Hold your nose and vote : why do some democracies tolerate corruption? / / prepared by Marco Pani.

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Superior document:IMF working paper ; WP/09/83
:
TeilnehmendeR:
Year of Publication:2009
Language:English
Series:IMF working paper ; WP/09/83.
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Physical Description:32 p.
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record_format marc
spelling Pani, Marco.
Hold your nose and vote [electronic resource] : why do some democracies tolerate corruption? / prepared by Marco Pani.
[Washington D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, 2009.
32 p.
IMF working paper ; WP/09/83
Includes bibliographical references.
Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest, 2015. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest affiliated libraries.
Political corruption.
Democracy.
Electronic books.
ProQuest (Firm)
IMF working paper ; WP/09/83.
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oeawat/detail.action?docID=1608208 Click to View
language English
format Electronic
eBook
author Pani, Marco.
spellingShingle Pani, Marco.
Hold your nose and vote why do some democracies tolerate corruption? /
IMF working paper ;
author_facet Pani, Marco.
ProQuest (Firm)
ProQuest (Firm)
author_variant m p mp
author2 ProQuest (Firm)
author2_role TeilnehmendeR
author_corporate ProQuest (Firm)
author_sort Pani, Marco.
title Hold your nose and vote why do some democracies tolerate corruption? /
title_sub why do some democracies tolerate corruption? /
title_full Hold your nose and vote [electronic resource] : why do some democracies tolerate corruption? / prepared by Marco Pani.
title_fullStr Hold your nose and vote [electronic resource] : why do some democracies tolerate corruption? / prepared by Marco Pani.
title_full_unstemmed Hold your nose and vote [electronic resource] : why do some democracies tolerate corruption? / prepared by Marco Pani.
title_auth Hold your nose and vote why do some democracies tolerate corruption? /
title_new Hold your nose and vote
title_sort hold your nose and vote why do some democracies tolerate corruption? /
series IMF working paper ;
series2 IMF working paper ;
publisher International Monetary Fund,
publishDate 2009
physical 32 p.
callnumber-first J - Political Science
callnumber-subject JF - Public Administration
callnumber-label JF1081
callnumber-sort JF 41081 P36 42009
genre Electronic books.
genre_facet Electronic books.
url https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oeawat/detail.action?docID=1608208
illustrated Not Illustrated
oclc_num 870245346
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hierarchy_sequence WP/09/83.
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