

Who is the proponent of Candrakīrti portrayed by Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge in the *sNyīng po*?

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To my dear late friend and colleague
Helmut Krasser, who liked asking me
“So, what’s new about Phya pa?”

Introduction

The Madhyamaka works composed by the Tibetan scholar Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169) testify to his affiliation to a line of interpretation which came to be associated with the Svātantrika orientation of Madhyamaka.¹ Among his recovered works, one finds commentaries on the *Madhyamakālaṅkāra* of Śāntarakṣita (ca. 725–788), the *Madhyamakāloka* of Kamalaśīla (ca. 740–795), and the *Satyadvayavibhaṅga* of Jñānagarbha (eighth cent.). A fourth work, which stands at the core of the present paper, is a Summary of Madhyamaka structured around the two-truth theory. The colophon gives the title “Madhyamaka– The Essence of Reality”² (*dbu ma de kho na nyid snying po*), while the cover-page of the manuscript edited by Helmut Tauscher (Tauscher 1999a) speaks of a “quintessential elucidation of the three Eastern Mādhyamikas” (*dbu ma shar gsum gyi stong thun*), an expression that refers to the three above-mentioned Indian teachers or to their main works.³

¹ On the Svātantrika–Prāsaṅgika distinction, see notably Dreyfus/McClintock 2003, Seyfort Ruegg 2006, and Vose 2009. See Tauscher 2003 for a discussion of Phya pa’s position in this regard.

² One could alternatively understand the title as “The Heart of the Essence (or: of the Essentials) of Madhyamaka.” However, it seems that in a number of cases the initial mention of “*dbu ma*” in the title of Madhyamaka works, respectively of “*tshad ma*” in the title of epistemological works, functions as an indicator of the subject of discussion rather than as part of the title properly speaking.

³ These four works of Phya pa appeared in the *bKa’ gdams gsung ’bum*. See *rGyan ’grel*, *sNang ’grel*, *bDen gnyis rnam bshad* and *sNyīng po* in the bibliography for

Following Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, Phya pa defends the idea that the central concept of Madhyamaka philosophy, “emptiness”—the being void of an essence, of inherent existence, of all phenomena—can be established by reasoning, through an inference that follows the rules set by Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–660). It thus qualifies as an argument that functions by the force of facts (Skt. *vastubalapravṛtta*, Tib. *dn̄gos po stobs zhugs*) and as an autonomous reasoning (Skt. *svatantra*, Tib. *rang rgyud*).⁴ Phya pa deals in particular (if not exclusively) with the proof of emptiness based on the logical reason “being neither one nor many” (Skt. *ekānekaviyoga*, Tib. *gcig dang du bral*).⁵ This argument is mentioned by Śāntarakṣita in the first verse of his *Madhyamakālaṅkāra*, while technical issues linked with this proof are discussed by Kamalaśīla in his *Madhyamakāloka* (see Keira 2004). Phya pa describes it as an argument that “negates a negandum” (*dgag bya dgag pa*)—i.e., it “negates ultimate entities” (*yang dag pa'i dn̄gos po dgag pa*) or “negates proliferations” (*spros pa dgag pa*)—but also as an argument that “proves pervasive emptiness” (*khyab pa'i stong nyid sgrub byed*). Phya pa discusses this inference in detail in two places: in an excursus appended to his commentary on the first verse of the *Madhyamakālaṅkāra* in his *rGyan 'grel*, and in a parallel discussion (in a somewhat longer version) in his Summary of Madhyamaka (*sNying po*) (see Hugon 2015). The identification of the elements in this argument (the subject, the logical reason, the thesis) and their relation are also recurring issues in Phya pa’s epistemological works.

