The Effectiveness of General Anti-Avoidance Rules : : Their Limits, Challenges and Potential in EU and International Tax Law.
The book analyzes two destination-based corporate tax models, their application to different types of digitalized business models, and their compliance with tax and data protection law frameworks.
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Superior document: | IBFD Doctoral Series ; v.65 |
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Place / Publishing House: | Amsterdam : : IBFD Publications USA, Incorporated,, 2022. ©2022. |
Year of Publication: | 2022 |
Edition: | 1st ed. |
Language: | English |
Series: | IBFD Doctoral Series
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Online Access: | |
Physical Description: | 1 online resource (325 pages) |
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Table of Contents:
- Cover
- IBFD Doctoral Series
- Title
- Copyright
- Table of Contents
- Preface
- Abbreviations
- Chapter 1: Introduction
- 1.1. The future of international taxation: The 2020s compromise?
- 1.2. The interdisciplinary field of tax law and economics
- 1.3. Methodology
- 1.4. Terminology
- 1.4.1. Tax evasion
- 1.4.2. Tax avoidance and tax abuse
- Chapter 2: Tax Policy in a Time of Crisis: Ensuring the Tax Revenue
- 2.1. Introduction to the global tax arena
- 2.2. The history of the international tax system: The harmonization vs. tax competition controversy
- 2.2.1. The global network of tax treaties
- 2.3. The international standards set by the OECD Model
- 2.3.1. The 1920s compromise: A system welded for tax competition
- 2.4. Alleviating double taxation by allocating tax revenue
- 2.4.1. Different forms of double taxation
- 2.4.2. A brief history of relieving double taxation
- 2.4.2.1. The economic consequences of double taxation
- 2.4.2.2. Checking tax evasion
- 2.4.2.3. Allocation rules for dividends and interest
- 2.4.3. The formation of the OECD
- 2.5. Corporate tax and how to avoid it
- 2.5.1. The role of the corporate form
- 2.5.2. Nexus and the notion of treaty residence
- 2.5.3. Distributive rules
- 2.5.3.1. The conduit company method
- 2.5.3.2. The last-minute restructuring method
- 2.5.4. The impact of the PPT
- 2.6. Economic substance: The ailment or the cure?
- 2.6.1. Transfer pricing as a method to allocate profit
- 2.6.2. Economic substance to counter abuse: BEPS Action 6
- 2.6.2.1. Action 6: Preamble
- 2.6.2.2. The treaty abuse rule in article 7: The PPT
- 2.7. The multilateral instrument (MLI)
- 2.8. Summary: Treaty shopping, directive shopping and withholding taxes
- Chapter 3: Preventing Treaty Abuse within the OECD Framework.
- 3.1. From preventing double taxation to further preventing treaty abuse
- 3.2. Combating BEPS
- 3.3. Improper use of tax treaties and treaty shopping
- 3.4. From beneficial ownership to a PPT
- 3.4.1. The 1963 and 1977 OECD Models
- 3.4.2. The 1986 OECD Conduit Companies Report
- 3.4.3. The 1992 update to the OECD Model Commentary
- 3.4.4. The 1998 Report on Harmful Tax Competition and the 2002 Report Restricting the Entitlement to Treaty Benefits
- 3.4.5. The 2003 update to the OECD Model Commentary
- 3.4.6. The 2014 update to the OECD Model Commentary
- 3.4.7. The 2017 update to the OECD Model Commentary
- 3.5. Preliminary conclusion
- Chapter 4: Judicial Anti-Avoidance in the European Union
- 4.1. Introduction
- 4.2. The specific nature of EU tax law
- 4.3. The methodological and constitutional nature of EU direct tax law
- 4.3.1. The internal market in the BEPS era
- 4.3.2. EU primary law - The treaties and the fundamental freedoms
- 4.3.3. The legal basis of general principles of EU law
- 4.3.4. The effect of a general principle in EU law
- 4.4. The case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union
- 4.4.1. Emsland Stärke - The elements of an abuse test
- 4.4.2. Cadbury Schweppes - Wholly artificial arrangements
- 4.4.3. Kofoed - A general principle of prohibition of abuse
- 4.4.4. The Danish beneficial ownership cases
- 4.4.4.1. Background
- 4.4.4.2. Legal framework
- 4.4.4.3. Difference from AG Kokott's opinions
- 4.4.4.4. Understanding the outcome
- 4.4.4.5. Assessing the facts
- 4.4.5. The dividend cases
- 4.4.5.1. T Danmark (C-116/16) - The TDC Case
- 4.4.5.2. Y Denmark (C-117/16) - The NetApp Case
- 4.4.6. The interest cases
- 4.4.6.1. Case C-115/16 - N Luxembourg I - The TDC Parent Case
- 4.4.6.2. Case C-118/16 - X Denmark A/S - The Nycomed/Takeda Case
- 4.4.6.3. Case C-119/16 - C Danmark I.
