Improving Effective Coverage in Health : : Do Financial Incentives Work?
Saved in:
Superior document: | Policy Research Reports |
---|---|
: | |
TeilnehmendeR: | |
Place / Publishing House: | Washington, D. C. : : World Bank Publications,, 2022. ©2022. |
Year of Publication: | 2022 |
Edition: | 1st ed. |
Language: | English |
Series: | Policy Research Reports
|
Online Access: | |
Physical Description: | 1 online resource (291 pages) |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
Table of Contents:
- Front Cover
- Contents
- Foreword
- Acknowledgments
- About the Authors
- Overview
- Abbreviations
- Chapter 1 Introduction
- Introduction
- Conclusions
- References
- Chapter 2 Effective Coverage: A Framework Linking Coverage and Quality
- Introduction
- Coverage, quality, and effective coverage
- Empirical applications
- Expanding the work on effective coverage by using data collected in health facilities
- Conclusions
- Notes
- References
- Chapter 3 Quality of Care: A Framework for Measurement
- Introduction
- Theoretical framework for assessing quality of care
- Measuring quality of care for research and policy
- Conclusions
- Notes
- References
- Chapter 4 Decomposing the Constraints to Quality of Care Using Data on Antenatal Care Consultations from Five Sub-Saharan African Countries
- Introduction
- Why antenatal care?
- Data
- Results
- Conclusions
- Annex 4A: Additional tables and figures
- Annex 4B: Data
- References
- Chapter 5 Performance-Based Financing Improves Coverage of Reproductive, Maternal, and Child Health Interventions
- Introduction
- PBF, health system performance, and health worker effort in theory
- Evidence of the impact of PBF on the quality and quantity of health service delivery in LMICs
- Impact of PBF on health worker motivation and satisfaction in six countries
- Results
- PBF, quality of care, and idle capacity
- Conclusions
- Notes
- References
- Chapter 6 Policy Alternatives to Performance-Based Financing
- Introduction
- Systematic review and meta-analysis of demand- and supply-side financial incentives
- Comparing the PBF and DFF approaches
- PBF, DFF, and institutional deliveries
- PBF, DFF, and baseline effort
- Complementarities in the PBF and DFF approaches
- Discussion and conclusions
- Annex 6A: Additional tables
- Notes
- References.
- Chapter 7 Performance-Based Financing as a Health System Reform and Cautionary Evidence on Performance Pay and Irrelevant Care
- Introduction
- Provision of nonindicated treatment in the context of financial incentives
- PBF as a health system reform
- Conclusion
- Notes
- References
- Chapter 8 Conclusion and Operational Implications
- Message 1: Recognize that sustainability is about more than just money
- Message 2: Support the four facility financing tenets
- Message 3: Understand PBF incentives in a broader health system context
- Message 4: Explore opportunities of maturing technologies
- Building a forward-looking research agenda
- References
- Boxes
- Box O.1 In Focus: Action items for task teams working on health financing reform
- Box 1.1 In Focus: A short history of performance-based financing and the related evaluation agenda
- Box 3.1 In Focus: Identifying misuse of care: A case study of malaria treatment in Mali
- Box 3.2 In Focus: Measuring quality of care and provider effort in antenatal and maternal care
- Box 4.1 In Focus: Exploring the drivers of variation in the content of care
- Box 4.2 In Focus: Does discrimination contribute to poor effort?
- Box 5.1 In Focus: A middle-income country's experience with performance-based financing: The case of Argentina and Plan Nacer and Programa Sumar
- Box 5.2 In Focus: Theoretical underpinnings of health worker motivation and paying for performance
- Box 5.3 In Focus: Measurement of worker motivation and satisfaction
- Box 5.4 In Focus: Heterogeneous effects of performance-based financing on motivation and satisfaction: An example from Nigeria
- Box 6.1 In Focus: Kyrgyz Republic PBF pilot
- Box 6.2 In Focus: Demand-side interventions and incentives for increasing preventive screening for noncommunicable diseases in Armenia.
