Agency Theory : : A Structured Approach to Writing Contracts.
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Superior document: | Forschungsergebnisse der Wirtschaftsuniversitaet Wien Series ; v.3 |
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Place / Publishing House: | Frankfurt a.M. : : Peter Lang GmbH, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften,, 2004. Ã2005. |
Year of Publication: | 2004 |
Edition: | 1st ed. |
Language: | English |
Series: | Forschungsergebnisse der Wirtschaftsuniversitaet Wien Series
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Online Access: | |
Physical Description: | 1 online resource (246 pages) |
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100 | 1 | |a Stremitzer, Alexander. | |
245 | 1 | 0 | |a Agency Theory : |b A Structured Approach to Writing Contracts. |
250 | |a 1st ed. | ||
264 | 1 | |a Frankfurt a.M. : |b Peter Lang GmbH, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften, |c 2004. | |
264 | 4 | |c Ã2005. | |
300 | |a 1 online resource (246 pages) | ||
336 | |a text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
337 | |a computer |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
338 | |a online resource |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
490 | 1 | |a Forschungsergebnisse der Wirtschaftsuniversitaet Wien Series ; |v v.3 | |
505 | 0 | |a Cover -- I INTRODUCTION -- 1 The Contracting Problem -- 2 Applications -- 3 Models of Contracting -- 4 Obsession with Modeling Single Effects -- 5 Methodological Reflection -- 6 A Note to the Reader -- II EPISTEMIC PROBLEMS AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE -- 1 Overview -- 2 The Objectives of Science -- 3 What makes Science scientific? -- 4 Absolute Justification -- 4.1 Basic Concepts of Cognition -- 4.2 Strategies to derive scientific statements -- 4.2.1 Introduction -- 4.2.2 Inductivism -- 4.2.3 Pragmatism - Foundation by Method -- 4.2.4 Falsificationism -- 4.2.5 Conclusion -- 5 Beyond Absolute Justification -- 5.1 Against Scepticism -- 5.2 Dogmatism -- 5.3 Common Sense -- 5.4 An Axiomatic Approach -- 6 The First Principle: Its Cognitive Status -- 6.1 Consequences of Relativism -- 6.2 Overcoming Relativism -- 7 Methodological Implications -- III THE METHOD OF ECONOMICS AND CONTRACT THEORY -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Overview -- 3 Instrumentalism vs. Realism -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Natural vs. Social Sciences -- 4 Methodological Individualism -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Rational Choice -- 4.2.1 Choice under Certainty -- 4.2.2 Choice under Uncertainty -- 4.3 A Remark on Game Theory -- 4.4 Defending Rational Choice on Normative Grounds -- 4.5 Economics as a Formal vs. Real Science -- 4.6 Realism of Assumptions -- 4.7 Defending Homo Oeconomicus -- 4.7.1 Introduction -- 4.7.2 Relevant Situations -- 4.7.3 Scope of Concepts -- 4.7.4 Robustness - Worst Case -- 4.7.5 Instrumentalism in Modeling -- 4.8 Bounded Rationality vs. Unconscious Rationality -- 4.8.1 Introduction -- 4.8.2 The Evolutionary Mechanism -- 4.8.3 Method of Evolutionary Economics -- 4.9 Piecemeal Social Engineering -- 4.10 Objection of Historicism -- 5< -- tab/> -- Introspection in Economics -- 5.1 Internal dimension and Instability -- 5.2 Blackboxing vs. Qualitative Method. | |
