The Legal Status of Extrinsic Instruments for the Interpretation of Tax Treaties.

National tax authorities can express their views in a variety of ways on how tax treaties should be interpreted. As a result, there are unilateral, bilateral and multilateral interpretive instruments that are not - or not necessarily - incorporated into an actual tax treaty, but are "extrinsic&...

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Bibliographic Details
Superior document:IBFD Doctoral Series ; v.61
:
Place / Publishing House:Amsterdam : : IBFD Publications USA, Incorporated,, 2022.
©2022.
Year of Publication:2022
Edition:1st ed.
Language:English
Series:IBFD Doctoral Series
Online Access:
Physical Description:1 online resource (1577 pages)
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Table of Contents:
  • Cover
  • IBFD Doctoral Series
  • Title
  • Copyright
  • Table of Contents
  • Foreword
  • Abbreviations
  • Chapter 1: General Introduction
  • 1.1. Preliminary observations
  • 1.2. Fundamental problem and relevance of the research project
  • 1.3. Research question
  • 1.4. State of the art
  • 1.5. Research hypothesis
  • 1.6. Research objective
  • 1.7. Scope of the research
  • 1.8. Methodology and structure of the research project
  • 1.9. Research questions
  • Part 1: Extrinsic Instruments
  • Chapter 2: Introduction to Part 1
  • Chapter 3: Model Conventions and Their Commentaries
  • 3.1. Purpose and role of the commentaries to model conventions
  • 3.1.1. Introduction
  • 3.1.2. League of Nations
  • 3.1.2.1. Brief history of the work of the League of Nations and its Fiscal Committee
  • 3.1.2.2. 1927 and 1928 model conventions
  • 3.1.2.3. 1933 and 1935 Model Conventions
  • 3.1.2.4. 1943 Mexico and 1946 London Model Conventions
  • 3.1.2.5. Interim conclusion
  • 3.1.3. Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC)
  • 3.1.3.1. Brief history of the work of the OEEC leading up to the Four Reports
  • 3.1.3.2. Objectives of the Fiscal Committee
  • 3.1.3.3. Methodology
  • 3.1.3.4. Deviations from the consensus article
  • 3.1.3.5. Legal foundation
  • 3.1.3.6. Interim conclusion
  • 3.1.4. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
  • 3.1.4.1. 1963 OECD Draft Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital
  • 3.1.4.1.1. Objectives of the Fiscal Committee
  • 3.1.4.1.2. Methodology
  • 3.1.4.1.3. Legal foundation
  • 3.1.4.2. 1977-2017 Model Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital
  • 3.1.4.2.1. Objectives of the Committee on Fiscal Affairs
  • 3.1.4.2.2. Methodology
  • 3.1.4.2.3. Legal foundation
  • 3.1.4.3. Interim conclusion.
  • 3.1.4.4. Multilateral Instrument to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
  • 3.1.5. Interim conclusion
  • 3.2. Types of commentaries
  • 3.2.1. Introduction
  • 3.2.2. League of Nations
  • 3.2.2.1. 1927-1928 Model Conventions
  • 3.2.2.1.1. Background to a term or provision
  • 3.2.2.1.2. Alternative provisions
  • 3.2.2.1.3. Description of a term or provision
  • 3.2.2.1.4. Purposive clarifications
  • 3.2.2.1.5. Examples of a term or provision
  • 3.2.2.1.6. Compelling clarifications
  • 3.2.2.1.7. Dissenting opinions
  • 3.2.2.2. 1933 and 1935 Model Conventions
  • 3.2.2.3. 1943 Mexico and 1946 London Drafts
  • 3.2.2.3.1. Background information on a term or provision
  • 3.2.2.3.2. Alternative provisions
  • 3.2.2.3.3. Descriptive clarifications
  • 3.2.2.3.4. Purposive clarifications
  • 3.2.2.3.5. Effects of a term or provision
  • 3.2.2.3.6. Examples of a term or provision
  • 3.2.2.3.7. Recommendatory clarifications
  • 3.2.2.3.8. Compelling clarifications
  • 3.2.3. Organisation for European Economic Co-operation
  • 3.2.3.1. Background information of a term or provision
  • 3.2.3.2. Alternative provisions
  • 3.2.3.3. Descriptive clarifications
  • 3.2.3.4. Purposive clarifications
  • 3.2.3.5. Effects of a term or provision
  • 3.2.3.6. Examples of a term or provision
  • 3.2.3.7. Deviations
  • 3.2.3.8. Recommendatory clarifications
  • 3.2.3.9. Compelling clarifications
  • 3.2.3.9.1. Confirming the ordinary meaning
  • 3.2.3.9.2. Widening the ordinary meaning
  • 3.2.3.9.3. Confining the ordinary meaning
  • 3.2.3.10. Special cases
  • 3.2.3.10.1. Dividend and interest income
  • 3.2.4. OECD
  • 3.2.4.1. 1963 OECD Draft Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital
  • 3.2.4.1.1. Background information to a term or provision
  • 3.2.4.1.2. Descriptive clarifications
  • 3.2.4.1.3. Alternative provisions.
