Institutional games and the U.S. Supreme Court / edited by James R. Rogers, Roy B. Flemming, and Jon R. Bond.
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| Year of Publication: | 2006 |
| Language: | English |
| Series: | Constitutionalism and democracy
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| Physical Description: | xix, 335 p. :; ill. |
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Table of Contents:
- Strategic games with Congress and the states
- Statutory battles and constitutional wars : Congress and the Supreme Court / Andrew D. Martin
- Why expert judges defer to (almost) ignorant legislators : accounting for the puzzle of judicial deference / James R. Rogers
- Institutions and independence in models of judicial review / Christopher Zorn
- "John Marshall has made his decision" : implementation, transparency, and public support / Georg Vanberg
- Court-state interactions : national judicial power and the dormant commerce clause / Clifford J. Carrubba and James R. Rogers
- Strategic games within the judicial hierarchy
- A court of appeals in a rational-choice model of Supreme Court decision making / Thomas H. Hammond, Chris W. Bonneau, and Reginald S. Sheehan
- Appeals mechanisms, litigant selection, and the structure of judicial hierarchies / Charles M. Cameron and Lewis A. Kornhauser
- Informative precedent and intrajudicial communications / Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Matthew Stephenson
- Decision making by an agent with multiple principals : environmental policy in the U.S. courts of appeals / Stefanie A. Lindquist and Susan B. Haire
- Afterword : studying courts formally / Lawrence Baum
- Appendix: a primer on game theory / James R. Rogers.