505 | 8 | |a 5.3 Heuristic or Independent Source? -- 5.4 The Hermeneutical Method and a priorism -- 6 Empirical Methods -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Reviving Monism -- 6.2.1 Theory of Revealed Preferences -- 6.2.2 Panphysicalism -- 6.3 Interviews -- 6.4 Controlled Experiment -- 6.5 Econometrics - Historical Experiment -- 6.6 Informal evidence -- 6.7 The Problem of Aggregation -- 6.8 Macro modeling: Beyond Methodological Individualism -- 6.9 Verificationism vs. Falsifications: A Normative Evaluation -- 7 Applied Microeconomics -- 7.1 Applied Microeconomics as an Art -- 7.2 Convergence of Applied Microeconomics and BWL -- 8 Model of Optimal Contract Design -- 8.1 Economics of Institutions -- 8.2 Solving for the Optimal Contract -- 8.3 The Rationale for the Micro-foundation -- 8.4 A Structured Approach -- 9 Practical Life and Theory -- IV ANALYTICAL AGENCY MODELS -- 1 Overview -- 2 The Classical Risk-Incentive Trade-Off -- 2.1 The Basic Model -- 2.1.1 Introduction -- 2.1.2 Modeling Assumptions -- 2.1.3 Contractible Effort -- 2.1.4 Uncontractible Effort -- 2.1.5 Discussion -- 2.2 Risk-Incentive Trade-off for Linear Contracts -- 2.2.1 Introduction -- 2.2.2 Modeling Assumptions -- 2.2.3 The Model -- 2.2.4 Discussion -- 2.2.5 Appendix -- 2.3 Risk Sharing -- 2.3.1 Introduction -- 2.3.2 The Model -- 2.3.3 Model Extension: Diversification -- 2.3.4 Discussion -- 2.4 The Optimal Contract -- 2.4.1 Introduction -- 2.4.2 Mechanics of the Optimal Sharing Rule -- 2.4.3 The Case for Linear Contracts -- 2.4.4 Valuable Information -- 2.4.5 Discussion -- 2.5 Limitations and Extensions -- 3 Error in judgement, Bankruptcy -- 3.1 Input Monitoring -- 3.1.1 Introduction -- 3.1.2 Modeling Assumptions -- 3.1.3 Absence of both Error and Bankruptcy Constraint -- 3.1.4 Bankruptcy constraint -- 3.1.5 Extension: The role of Agent Risk Averseness -- 3.1.6 Presence of Error -- 3.1.7 Discussion. | |
505 | 8 | |a 3.2 Output Monitoring -- 3.2.1 Introduction -- 3.2.2 Shifting Support -- 3.2.3 Moral Hazard with respect to Risk -- 3.2.4 Discussion -- 4 Transaction Cost, Bonding, Distortion -- 4.1 Transaction Cost and Bonding -- 4.2 Distortion -- 4.2.1 Introduction -- 4.2.2 The Model -- 4.2.3 Discussion -- 5 Dynamic Extensions -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Income smoothing -- 5.2.1 Introduction -- 5.2.2 The Model -- 5.2.3 Discussion -- 5.3 Reputation Effects in Supergames -- 5.3.1 Introduction -- 5.3.2 Observable but Uncontractible Effort -- 5.3.3 Observable but Uncontractible Output -- 5.3.4 Reinterpretation of the Discount rate -- 5.3.5 A Multiparty Extension -- 5.3.6 Discussion -- 5.4 Career Concerns - Learning -- 5.4.1 Introduction -- 5.4.2 The Basic Model -- 5.4.3 Extension: Adding Innovation -- 5.4.4 Disequilibrium - Transient Effects -- 5.4.5 Discussion -- V CONCLUSIONS -- 1.1 Results -- 1.2 Checklist -- 1.3 Outlook. | |
588 | |a Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources. | ||
590 | |a Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries. | ||
655 | 4 | |a Electronic books. | |
776 | 0 | 8 | |i Print version: |a Stremitzer, Alexander |t Agency Theory: Methodology, Analysis |d Frankfurt a.M. : Peter Lang GmbH, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften,c2004 |z 9783631529737 |
797 | 2 | |a ProQuest (Firm) | |
830 | 0 | |a Forschungsergebnisse der Wirtschaftsuniversitaet Wien Series | |
856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oeawat/detail.action?docID=30685986 |z Click to View |