  • 3.2.4.1.4. Purposive clarifications
  • 3.2.4.1.5. Effects of a term or provision
  • 3.2.4.1.6. Examples of a term or provision
  • 3.2.4.1.7. Recommendatory clarifications
  • 3.2.4.1.8. Compelling clarifications
  • 3.2.4.1.9. Reservations
  • 3.2.4.1.10. Interim conclusion
  • 3.2.4.2. 1977-2014 Model Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital
  • 3.2.4.2.1. Background information of a term or provision
  • 3.2.4.2.2. Descriptive clarifications
  • 3.2.4.2.3. Alternative provisions
  • 3.2.4.2.4. Purposive clarifications
  • 3.2.4.2.5. Effects of a term or provision
  • 3.2.4.2.6. Examples of a term or provision
  • 3.2.4.2.7. Recommendatory clarifications
  • 3.2.4.2.8. Compelling clarifications
  • 3.2.4.2.8.1. Confirming the ordinary meaning
  • 3.2.4.2.8.2. Widening the ordinary meaning
  • 3.2.4.2.8.3. Confining the ordinary meaning
  • 3.2.4.2.9. Integrated cases
  • 3.2.4.2.9.1. Liable to tax
  • 3.2.4.2.9.2. Permanent establishment
  • 3.2.4.2.9.3. Attribution of profits to permanent establishments
  • 3.2.4.2.9.4. Dividend and interest income
  • 3.2.4.2.9.5. Beneficial ownership
  • 3.2.4.2.9.6. Preventing tax avoidance
  • 3.2.4.2.9.7. Know-how and software
  • 3.2.4.2.9.8. Income from employment
  • 3.2.4.2.9.9. Entertainer and sportsperson
  • 3.2.4.2.9.10. Non-discrimination
  • 3.2.4.2.9.11. Mutual agreement procedure
  • 3.2.4.2.9.12. Exchange of information
  • 3.2.4.2.10. Observations
  • 3.2.4.2.10.1. 1977 OECD Commentary
  • 3.2.4.2.10.2. 2014 OECD Commentary
  • 3.2.4.2.11. Interim conclusion
  • 3.2.5. Interim conclusion
  • 3.3. References to extrinsic instruments in the OECD Commentaries
  • 3.3.1. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines
  • 3.3.1.1. Purpose and role in light of articles 7 and 9 of the OECD Model
  • 3.3.1.1.1. The Carroll Report and the 1933 and 1935 Draft Model Conventions
  • 3.3.1.1.2. Section 45 of the IRC and the 1935 Treasury Regulations.
