The Effectiveness of General Anti-Avoidance Rules : : Their Limits, Challenges and Potential in EU and International Tax Law.

The book analyzes two destination-based corporate tax models, their application to different types of digitalized business models, and their compliance with tax and data protection law frameworks.

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Bibliographic Details
Superior document:IBFD Doctoral Series ; v.65
:
Place / Publishing House:Amsterdam : : IBFD Publications USA, Incorporated,, 2022.
©2022.
Year of Publication:2022
Edition:1st ed.
Language:English
Series:IBFD Doctoral Series
Online Access:
Physical Description:1 online resource (325 pages)
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Table of Contents:
  • Cover
  • IBFD Doctoral Series
  • Title
  • Copyright
  • Table of Contents
  • Preface
  • Abbreviations
  • Chapter 1: Introduction
  • 1.1. The future of international taxation: The 2020s compromise?
  • 1.2. The interdisciplinary field of tax law and economics
  • 1.3. Methodology
  • 1.4. Terminology
  • 1.4.1. Tax evasion
  • 1.4.2. Tax avoidance and tax abuse
  • Chapter 2: Tax Policy in a Time of Crisis: Ensuring the Tax Revenue
  • 2.1. Introduction to the global tax arena
  • 2.2. The history of the international tax system: The harmonization vs. tax competition controversy
  • 2.2.1. The global network of tax treaties
  • 2.3. The international standards set by the OECD Model
  • 2.3.1. The 1920s compromise: A system welded for tax competition
  • 2.4. Alleviating double taxation by allocating tax revenue
  • 2.4.1. Different forms of double taxation
  • 2.4.2. A brief history of relieving double taxation
  • 2.4.2.1. The economic consequences of double taxation
  • 2.4.2.2. Checking tax evasion
  • 2.4.2.3. Allocation rules for dividends and interest
  • 2.4.3. The formation of the OECD
  • 2.5. Corporate tax and how to avoid it
  • 2.5.1. The role of the corporate form
  • 2.5.2. Nexus and the notion of treaty residence
  • 2.5.3. Distributive rules
  • 2.5.3.1. The conduit company method
  • 2.5.3.2. The last-minute restructuring method
  • 2.5.4. The impact of the PPT
  • 2.6. Economic substance: The ailment or the cure?
  • 2.6.1. Transfer pricing as a method to allocate profit
  • 2.6.2. Economic substance to counter abuse: BEPS Action 6
  • 2.6.2.1. Action 6: Preamble
  • 2.6.2.2. The treaty abuse rule in article 7: The PPT
  • 2.7. The multilateral instrument (MLI)
  • 2.8. Summary: Treaty shopping, directive shopping and withholding taxes
  • Chapter 3: Preventing Treaty Abuse within the OECD Framework.
  • 3.1. From preventing double taxation to further preventing treaty abuse
  • 3.2. Combating BEPS
  • 3.3. Improper use of tax treaties and treaty shopping
  • 3.4. From beneficial ownership to a PPT
  • 3.4.1. The 1963 and 1977 OECD Models
  • 3.4.2. The 1986 OECD Conduit Companies Report
  • 3.4.3. The 1992 update to the OECD Model Commentary
  • 3.4.4. The 1998 Report on Harmful Tax Competition and the 2002 Report Restricting the Entitlement to Treaty Benefits
  • 3.4.5. The 2003 update to the OECD Model Commentary
  • 3.4.6. The 2014 update to the OECD Model Commentary
  • 3.4.7. The 2017 update to the OECD Model Commentary
  • 3.5. Preliminary conclusion
  • Chapter 4: Judicial Anti-Avoidance in the European Union
  • 4.1. Introduction
  • 4.2. The specific nature of EU tax law
  • 4.3. The methodological and constitutional nature of EU direct tax law
  • 4.3.1. The internal market in the BEPS era
  • 4.3.2. EU primary law - The treaties and the fundamental freedoms
  • 4.3.3. The legal basis of general principles of EU law
  • 4.3.4. The effect of a general principle in EU law
  • 4.4. The case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union
  • 4.4.1. Emsland Stärke - The elements of an abuse test
  • 4.4.2. Cadbury Schweppes - Wholly artificial arrangements
  • 4.4.3. Kofoed - A general principle of prohibition of abuse
  • 4.4.4. The Danish beneficial ownership cases
  • 4.4.4.1. Background
  • 4.4.4.2. Legal framework
  • 4.4.4.3. Difference from AG Kokott's opinions
  • 4.4.4.4. Understanding the outcome
  • 4.4.4.5. Assessing the facts
  • 4.4.5. The dividend cases
  • 4.4.5.1. T Danmark (C-116/16) - The TDC Case
  • 4.4.5.2. Y Denmark (C-117/16) - The NetApp Case
  • 4.4.6. The interest cases
  • 4.4.6.1. Case C-115/16 - N Luxembourg I - The TDC Parent Case
  • 4.4.6.2. Case C-118/16 - X Denmark A/S - The Nycomed/Takeda Case
  • 4.4.6.3. Case C-119/16 - C Danmark I.