Phya pa’s endeavor to show that such an argument for proving emptiness is possible and correct, which builds on Kamalaśīla’s discussion, is thus common to several of his works. But it is solely in the *sNying po* that Phya pa extensively addresses the adverse position according to which this inference is not proper—more generally, that no autonomous inference is acceptable for Mādhyamikas—and that the negation of the negandum (i.e., of “ultimate entity” or “proliferation”) is to be carried out

references. The manuscript of the *sNying po* published in the *bKa' gdams gsung 'bum* is different from the one edited by Tauscher (1999a); its first folio is missing. See Hugon 2012 for remarks on some different readings in the two manuscripts. The section numbers for *sNying po* used in this paper correspond to the ones in Tauscher’s edition, which follow the divisions made by Phya pa.

- ⁴ In Phya pa’s use, *rang rgyud* is concordant with the notion of an inference with a reason whose three characteristics are established through valid cognition.
- ⁵ In *sNying po* §125.113 Phya pa mentions both the neither one nor many argument and the proof based on the logical reason “dependent arising,” but only the former is discussed in §125.12.

exclusively by a “consequence” (Tib. *thal ’gyur*, Skt. *prasaṅga*).⁶ A very brief mention and criticism of the same position is otherwise found in Phya pa’s doxography, without its proponent being identified by name.⁷

In the *sNying po* Phya pa identifies the proponent of this view as “Candrakīrti, etc.” (*zla ba grags pa la sogs pa*). Note that Phya pa does not label his opponent “*thal ’gyur pa*” (see Vose 2009: 304, n. 27). The terms *thal ’gyur pa* and its correlate *rang rgyud pa* do not appear in the *sNying po* (Tauscher 2003: 212). Phya pa does not mention the *thal ’gyur pa/rang rgyud pa* division either when discussing the sub-schools of Madhyamaka in his doxography (*gZhung rnam ’byed* 29a5ff.) and does not use these expressions in his other Madhyamaka works. Whether he was acquainted with these expressions or not is debatable. The use of these terms in Tibet largely predates Phya pa. The term *thal ’gyur ba* is indeed already found to qualify Candrakīrti’s position in a work reporting the teaching of Hasumati, a work which was presumably written by Pa tshab Nyi ma grags (cf. Dreyfus/Tsering 2009: 393–395). The latter had already returned to Tibet around the year 1100 (Vose 2009: 48), before Phya pa was even born. However, Apple (2016: 630–631, n. 18) notes that, while there is evidence that some scholars contemporaneous with Phya pa knew the classification “*thal ’gyur ba*” (namely, Bya ’Chad kha ba Ye shes rdo rje [1101–1175] applies it in his doxography), it was not used by Pa tshab’s own disciple Zhang Thang sag pa or by Pa tshab’s bKa’ gdams pa supporter Shar ba pa Yon tan grags (1070–1141). It is thus maybe not so surprising that it would not be widespread in the works of scholars related to the gSang phu tradition, even if these scholars did distinguish the logical notions of autonomous arguments and arguments by consequence.⁸

⁶ *sNying po* §125.11 (T 55–77; bKa’ 24a6–31a4). See Section 1 below for an outline of this passage.

⁷ *gZhung rnam ’byed* 32a4–32b2: *cir yang ma grub pa’ang pha rol pos ’gal zla ’am blangs pa de’i ’gal ’gog pa’i thal bas grub la ’gog gyi phyogs kyi chos dang tshad ma nges pa la brten pa’i rjes dpag gis ’gog pa ma yin te de dag mthun snang du grub pa’i tshad ma med pa’i phyir ro zhes brjod par mi bya ste | ... khas blangs kho na la thal ba sbyor bas the tshom dang srid pa bkag par ’gyur la | khas blangs pa bden na de’i dor ba mi ’thad la mi bden na des ’gal la ’gog mi nus pa’i phyir yang thal tsam ma yin te | sngar rjod pa’i rjes dpag nyid kyi yin no ||*