- 4.4.6.4. Case C-299/16 - Z Denmark
- 4.4.7. The notion of abuse in EU law after the Danish beneficial ownership cases
- 4.4.8. The elements of the abuse test
- 4.4.8.1. The subjective element of the abuse test
- 4.4.9. Balancing the general principles of EU law - Legal certainty and anti-abuse
- 4.4.9.1. The legal nature of the prohibition of abuse of rights under EU law
- 4.4.9.2. The general principle of abuse and the fundamental freedoms
- 4.4.9.3. The principle of abuse and the directives
- 4.5. Preliminary conclusion
- Chapter 5: Alignment between the European Union and the OECD: An Interlocking Relationship
- 5.1. Introduction
- 5.2. Beneficial ownership according to the ECJ: A specific example of alignment
- 5.3. Common standards to combat tax abuse
- 5.4. Disentangling abuse from real economic activity: An economic assessment
- 5.5. Understanding the indications of abuse through economic theory
- 5.5.1. Behavioural theory of corporations
- 5.5.2. The theory of the firm
- 5.6. Everyday hallmarks of economic standards
- 5.6.1. Pre-tax profit
- 5.6.2. Risk and market forces
- 5.6.3. Indifferent parties and intermediaries
- 5.7. Indications of abuse in the subjective element
- 5.7.1. Group structure put in place to obtain a tax advantage
- 5.7.2. Immediate redistribution of dividends or interest
- 5.7.3. Insignificant income
- 5.7.4. Sole activity is redistribution and company lacks personnel and facilities
- 5.7.5. Contractual obligations rendering the company unable to use and enjoy
- 5.7.6. Close connection between the arrangement and new tax legislation
- 5.8. Preliminary conclusion: An economic test to disentangle abuse from real economic activity
- Chapter 6: A Network Analysis to Estimate the Effects of Anti-Avoidance Measures in the European Union and the OECD
- 6.1. Introduction.