- Box 6.3 In Focus: Systematic review search results
- Box 6.4 In Focus: Mean effect size computation and subgroup analysis
- Box 6.5 In Focus: Effect size heterogeneity
- Box 6.6 In Focus: Combining supply- and demand-side incentives
- Box 6.7 In Focus: PBF and equity
- Box 6.8 In Focus: How do impacts depend on the baseline outcome values? Results from the meta-analysis
- Box 8.1 In Focus: Combining technological innovations to facilitate strategic purchasing
- Figures
- Figure O.1 Effective coverage contours for antenatal care
- Figure O.2 Lay of the land in centralized health systems in low-income countries
- Figure O.3 Availability of drugs and consumables, equipment, and other supplies for providing antenatal care
- Figure O.4 Know-can-do gaps in the provision of antenatal care
- Figure O.5 Provision of unnecessary care in antenatal care provision in five Sub-Saharan African countries
- Figure O.6 Impacts of performance-based financing on facility physical capacity in Cameroon and Nigeria
- Figure O.7 Impacts of performance-based financing on idle capacity-or the know-can-do gap-in Cameroon and Nigeria
- Figure O.8 Comparison of the pooled impact of performance-based and unconditional facility financing in five Sub-Saharan African countries (Cameroon, Nigeria, Rwanda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe)
- Figure O.9 Impacts of PBF, vouchers, and conditional cash transfers on the utilization of maternal and child health services: Results from a meta-analysis
- Figure 1.1 Lay of the land in centralized health systems
- Figure 1.2 Lay of the land in health systems with the addition of demand- and supply-side incentives
- Figure 2.1 Utilization, coverage, and effective coverage
- Figure 2.2 Coverage, quality, effective coverage, and the care cascade
- Figure 2.3 Effective coverage tree and its decomposition.
- Figure 2.4 Effective coverage and its decomposition as the product of coverage and quality
- Figure 2.5 Effective coverage contours and isocurves
- Figure 2.6 Effective coverage and its decomposition: Antenatal care and pneumonia
- Figure 2.7 Effective coverage contours for antenatal care
- Figure 2.8 Effective coverage contours for hypertension treatment
- Figure 2.9 Effective coverage contours for tuberculosis treatment
- Figure 2.10 Effective coverage contours for HIV/AIDS treatment in Mozambique, by wealth quintile, 2015
- Figure 2.11 Effective coverage contours for child malaria and diarrhea treatment
- Figure 2.12 Effective coverage contours for various medical conditions
- Figure 2.13 Potential data sources for measuring effective coverage
- Figure 3.1 Prescriptions for antimalarials in the malaria case study
- Figure 4.1 Effective antenatal care coverage in five Sub-Saharan African countries
- Figure 4.2 Availability of drugs and consumables, equipment, and other supplies for providing antenatal care
- Figure 4.3 Performance in patient-provider interactions during antenatal care
- Figure B4.1.1 Variation in content of care in patient-provider interactions in antenatal care
- Figure 4.4 Know-can-do gaps in the provision of antenatal care
- Figure 4.5 Overuse in antenatal care provision in five Sub-Saharan African countries
- Figure 4.6 Correlation between idle capacity and provider type
- Figure B4.2.1 Inequality in the provision of ANC and effective ANC in the Democratic Republic of Congo
- Figure 4A.1 Know-can-do gaps in the performance of antenatal care in Cameroon
- Figure 4A.2 Know-can-do gaps in the performance of antenatal care in the Central African Republic
- Figure 4A.3 Know-can-do gaps in the performance of antenatal care in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
- Figure 4A.4 Know-can-do gaps in the performance of antenatal care in Nigeria
- Figure 4A.5 Know-can-do gaps in the performance of antenatal care in the Republic of Congo
- Figure 5.1 Key factors of performance-based financing that influence population health: An illustration
- Figure 5.2 Impacts of performance-based financing on facility physical capacity in Cameroon and Nigeria
- Figure 5.3 Impact of PBF on health worker motivation: Treatment effect (%), PBF vs. control
- Figure 5.4 Impact of PBF on health worker satisfaction: Treatment effect (%), PBF vs. control
- Figure 5.5 Impact of PBF on health worker well-being: Treatment effect (%), PBF vs. control
- Figure B5.4.1 Impact of PBF on health worker motivation: Heterogeneity in treatment effects (%), by cadre, PBF vs. control
- Figure 5.6 Impacts of performance-based financing on idle capacity-or the know-can-do gap-in Cameroon and Nigeria
- Figure 6.1 Typology and theory of change of included financial incentive interventions
- Figure B6.3.1 Search and data extraction results across all financial incentive intervention types
- Figure B6.3.2 Programs per outcome, by financial incentive intervention type
- Figure 6.2 Mean effect sizes for all incentive interventions combined
- Figure 6.3 Mean effect sizes, by intervention type
- Figure B6.6.1 Difference in mean effect size between schemes combining supply- and demand-side interventions and schemes intervening only on the supply or demand side
- Figure 6.4 Comparison of the pooled impact of performance-based and unconditional facility financing in five Sub-Saharan African countries (Cameroon, Nigeria, Rwanda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe)
- Figure 6.5 Impacts of PBF relative to DFF on idle capacity in antenatal care consultations in Cameroon and Nigeria
- Figure B6.7.1 Patient socioeconomic status, PBF, DFF, and know-can-do gaps in Nigeria.
- Figure B6.7.2 Patient socioeconomic status, PBF, DFF, and know-can-do gaps in Cameroon.