⁸ Notably, Phya pa’s teacher of Madhyamaka rGya dmar ba Byang chub grags contrasts the use of autonomous arguments (*rang rgyud*) and that of consequences (*thal ’gyur*). Gro lung pa (who had been Phya pa’s teacher towards the end of his life, see Cabezón 2010) similarly opposes *thal ’gyur* and *tshad ma dngos rang rgyud pa* in his *bsTan rim chen mo* (Vose 2009: 53). Neither of them name the partisans of the respective arguments *rang rgyud pa* and *thal ’gyur ba*. See

Phya pa's refutation of Candrakīrti is mentioned in the *Deb sngon* by 'Gos lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal (1392–1481).⁹ gSer mdog paṅ chen Śākya mchog ldan (1428–1507) summarizes in his *dBu ma rgya mtsho* the arguments of Phya pa. Śākya mchog ldan does not identify his source as the *sNying po*, but presents these arguments as “a series of refutations by Phya pa, having identified the opponent by name as Candrakīrti.”¹⁰ A number of passages from Phya pa's account of the views of Candrakīrti find a literal equivalent, and others are adapted, in the doxography of the rNying ma pa master Klong chen Rab 'byams pa Dri med 'od zer (1308–1364), the *Grub mtha' mdzod*. The corresponding position is dealt with last in Klong chen pa's presentation of the various Buddhist and non-Buddhist systems in the third chapter of this work.¹¹ Klong chen pa, like Phya pa, ascribes the position he presents to “Candrakīrti and others,”¹² but further identifies it in terms of “Prāsaṅgika” (*thal 'gyur ba'i lugs*). Unlike Phya pa, Klong chen pa does not include a criticism of this position, which he himself recognizes as the highest philosophical system (Butters 2006: 157–164). Klong chen pa probably became acquainted with the *sNying po* and other works of Phya pa during his studies in gSang phu as a young man (see Butters 2006: 26).¹³

Section 4.1. for more information on these two scholars.

- ⁹ *Deb sngon* 406,11–12: *slob dpon phywa bas slob dpon zla ba grags pa la dgag pa mang du mdzad pa la...*
- ¹⁰ *dBu ma rgya mtsho*, chap. 2, vol. 14, 53b5 (p. 518): *phyas pas zla ba'i zhabs kyi mtshan nas bos te dgag pa byas pa'i rim pa rnams...* This passage is located in the section discussing the Prāsaṅgika movement (starting at fol. 53a2 [p. 517]: *gnyis pa thal 'gyur du smra ba'i gzhung la log par rlog pa bsal ba*). The account of Phya pa's arguments is found on fol. 53b5–55b6 (p. 518–522). Śākya mchog ldan also writes in his *dBu ma byung tshul* that “Phya pa composed a treatise in which one finds numerous refutations of both the content and the words of Candrakīrti's treatise.” (*dBu ma byung tshul* 13b6: *phyas pas...zla ba'i bstan bcos kyi tshig don gnyis ka la dgag pa'i rnam grangs shin tu mang po yod pa'i bstan bcos mdzad*).
- ¹¹ The presentation of Prāsaṅgika (*Grub mtha' mdzod* 100–113) is found in the section 1.2.2.2.1.1.2.2.2 (see the outline of the work in Butters 2006: Appendix B). The Prāsaṅgika-section in the *Grub mtha' mdzod* is subdivided into the same subsections as *sNying po* §125.111, but the refutation of autonomous argumentative statements (found in *sNying po* §125.111.3) is omitted (*Grub mtha' mdzod* 100,20–101,2). Conversely, Klong chen pa adds a number of paragraphs that are absent in the *sNying po*, notably, sections on the definitional bases (*mtshan gzhi*) and the definitions (*mtshan nyid*) of the two truths according to the Prāsaṅgikas (*Grub mtha' mdzod* 102–104). The closest literal parallels with the *sNying po* are found in the third subsection (*thal 'gyur gyis spros pa gcod pa'i tshul*), which repeats to a large extent *sNying po* §125.111.4.
- ¹² *Grub mtha' mdzod* 101,2–4: *slob dpon klu sgrub kyi snges pa don gyi lta ba 'dzin pa'i slob ma'i mchog zla ba grags pa la sogs pa rnams ni 'di ltar 'dod de...*
- ¹³ Werner (2014: 37–40) has brought to the fore ample evidence that in the *Grub*

