Constructing international security : alliances, deterrence, and moral hazard / / Brett V. Benson.

"This book explains when and why state leaders form different types of security relationships such as ambiguous alliance agreements. These differences are important because commitments, such as formal military alliances and extended deterrence threats, form the basis of the international securi...

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Year of Publication:2012
Language:English
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Physical Description:xiii, 207 p. :; ill.
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spelling Benson, Brett V., 1973-
Constructing international security [electronic resource] : alliances, deterrence, and moral hazard / Brett V. Benson.
Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2012.
xiii, 207 p. : ill.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Machine generated contents note: 1. Understanding the design of security commitments; 2. A typology of third-party commitments; 3. Time consistency and entrapment; 4. Evidence of moral hazard in military alliances; 5. A theory of commitment design; 6. Testing the implications for alliance design; 7. Deterrent commitments in East Asia; 8. Constructing security in today's world.
"This book explains when and why state leaders form different types of security relationships such as ambiguous alliance agreements. These differences are important because commitments, such as formal military alliances and extended deterrence threats, form the basis of the international security order. Experts have long understood that leaders looking to secure allies face a critical tradeoff between strengthening their prospective ally to deter challenges to it while simultaneously refraining from making the ally too aggressive. The author explains how and when leaders can balance these tensions by building commitments that contain conditions and ambiguity"-- Provided by publisher.
Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest, 2015. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest affiliated libraries.
Security, International.
Electronic books.
ProQuest (Firm)
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oeawat/detail.action?docID=1042524 Click to View
language English
format Electronic
eBook
author Benson, Brett V., 1973-
spellingShingle Benson, Brett V., 1973-
Constructing international security alliances, deterrence, and moral hazard /
Machine generated contents note: 1. Understanding the design of security commitments; 2. A typology of third-party commitments; 3. Time consistency and entrapment; 4. Evidence of moral hazard in military alliances; 5. A theory of commitment design; 6. Testing the implications for alliance design; 7. Deterrent commitments in East Asia; 8. Constructing security in today's world.
author_facet Benson, Brett V., 1973-
ProQuest (Firm)
ProQuest (Firm)
author_variant b v b bv bvb
author2 ProQuest (Firm)
author2_role TeilnehmendeR
author_corporate ProQuest (Firm)
author_sort Benson, Brett V., 1973-
title Constructing international security alliances, deterrence, and moral hazard /
title_sub alliances, deterrence, and moral hazard /
title_full Constructing international security [electronic resource] : alliances, deterrence, and moral hazard / Brett V. Benson.
title_fullStr Constructing international security [electronic resource] : alliances, deterrence, and moral hazard / Brett V. Benson.
title_full_unstemmed Constructing international security [electronic resource] : alliances, deterrence, and moral hazard / Brett V. Benson.
title_auth Constructing international security alliances, deterrence, and moral hazard /
title_new Constructing international security
title_sort constructing international security alliances, deterrence, and moral hazard /
publisher Cambridge University Press,
publishDate 2012
physical xiii, 207 p. : ill.
contents Machine generated contents note: 1. Understanding the design of security commitments; 2. A typology of third-party commitments; 3. Time consistency and entrapment; 4. Evidence of moral hazard in military alliances; 5. A theory of commitment design; 6. Testing the implications for alliance design; 7. Deterrent commitments in East Asia; 8. Constructing security in today's world.
isbn 9781139782920 (electronic bk.)
callnumber-first J - Political Science
callnumber-subject JZ - International Relations
callnumber-label JZ5588
callnumber-sort JZ 45588 B46 42012
genre Electronic books.
genre_facet Electronic books.
url https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oeawat/detail.action?docID=1042524
illustrated Illustrated
dewey-hundreds 300 - Social sciences
dewey-tens 350 - Public administration & military science
dewey-ones 355 - Military science
dewey-full 355/.031
dewey-sort 3355 231
dewey-raw 355/.031
dewey-search 355/.031
oclc_num 833769634
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is_hierarchy_title Constructing international security alliances, deterrence, and moral hazard /
author2_original_writing_str_mv noLinkedField
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