Improving Effective Coverage in Health : : Do Financial Incentives Work?

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Superior document:Policy Research Reports
:
TeilnehmendeR:
Place / Publishing House:Washington, D. C. : : World Bank Publications,, 2022.
©2022.
Year of Publication:2022
Edition:1st ed.
Language:English
Series:Policy Research Reports
Online Access:
Physical Description:1 online resource (291 pages)
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Table of Contents:
  • Front Cover
  • Contents
  • Foreword
  • Acknowledgments
  • About the Authors
  • Overview
  • Abbreviations
  • Chapter 1 Introduction
  • Introduction
  • Conclusions
  • References
  • Chapter 2 Effective Coverage: A Framework Linking Coverage and Quality
  • Introduction
  • Coverage, quality, and effective coverage
  • Empirical applications
  • Expanding the work on effective coverage by using data collected in health facilities
  • Conclusions
  • Notes
  • References
  • Chapter 3 Quality of Care: A Framework for Measurement
  • Introduction
  • Theoretical framework for assessing quality of care
  • Measuring quality of care for research and policy
  • Conclusions
  • Notes
  • References
  • Chapter 4 Decomposing the Constraints to Quality of Care Using Data on Antenatal Care Consultations from Five Sub-Saharan African Countries
  • Introduction
  • Why antenatal care?
  • Data
  • Results
  • Conclusions
  • Annex 4A: Additional tables and figures
  • Annex 4B: Data
  • References
  • Chapter 5 Performance-Based Financing Improves Coverage of Reproductive, Maternal, and Child Health Interventions
  • Introduction
  • PBF, health system performance, and health worker effort in theory
  • Evidence of the impact of PBF on the quality and quantity of health service delivery in LMICs
  • Impact of PBF on health worker motivation and satisfaction in six countries
  • Results
  • PBF, quality of care, and idle capacity
  • Conclusions
  • Notes
  • References
  • Chapter 6 Policy Alternatives to Performance-Based Financing
  • Introduction
  • Systematic review and meta-analysis of demand- and supply-side financial incentives
  • Comparing the PBF and DFF approaches
  • PBF, DFF, and institutional deliveries
  • PBF, DFF, and baseline effort
  • Complementarities in the PBF and DFF approaches
  • Discussion and conclusions
  • Annex 6A: Additional tables
  • Notes
  • References.
  • Chapter 7 Performance-Based Financing as a Health System Reform and Cautionary Evidence on Performance Pay and Irrelevant Care
  • Introduction
  • Provision of nonindicated treatment in the context of financial incentives
  • PBF as a health system reform
  • Conclusion
  • Notes
  • References
  • Chapter 8 Conclusion and Operational Implications
  • Message 1: Recognize that sustainability is about more than just money
  • Message 2: Support the four facility financing tenets
  • Message 3: Understand PBF incentives in a broader health system context
  • Message 4: Explore opportunities of maturing technologies
  • Building a forward-looking research agenda
  • References
  • Boxes
  • Box O.1 In Focus: Action items for task teams working on health financing reform
  • Box 1.1 In Focus: A short history of performance-based financing and the related evaluation agenda
  • Box 3.1 In Focus: Identifying misuse of care: A case study of malaria treatment in Mali
  • Box 3.2 In Focus: Measuring quality of care and provider effort in antenatal and maternal care
  • Box 4.1 In Focus: Exploring the drivers of variation in the content of care
  • Box 4.2 In Focus: Does discrimination contribute to poor effort?
  • Box 5.1 In Focus: A middle-income country's experience with performance-based financing: The case of Argentina and Plan Nacer and Programa Sumar
  • Box 5.2 In Focus: Theoretical underpinnings of health worker motivation and paying for performance
  • Box 5.3 In Focus: Measurement of worker motivation and satisfaction
  • Box 5.4 In Focus: Heterogeneous effects of performance-based financing on motivation and satisfaction: An example from Nigeria
  • Box 6.1 In Focus: Kyrgyz Republic PBF pilot
  • Box 6.2 In Focus: Demand-side interventions and incentives for increasing preventive screening for noncommunicable diseases in Armenia.