This remarkable passage of the *sNyung po* did not escape the attention of modern scholars. It was previously discussed in broad lines by Tauscher in his inquiry of Phya pa's views on arguments by consequence (Tauscher 1999b). Vose fully translated it in his book *Resurrecting Candrakīrti* (Vose 2009: 139–169), and identifies it as “perhaps our most important document for understanding the formation of Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika schools of Tibetan Madhyamaka” (ibid. 139). In spite of the pioneering insight both scholars provide into this passage, their contributions left a number of interpretative and terminological questions open. Tauscher expressed his perplexity at the apparent absence in this text of elements of the theory of argumentation by consequence as it is ascribed to Phya pa in later sources, and at the possibility that Phya pa might even be rejecting argumentation by consequence completely in the *sNyung po* in view of the title of §125.11.¹⁴ Vose appears to have been puzzled by some expressions used by Phya pa when discussing argumentation methods.¹⁵ This owes to the fact that Phya pa did not include in the *sNyung po* a full-fledged exposition of his own theory of argumentation by consequence, although it stands in the background of the whole discussion. One has to turn to his epistemological works for an extensive presentation of his own views, which he spells out in the fifth chapter of his Summary of epistemology (*Mun sel*) and in a parallel excursus in his commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya* ('*Od zer*). It is entirely clear in these works that Phya pa does not have anything against argumentation by consequence *per se*. In particular, the neither one nor many argument itself can be presented in the form of a consequence statement.¹⁶ Phya pa is objecting in the *sNyung po* to a specific model of consequence that finds no legitimate place in his own theory. In brief, Phya pa does not accept a model of consequence that claims to achieve the *negation* of the opponent's tenets without involving, at some stage, *establishment* by a means of valid cognition. According to Phya pa's theory, given a consequence of the form “it follows that S is

mtha' mdzod Klong chen pa is silently re-using and adapting passages from Phya pa's doxography in his discussion of philosophical systems, notably, Yogācāra.

¹⁴ This section is indeed entitled “Refuting the view that the negandum is negated via a consequence” (*dgag bya thal 'gyur gyis 'gog pa sun dbyung ba*). However, as Tauscher points out (1999b: 392), Śākya mchog ldan rephrases the title of this section as “negating substantialists through consequence *alone* is incorrect” (*dBu ma rgya mtsho*, chap. 2, vol. 14, 54a7–54b1 [p. 519–529]; *thal 'gyur rkyang pas dngos por smra ba 'gog pa mi 'thad*).

¹⁵ See for instance my remark on the expression *thal bas 'phangs pa rang rgyud gyi rtags* in Hugon 2012: 187.

¹⁶ See *Mun sel* 90b5–6 and '*Od zer* 145b2–4.

Q, because P;” if there is no establishment, by a valid cognition, of the pervasion (P entails Q) or of the opposite of the derived conclusion of a consequence (i.e., of the opposite of ‘S is Q’), the consequence may be genuine, but it only qualifies as a “refuting consequence,” which does not prove or negate any thesis. Proving or negating a thesis requires that these features are established by a valid cognition. In such a case (provided additional features are also satisfied), the consequence is a “proving consequence” which has the same capacity as its reverse form, the autonomous argument (i.e., proving nonP, negating P).¹⁷

Knowledge of Phya pa’s theory of argumentation (which was undoubtedly expected from Phya pa’s readers at the time) sheds much light on the discussion in *sNying po* §125.11, helping us to better understand Phya pa’s arguments against the opponent’s model of argumentation. Nevertheless, one can observe that Phya pa’s portrayal of the opponent’s position includes notions that are not part of Phya pa’s own theory of argumentation, and which he does not discuss elsewhere. In this paper I examine Phya pa’s account of the views regarding argumentation methods that he ascribes to “Candrakīrti, etc.” (*sNying po* §125.111.3 and §125.111.4)¹⁸ and attempt to identify Phya pa’s source(s). Two features of Phya pa’s portrayal are particularly relevant in this regard: the version of the translation of verses from Candrakīrti’s works cited in the *sNying po* (Section 2) and the logical notions and technical terms that are part of the opponent’s position (Section 3).