  • 4.4.6.4. Case C-299/16 - Z Denmark
  • 4.4.7. The notion of abuse in EU law after the Danish beneficial ownership cases
  • 4.4.8. The elements of the abuse test
  • 4.4.8.1. The subjective element of the abuse test
  • 4.4.9. Balancing the general principles of EU law - Legal certainty and anti-abuse
  • 4.4.9.1. The legal nature of the prohibition of abuse of rights under EU law
  • 4.4.9.2. The general principle of abuse and the fundamental freedoms
  • 4.4.9.3. The principle of abuse and the directives
  • 4.5. Preliminary conclusion
  • Chapter 5: Alignment between the European Union and the OECD: An Interlocking Relationship
  • 5.1. Introduction
  • 5.2. Beneficial ownership according to the ECJ: A specific example of alignment
  • 5.3. Common standards to combat tax abuse
  • 5.4. Disentangling abuse from real economic activity: An economic assessment
  • 5.5. Understanding the indications of abuse through economic theory
  • 5.5.1. Behavioural theory of corporations
  • 5.5.2. The theory of the firm
  • 5.6. Everyday hallmarks of economic standards
  • 5.6.1. Pre-tax profit
  • 5.6.2. Risk and market forces
  • 5.6.3. Indifferent parties and intermediaries
  • 5.7. Indications of abuse in the subjective element
  • 5.7.1. Group structure put in place to obtain a tax advantage
  • 5.7.2. Immediate redistribution of dividends or interest
  • 5.7.3. Insignificant income
  • 5.7.4. Sole activity is redistribution and company lacks personnel and facilities
  • 5.7.5. Contractual obligations rendering the company unable to use and enjoy
  • 5.7.6. Close connection between the arrangement and new tax legislation
  • 5.8. Preliminary conclusion: An economic test to disentangle abuse from real economic activity
  • Chapter 6: A Network Analysis to Estimate the Effects of Anti-Avoidance Measures in the European Union and the OECD
  • 6.1. Introduction.