- 6.2. Applying the tax treaty network in light of modern international tax policy
- 6.3. Computing the tax benefit of holding structures
- 6.3.1. Case C-116/16: T Danmark - TDC
- 6.3.2. Case C-117/16: Y Denmark - NetApp ApS
- 6.4. Weighing the tax benefits against other business benefits
- 6.5. Assessing the impact of the rulings on treaty shopping gains
- 6.6. Network analysis of treaty shopping
- 6.6.1. The network approach and treaty shopping gains
- 6.6.2. Baseline 2018
- 6.6.3. Scenarios for the analysis
- 6.7. Impact analysis: Scenario results
- 6.7.1. Scenario 1: Denmark unilateral
- 6.7.2. Scenario 2: EU-wide
- 6.7.3. Scenario 3: Inclusive Framework
- 6.7.4. Scenario 4: EU-wide prohibitive penalty
- 6.7.5. Scenario 5: OECD IF (Strong)
- 6.8. Summary of scenario results
- 6.9. Preliminary conclusion
- Chapter 7: Case Studies
- 7.1. Introduction
- 7.2. France
- 7.2.1. Introduction
- 7.2.2. The history of the French GAAR: Fictious arrangements and fraude à la loi
- 7.2.3. Applying the French GAAR
- 7.2.4. The French GAAR and the European Union
- 7.2.4.1. Non-genuine arrangements
- 7.2.4.2. Main purpose/one of the main purposes to obtain a tax advantage
- 7.2.4.3. Case C-6/16 Eqiom SAS &
- Enka SA
- 7.2.4.4. Domestic rulings from the Conseil d'État on 5 June 2020 (nos. 423811, 423809, 423810, 423812 and Enka)
- 7.2.5. The French GAAR and tax treaties
- 7.2.6. Preliminary conclusion
- 7.3. Germany
- 7.3.1. Introduction
- 7.3.2. The history of the German GAAR: Teleological interpretation or statutory provision?
- 7.3.3. Applying the German GAAR
- 7.3.4. The German GAAR and the European Union
- 7.3.4.1. Non-genuine arrangements
- 7.3.4.2. Main/sole purpose
- 7.3.4.3. Cases C-504/16 Deister Holding AG and C-613/16 Juhler Holding A/S
- 7.3.4.4. GS
- 7.3.4.5. X
- 7.3.5. The German GAAR and tax treaties.
- 7.3.6. Preliminary conclusion
- 7.4. Denmark
- 7.4.1. Introduction
- 7.4.2. The (brief) history of the Danish GAAR from 2015
- 7.4.3. Recent rulings involving the Danish GAAR
- 7.4.3.1. SKM2017.333.SR
- 7.4.3.2. SKM2019.413.SR
- 7.4.3.3. SKM2020.39.SR: The first domestic application on "inverted Christmas trees"
- 7.4.4. The Danish GAAR and tax treaties
- 7.4.4.1. SKM2018.466.SR: The "Singapore ruling"
- 7.4.5. Rulings from the High Court of Eastern Denmark on the beneficial ownership cases on dividends
- 7.4.5.1. The TDC Case: C-116/16 T Danmark
- 7.4.5.2. The NetApp Case: C-117/16 Y Denmark ApS
- 7.4.6. Preliminary conclusion
- 7.5. Australia
- 7.5.1. Introduction
- 7.5.2. The Australian GAAR: Literal or purposive interpretation?
- 7.5.3. Applying the GAAR
- 7.5.3.1. Sole/dominant purpose or principal purpose
- 7.5.3.2. Tax benefit
- 7.5.4. Significant case law
- 7.5.4.1. Peabody
- 7.5.4.2. Spotless
- 7.5.4.3. Hart
- 7.5.4.4. RCI
- 7.5.4.5. Futuris
- 7.5.5. Australia's recent GAAR rules dealing with BEPS
- 7.5.6. The Australian GAAR and the OECD Multilateral Instrument
- 7.5.7. Preliminary conclusion
- Chapter 8: Conclusion - Effectiveness of the GAARs
- 8.1. Chapter 1 - Introduction
- 8.2. Chapter 2 - Ensuring the tax revenue
- 8.3. Chapter 3 - Preventing treaty abuse within the OECD framework
- 8.4. Chapter 4 - Judicial anti-avoidance in the European Union
- 8.5. Chapter 5 - Alignment between the European Union and the OECD - An interlocking relationship
- 8.6. Chapter 6 - A network analysis to estimate the effects of anti-avoidance measures in the European Union and the OECD
- 8.7. Chapter 7 - Case studies
- 8.7.1. France
- 8.7.2. Germany
- 8.7.3. Denmark
- 8.7.4. Australia
- 8.8. Final conclusions
- References
- Other Titles in the IBFD Doctoral Series.