1. Outline of *sNying po* §125.11

The structure of the relevant passage of the *sNying po* makes clear which were the main points of contention in the debate about the argumentative method to be followed. “Candrakīrti and others” vouch for a complete rejection of autonomous inference (*sNying po* §125.111.3) and propose an alternative method for negating proliferations (§125.111.4).

The Candrakīrtian arguments against autonomous inference can be divided into two sets. In the first set of arguments, the opponent invokes

¹⁷ “Proving consequences” only differ from autonomous inferences in terms of the verbalization of the argument: the latter present the triply characterized reason directly, proving consequences do so indirectly. See Hugon 2013: 678.

¹⁸ The other aspects of the opponent’s position, *sNying po* §125.111.1 (“the distinction between mistaken and non-mistaken awareness”) and °.2 (“the distinction between the two truths”), as well as the third part of Phya pa’s objections against the opponent’s position in §125.112.3 (“it is incorrect that mind and mental factors are cut off in Buddhahood”) are thoroughly discussed in Vose 2009.

the lack of a commonly appearing subject (i); the lack of a thesis to be proven (ii); the absence of a valid cognition able to establish the three characteristics of the logical reason (iii)—perception and inference are just worldly cognitions (*'jig rten pa'i blo*); they are not properly speaking valid cognitions (*tshad ma*). The closing statement of §125.111.3 reads:

Mādhyamikas do not have any thesis whatsoever. Therefore a logical reason proving it and an autonomous argument indicating that (logical reason) are incorrect. And for this reason also, there is no elimination of proliferations by an autonomous argument.¹⁹

The second set of arguments against autonomous inference contains three claims: autonomous inference is not necessary to negate proliferations (iv), incapable of doing so (v), and is incorrect (vi).

The method of argumentation prescribed by “Candrakīrti and others” (on which more will be said below in Section 3) is used in *sNying po* §125.111.4 in the presentation of the arguments adduced to refute all the possible options of “arising,” building on the refutation of arising by Nāgārjuna in *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (MMK) I.1. The opponent’s method purports to negate (*'gegs pa/dgag pa/'gog*) the respective options of arising—[a] arising from self, [b] arising from something else, [c] arising from both, [d] arising without a cause²⁰—eventually leading to “the substantialist being countered” (*dnogs por smra ba 'gog pa*) and “proliferations being negated” or “eliminated” (*spros pa 'gog pa; spros pa gcod pa*) without anything being established for the proponent.

Phya pa rebuts the first set of arguments against autonomous inference (i, ii, iii) in *sNying po* §125.112.1 (“it is incorrect not to accept an autonomous argument”). He addresses the claims in the second set (iv, v, vi) when rejecting controversies with regard to his own position (§125.114). He refutes the opponent’s specific arguments [a], [b] and [d] for negating arising in §125.112.21 (“it is incorrect/impossible to negate the substantialist view via a consequence”). There he points out that a consequence, in the opponent’s model, is unable to negate the negandum at all, is unable to negate all proliferations, and is unable to eliminate the doubt that there are proliferations.

¹⁹ *sNying po* T 62,13–14; bKa' 25b4: *dbu ma pa la cir yang* (T *cir yang*: bKa' *ci'ang*) *dam bcar med pas de'i sgrub byed kyi rtags dang de ston pa'i rang rgyud* (T *dang de ston pa'i rang rgyud*: bKa' *dang de ston pa'i rtags dang rang rgyud*) *mi 'thad pa'i phyir yang rang rgyud kyis spros pa gcod pa ma yin no* ||. A similar statement is found in T 61,15–18.