  • Box 6.3 In Focus: Systematic review search results
  • Box 6.4 In Focus: Mean effect size computation and subgroup analysis
  • Box 6.5 In Focus: Effect size heterogeneity
  • Box 6.6 In Focus: Combining supply- and demand-side incentives
  • Box 6.7 In Focus: PBF and equity
  • Box 6.8 In Focus: How do impacts depend on the baseline outcome values? Results from the meta-analysis
  • Box 8.1 In Focus: Combining technological innovations to facilitate strategic purchasing
  • Figures
  • Figure O.1 Effective coverage contours for antenatal care
  • Figure O.2 Lay of the land in centralized health systems in low-income countries
  • Figure O.3 Availability of drugs and consumables, equipment, and other supplies for providing antenatal care
  • Figure O.4 Know-can-do gaps in the provision of antenatal care
  • Figure O.5 Provision of unnecessary care in antenatal care provision in five Sub-Saharan African countries
  • Figure O.6 Impacts of performance-based financing on facility physical capacity in Cameroon and Nigeria
  • Figure O.7 Impacts of performance-based financing on idle capacity-or the know-can-do gap-in Cameroon and Nigeria
  • Figure O.8 Comparison of the pooled impact of performance-based and unconditional facility financing in five Sub-Saharan African countries (Cameroon, Nigeria, Rwanda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe)
  • Figure O.9 Impacts of PBF, vouchers, and conditional cash transfers on the utilization of maternal and child health services: Results from a meta-analysis
  • Figure 1.1 Lay of the land in centralized health systems
  • Figure 1.2 Lay of the land in health systems with the addition of demand- and supply-side incentives
  • Figure 2.1 Utilization, coverage, and effective coverage
  • Figure 2.2 Coverage, quality, effective coverage, and the care cascade
  • Figure 2.3 Effective coverage tree and its decomposition.
  • Figure 2.4 Effective coverage and its decomposition as the product of coverage and quality
  • Figure 2.5 Effective coverage contours and isocurves
  • Figure 2.6 Effective coverage and its decomposition: Antenatal care and pneumonia
  • Figure 2.7 Effective coverage contours for antenatal care
  • Figure 2.8 Effective coverage contours for hypertension treatment
  • Figure 2.9 Effective coverage contours for tuberculosis treatment
  • Figure 2.10 Effective coverage contours for HIV/AIDS treatment in Mozambique, by wealth quintile, 2015
  • Figure 2.11 Effective coverage contours for child malaria and diarrhea treatment
  • Figure 2.12 Effective coverage contours for various medical conditions
  • Figure 2.13 Potential data sources for measuring effective coverage
  • Figure 3.1 Prescriptions for antimalarials in the malaria case study
  • Figure 4.1 Effective antenatal care coverage in five Sub-Saharan African countries
  • Figure 4.2 Availability of drugs and consumables, equipment, and other supplies for providing antenatal care
  • Figure 4.3 Performance in patient-provider interactions during antenatal care
  • Figure B4.1.1 Variation in content of care in patient-provider interactions in antenatal care
  • Figure 4.4 Know-can-do gaps in the provision of antenatal care
  • Figure 4.5 Overuse in antenatal care provision in five Sub-Saharan African countries
  • Figure 4.6 Correlation between idle capacity and provider type
  • Figure B4.2.1 Inequality in the provision of ANC and effective ANC in the Democratic Republic of Congo
  • Figure 4A.1 Know-can-do gaps in the performance of antenatal care in Cameroon
  • Figure 4A.2 Know-can-do gaps in the performance of antenatal care in the Central African Republic
  • Figure 4A.3 Know-can-do gaps in the performance of antenatal care in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
  • Figure 4A.4 Know-can-do gaps in the performance of antenatal care in Nigeria
  • Figure 4A.5 Know-can-do gaps in the performance of antenatal care in the Republic of Congo
  • Figure 5.1 Key factors of performance-based financing that influence population health: An illustration
  • Figure 5.2 Impacts of performance-based financing on facility physical capacity in Cameroon and Nigeria
  • Figure 5.3 Impact of PBF on health worker motivation: Treatment effect (%), PBF vs. control
  • Figure 5.4 Impact of PBF on health worker satisfaction: Treatment effect (%), PBF vs. control
  • Figure 5.5 Impact of PBF on health worker well-being: Treatment effect (%), PBF vs. control
  • Figure B5.4.1 Impact of PBF on health worker motivation: Heterogeneity in treatment effects (%), by cadre, PBF vs. control
  • Figure 5.6 Impacts of performance-based financing on idle capacity-or the know-can-do gap-in Cameroon and Nigeria
  • Figure 6.1 Typology and theory of change of included financial incentive interventions
  • Figure B6.3.1 Search and data extraction results across all financial incentive intervention types
  • Figure B6.3.2 Programs per outcome, by financial incentive intervention type
  • Figure 6.2 Mean effect sizes for all incentive interventions combined
  • Figure 6.3 Mean effect sizes, by intervention type
  • Figure B6.6.1 Difference in mean effect size between schemes combining supply- and demand-side interventions and schemes intervening only on the supply or demand side
  • Figure 6.4 Comparison of the pooled impact of performance-based and unconditional facility financing in five Sub-Saharan African countries (Cameroon, Nigeria, Rwanda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe)
  • Figure 6.5 Impacts of PBF relative to DFF on idle capacity in antenatal care consultations in Cameroon and Nigeria
  • Figure B6.7.1 Patient socioeconomic status, PBF, DFF, and know-can-do gaps in Nigeria.
  • Figure B6.7.2 Patient socioeconomic status, PBF, DFF, and know-can-do gaps in Cameroon.