial decontamination in food and water supplies -- Biosafety in microbiological and biomedical laboratories -- Environmental infection control in health care facilities -- Decontamination of U.S. Army Biological Warfare laboratories -- Development of Superfund and remediation plans -- Remediation experiences in the U.S. nuclear weapons complex -- Anthrax decontamination after the 2001 attacks: social and political context -- Uncertain science, certain social division -- Case study selection -- Framework for event management -- Hazard identification and assessment -- Identification of the agent -- Evaluating the state of the agent -- Evaluating the state of the contaminated building -- Factors influencing exposure to harmful biological agents in indoor environments -- Exposure -- Sources -- Building design and operations -- Heating, ventilating, and air conditioning systems -- Transport and fate of harmful biological agents -- Deposition -- Resuspension -- Preparing and operating buildings for a bioterrorism attack and subsequent operation -- Analyzing health risks -- Assessment of risks posed by a biological hazard -- Dose-response: principles and uncertainties -- Sampling strategies and technologies -- Sampling and identification -- General sampling plan for quantifying the extent of cleanup -- Decontamination practices and principles -- Processes for decontamination of harmful biological agents and other response options --Decontamination of harmful biological agents by chemical and physical methods -- Examples of decontamination: Hart Senate Office Building and American Media International Building
Safe reoccupation of a facility -- Planning for biological agent attack -- Buildings declared contaminated -- Harmful biological agents in a public facility: the airport scenario -- Planning can make a major difference --All findings and recommendations -- Other relevant case studies -- Were the 2001 anthrax exposures consistent with dose-response: the case of the AMI building.
callnumber-first R - Medicine
callnumber-subject RC - Internal Medicine
callnumber-label RC88
callnumber-sort RC 288.9 T47 N27 42005
genre Electronic books.
genre_facet Electronic books.
geographic_facet United States.
url https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oeawat/detail.action?docID=3564102
illustrated Illustrated
dewey-hundreds 300 - Social sciences
dewey-tens 360 - Social problems & social services
dewey-ones 363 - Other social problems & services
dewey-full 363.34/97
dewey-sort 3363.34 297
dewey-raw 363.34/97
dewey-search 363.34/97
oclc_num 70143642
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