²⁰ Cf. *sNying po*, T 63,1–14 [a], T 63,15–64,5 [b], T 64,6 [c], T 64,7–15 [d]. These subdivisions of §125.111.4 are not marked in Tauscher’s edition.

2. Citations from Candrakīrti's works in the *sNying po*

The view that Phya pa ascribes to “Candrakīrti and others” is supported by a number of citations from Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra* (MA):

- MA XII.4 on the distinction between mistaken and non-mistaken cognition (cited in *sNying po* §125.111.1)
- MA VI.23–26 and VI.28–29 on the distinction between the two truths (§125.111.2)
- MA VI.30 in connection with the rejection of autonomous arguments (§125.111.3)
- MA VI.8cd, VI.14ab and VI.100 when presenting, respectively, arguments [a], [b] and [d] against arising (§125.111.4).²¹

Also relevant is the citation, in *sNying po* §125.111.3, of verses from Nāgārjuna's *Vigrahavyāvartanī* (VV 29) and Āryadeva's *Catuhśataka* (CŚ XVI.25) in support of the claim that Mādhyamikas do not have a thesis.

The MA citations might not all come from the MA/MABh directly. Those in §125.111.4 might be cited through Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* (PsP). Indeed, in PsP on MMK I.1, Candrakīrti incorporates MA VI.8cd, VI.14 and VI.100ab (MacDonald 2015: §21, §61 and §65), as well as Nāgārjuna's VV 29 and Āryadeva's CŚ XVI.25 (MacDonald 2015: §26). The verse of the CŚ is also cited in MABh (D311b5–6), but that of the VV is not. The *sNying po* does not elaborate on the Buddhapālita/Bhāviveka debate, with which Candrakīrti deals at length in the PsP.²² But elements of the arguments for negating arising reported in the *sNying po* are in part traceable to Candrakīrti's discussion in the PsP rather than the MABh (see for instance below Section 3 (1), n. 40).

²¹ No verse is cited in connection with the refutation of “arising from both” [c], which follows from the refutation of “arising from self” and “arising from other.” When dealing with the third option in the MABh, Candrakīrti repeats the half-verses MA VI.8cd and VI.14ab between VI.98ab and VI.98cd.

²² In the *sNang 'grel* (which post-dates the *sNying po*, see Hugon 2015: 59, n. 9), Phya pa mentions the name Buddhapālita (*slob dpon sangs rgyas skyangs*) in the section on the refutation of arising from self entitled *sngon gyi slob dpon kyi tshig la klan ka spang ba* (*sNang 'grel* 48a3, when commenting on “*m khas pa rnams*” in MĀ D190b2). He mentions the name Bhāviveka (*slob dpon legs ldan 'byed*) in *sNang 'grel* 55a8 (commenting on MĀ D198a6) in connection with the refutation of arising from other, where his objections against “previous teachers” (*sngon gyi slob dpon*) are rejected. The name Bhāviveka appears also in connection with the refutation of arising from other in *sNang 'grel* 9b4 (commenting on MĀ D137a7). Both are named side by side in *sNang 'grel* 2a3–4. Phya pa does not mention the name Candrakīrti in these passages.