  • 3.3.1.1.3. Articles 7(2) and 9(1) of the OECD Model and their predecessors
  • 3.3.1.1.4. 1968 Treasury Regulations
  • 3.3.1.1.5. 1979 OECD Report on Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises
  • 3.3.1.1.6. 1988 US Treasury "White paper"
  • 3.3.1.1.7. 1995 Transfer Pricing Guidelines
  • 3.3.1.1.8. 2010 Transfer Pricing Guidelines
  • 3.3.1.1.9. 2017 Transfer Pricing Guidelines
  • 3.3.1.2. Legal foundation
  • 3.3.1.3. References to Transfer Pricing Guidelines in the OECD Commentaries
  • 3.3.1.3.1. Arm's length principle between associatedenterprises: Article 9 of the OECD Model
  • 3.3.1.3.2. Attribution of profits to permanentestablishments: Article 7 of the OECD Model
  • 3.3.1.3.3. Sample mutual agreement for arbitration:Article 25 of the OECD Model
  • 3.3.2. OECD Reports
  • 3.3.3. Interim conclusion
  • 3.4. Interim conclusion on chapter 3
  • Chapter 4: Implementation of the OECD Commentaries by the Executive Branch
  • 4.1. OECD Commentaries as point of reference during treaty negotiations
  • 4.1.1. National tax treaty policy
  • 4.1.1.1. Recognition of the Commentaries for negotiation purposes
  • 4.1.1.2. Recognition of specific commentaries for negotiation purposes
  • 4.1.1.3. Recognition of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines and OECD reports for negotiation purposes
  • 4.1.1.4. Interim conclusion
  • 4.1.2. Guidance conveyed to legislature in view of treaty approval
  • 4.1.2.1. Recognition of the OECD Commentaries for negotiation purposes
  • 4.1.2.2. Recognition of specific commentaries for negotiation purposes
  • 4.1.2.3. Interim conclusion
  • 4.1.3. Interim conclusion
  • 4.2. OECD Commentaries as instrument for the interpretation of tax treaties
  • 4.2.1. Implementation in bilateral instruments
  • 4.2.1.1. Treaty or Protocol
  • 4.2.1.1.1. General interpretive clause
  • 4.2.1.1.1.1. National model conventions
  • 4.2.1.1.1.2. Individual tax treaties.
  • 4.2.1.1.2. Specific interpretive clauses
  • 4.2.1.1.3. References to Transfer Pricing Guidelines and OECD reports
  • 4.2.1.1.4. Interim conclusion
  • 4.2.1.2. Other bilateral instruments
  • 4.2.1.2.1. Memoranda of understanding/exchange of letters/exchange of notes
  • 4.2.1.2.2. Joint Guidance relating to the Belgium-Netherlands Income and Capital Tax Treaty
  • 4.2.1.2.3. Competent authority agreement
  • 4.2.1.2.4. Interim conclusion
  • 4.2.2. Implementation in unilateral instruments
  • 4.2.2.1. National tax treaty policy
  • 4.2.2.1.1. Recognition of the Commentaries for interpretation purposes
  • 4.2.2.1.2. Recognition of specific commentaries for interpretation purposes
  • 4.2.2.1.3. Recognition of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines and OECD reports for interpretation purposes
  • 4.2.2.1.4. Interim conclusion
  • 4.2.2.2. Guidance presented to legislative branch in view of treaty approval
  • 4.2.2.2.1. Indifference vis-à-vis the type of clarification and the conformity with the ordinary meaning of treaty terms and provisions
  • 4.2.2.2.2. Indifference vis-à-vis the explicit recognition of the Commentaries as an interpretive instrument
  • 4.2.2.2.3. Divergent and inconsistent recourse to the Commentaries for the interpretation of undefined treaty terms
  • 4.2.2.2.4. Transfer Pricing Guidelines and OECD reports
  • 4.2.2.2.5. Interim conclusion
  • 4.2.2.3. General administrative positions on individual tax treaties
  • 4.2.2.4. Individual administrative positions regarding interpretation of tax treaties
  • 4.2.3. Interim conclusion
  • 4.3. Interim conclusion on chapter 4
  • Chapter 5: Conclusion on Part 1
  • Part 2: Legal Status of Extrinsic Instruments under International Law
  • Chapter 6: Introduction to Part 2
  • Chapter 7: Potential Relevant Sources of International Law
  • 7.1. Legal status of OECD recommendations and Transfer Pricing Guidelines.
  • 7.1.1. Recommendations as a form of "soft law".