  • 6.2. Applying the tax treaty network in light of modern international tax policy
  • 6.3. Computing the tax benefit of holding structures
  • 6.3.1. Case C-116/16: T Danmark - TDC
  • 6.3.2. Case C-117/16: Y Denmark - NetApp ApS
  • 6.4. Weighing the tax benefits against other business benefits
  • 6.5. Assessing the impact of the rulings on treaty shopping gains
  • 6.6. Network analysis of treaty shopping
  • 6.6.1. The network approach and treaty shopping gains
  • 6.6.2. Baseline 2018
  • 6.6.3. Scenarios for the analysis
  • 6.7. Impact analysis: Scenario results
  • 6.7.1. Scenario 1: Denmark unilateral
  • 6.7.2. Scenario 2: EU-wide
  • 6.7.3. Scenario 3: Inclusive Framework
  • 6.7.4. Scenario 4: EU-wide prohibitive penalty
  • 6.7.5. Scenario 5: OECD IF (Strong)
  • 6.8. Summary of scenario results
  • 6.9. Preliminary conclusion
  • Chapter 7: Case Studies
  • 7.1. Introduction
  • 7.2. France
  • 7.2.1. Introduction
  • 7.2.2. The history of the French GAAR: Fictious arrangements and fraude à la loi
  • 7.2.3. Applying the French GAAR
  • 7.2.4. The French GAAR and the European Union
  • 7.2.4.1. Non-genuine arrangements
  • 7.2.4.2. Main purpose/one of the main purposes to obtain a tax advantage
  • 7.2.4.3. Case C-6/16 Eqiom SAS &amp
  • Enka SA
  • 7.2.4.4. Domestic rulings from the Conseil d'État on 5 June 2020 (nos. 423811, 423809, 423810, 423812 and Enka)
  • 7.2.5. The French GAAR and tax treaties
  • 7.2.6. Preliminary conclusion
  • 7.3. Germany
  • 7.3.1. Introduction
  • 7.3.2. The history of the German GAAR: Teleological interpretation or statutory provision?
  • 7.3.3. Applying the German GAAR
  • 7.3.4. The German GAAR and the European Union
  • 7.3.4.1. Non-genuine arrangements
  • 7.3.4.2. Main/sole purpose
  • 7.3.4.3. Cases C-504/16 Deister Holding AG and C-613/16 Juhler Holding A/S
  • 7.3.4.4. GS
  • 7.3.4.5. X
  • 7.3.5. The German GAAR and tax treaties.
  • 7.3.6. Preliminary conclusion
  • 7.4. Denmark
  • 7.4.1. Introduction
  • 7.4.2. The (brief) history of the Danish GAAR from 2015
  • 7.4.3. Recent rulings involving the Danish GAAR
  • 7.4.3.1. SKM2017.333.SR
  • 7.4.3.2. SKM2019.413.SR
  • 7.4.3.3. SKM2020.39.SR: The first domestic application on "inverted Christmas trees"
  • 7.4.4. The Danish GAAR and tax treaties
  • 7.4.4.1. SKM2018.466.SR: The "Singapore ruling"
  • 7.4.5. Rulings from the High Court of Eastern Denmark on the beneficial ownership cases on dividends
  • 7.4.5.1. The TDC Case: C-116/16 T Danmark
  • 7.4.5.2. The NetApp Case: C-117/16 Y Denmark ApS
  • 7.4.6. Preliminary conclusion
  • 7.5. Australia
  • 7.5.1. Introduction
  • 7.5.2. The Australian GAAR: Literal or purposive interpretation?
  • 7.5.3. Applying the GAAR
  • 7.5.3.1. Sole/dominant purpose or principal purpose
  • 7.5.3.2. Tax benefit
  • 7.5.4. Significant case law
  • 7.5.4.1. Peabody
  • 7.5.4.2. Spotless
  • 7.5.4.3. Hart
  • 7.5.4.4. RCI
  • 7.5.4.5. Futuris
  • 7.5.5. Australia's recent GAAR rules dealing with BEPS
  • 7.5.6. The Australian GAAR and the OECD Multilateral Instrument
  • 7.5.7. Preliminary conclusion
  • Chapter 8: Conclusion - Effectiveness of the GAARs
  • 8.1. Chapter 1 - Introduction
  • 8.2. Chapter 2 - Ensuring the tax revenue
  • 8.3. Chapter 3 - Preventing treaty abuse within the OECD framework
  • 8.4. Chapter 4 - Judicial anti-avoidance in the European Union
  • 8.5. Chapter 5 - Alignment between the European Union and the OECD - An interlocking relationship
  • 8.6. Chapter 6 - A network analysis to estimate the effects of anti-avoidance measures in the European Union and the OECD
  • 8.7. Chapter 7 - Case studies
  • 8.7.1. France
  • 8.7.2. Germany
  • 8.7.3. Denmark
  • 8.7.4. Australia
  • 8.8. Final conclusions
  • References
  • Other Titles in the IBFD Doctoral Series.