The assault on international law / / Jens David Ohlin.

"International law presents a conceptual riddle. Why comply with it when there is no world government to enforce it? The United States has a long history of skepticism towards international law, but 9/11 ushered in a particularly virulent phase of American exceptionalism. Torture became offici...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
VerfasserIn:
Place / Publishing House:New York, New York : : Oxford University Press,, 2015.
Year of Publication:2015
Language:English
Online Access:
Physical Description:1 online resource (304 pages)
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Table of Contents:
  • Machine generated contents note:
  • PROLOGUE: DRAMATIS PERSONAE
  • 1. The Office of Legal Counsel
  • 2. The Emergence of the New Realists
  • 3. Conclusion
  • CHAPTER ONE: GAMING THE FEDERAL COURTS
  • 1. The Erie Doctrine 2.0
  • 2. The Filartiga Era: Enforcing International Law at Home
  • 3. Filartiga's Demise, Parochialism's Rise
  • 4. The New Realists go to Washington
  • 5. International Law as Interpretive Guidance
  • 6. Conclusion
  • CHAPTER TWO: PRESIDENTS AND LEVIATHANS
  • 1. Public Opinion and Law
  • 2. Presidential Power: The New Realist's Normative Argument
  • 3. Democratic Decision-making versus Schmittology
  • 4. Executive Action During Emergencies
  • 5. Why Schmittian Administrative Law is Not Inevitable
  • 6. Conclusion
  • CHAPTER THREE: THE ATTACK: MISUNDERSTANDING RATIONALITY
  • 1. The Game Theory Game
  • 2. The Prisoner's Dilemma and Nash Equilibrium
  • 3. Law and Self-Interest
  • 4. Objections to the Moral Obligation of States
  • CHAPTER FOUR: SOLVING THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
  • 1. The Toxin Puzzle and Taking the Long View
  • 2. The Deterrence Paradox and the Limits of Follow-Through
  • 3. Assurances and Cooperation
  • 4. Why the New Realists Fail to Understand Rationality
  • 5. Rationality and Obligation
  • CHAPTER FIVE: WAR AS COOPERATION
  • 1. War as Cooperation
  • 2. Who can be Targeted? Combatants, Civilians, and CCFers
  • 3. Geographical Constraints on Armed Conflict
  • 4. Co-Applying the Laws of War with Human Rights
  • CHAPTER 6: REENGAGING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
  • 1. Global Legalism vs. Rational Choice: A False Dichotomy
  • 2. Does Globalization Need Taming?
  • 3. The United Nations
  • 4. The International Court of Justice
  • 5. The International Criminal Court.