Tauscher (2003: 245, n. 22) observed that the *sNying po* version of the verses of the MA significantly diverges from Pa tshab's translation of the MA (the work was originally translated by Pa tshab and Tilakakalaśa; the translation was subsequently revised by Pa tshab and Kanakavarman) as well as from the earlier translation of the MA by Nag tsho Tshul khriims rgyal ba (a student of Atiśa, born in 1011), a translation which was revised by Pa tshab and Tilakakalaśa.²³ (The revised version of Nag tsho's translation is preserved in the Peking *bsTan 'gyur*. For the sake of convenience, I will refer to it below as "Nag tsho's translation.") The translation of the MA verses in the *sNying po* also differs from the version found in Jayānanda's MA-ṭīkā, a work that was composed in Mi nyag (after Jayānanda's stay in Tibet) and translated by the author himself and Kun dga' grags (see van der Kuijp 1993). In Jayānanda's MA-ṭīkā these verses appear in a version that resembles Pa tshab's translation of the MA. The issue is made more complicated by the fact that there are numerous differences in the two manuscripts of the *sNying po* between the readings of the cited verses. Most of them are minor differences, but there are also important variations in structure (see below MA VI.23a) and in the number of syllables per line (MA VI.14a, MA VI.100c).

In the comparative tables below, the relevant differences between the various versions are marked with bold characters. Orthographic differences that are not relevant to the comparison are not reported. Minor differences (including those interpreted as a scribal error) between the two versions of the *sNying po*, and between Nag tsho's and Pa tshab's translations, are reported in parentheses rather than in distinct columns.²⁴

For verses MA VI.23–26, 28–30 and XII.4, Nag tsho's and Pa tshab's translations mostly concord. When they differ, the version in the *sNying po* offers in three cases (MA VI.23a, VI.28b, XII.4b) a still different reading, but sides with Pa tshab's translation in two cases (MA VI.23d and IV.24a). Interestingly, in MA VI.23a, the *sNying po* has the alternative reading *log pa* where Nag tsho's translation reads *'khrul ba* and Pa tshab's reads

²³ The difference between the two translations of the MA is discussed in Tauscher 1983.

²⁴ The reading of MA in Nag tsho's translation is the one from P5261. Tauscher's verse-index (1989) provides alternative readings for these verses based on citations by later Tibetan scholars (such as Tsong kha pa), but no relevant variant was found for the verses under consideration. The reading of Pa tshab's translation of the MA is that from Louis de La Vallée Poussin's edition cited in the notes of Tauscher 1999a. I did not indicate here the variations of MA verses in D and P (all minor), nor the few variants in the reading of these verses in the MABh as they were not relevant for the comparison with *sNying po* (except in VI.23 and XII.4).

brdzun pa (for the Sanskrit *mṛṣā*).²⁵ But in VI.23d and IV.24a, where one also finds the same divergence—*'khrul ba* in Nag tsho's translation and *brdzun pa* in Pa tshab's—the *sNying po* reads *brdzun pa*, like in Pa tshab's translation. In MA XII.4, both Nag tsho's and Pa tshab's translations have 15-syllable lines. The corresponding verse in the *sNying po* has 15 syllables for lines a and b (different from Nag tsho and Pa tshab, but with common elements), and 13 syllables for lines c and d.

MA VI.23

	<i>sNying po</i>		MA (Nag tsho)	MA (Pa tshab)
	bKa' 24b6	T59,16–17		
a	<i>dngos tshogs yang dag log pa'i mthong pa yis</i>	<i>dngos tshogs yang dag mthong pa'i log pa yis</i>	<i>dngos kun yang dag mthong ba'i 'khrul pa yis</i>	<i>dngos kun yang dag rdzun pa mthong ba yis</i>
b	<i>dngos rnyed ngo bo gnyis ni 'dzin par 'gyur</i>		<i>dngos rnyed (Isnyed Nag tsho) ngo bo gnyis ni 'dzin par 'gyur</i>	
c	<i>yang dag mthong yul gang yin de nyid de</i>		<i>yang dag mthong yul gang yin de nyid de</i>	<i>yang dag mthong yul gang de (/gang yin MABh D) de nyid de</i>
d	<i>mthong ba brdzun pa kun rdzob bden par 'dod</i>	<i>mthong ba brdzun pa kun rdzob bden par gsungs</i>	<i>mthong ba 'khrul pa'i kun rdzob bden par gsungs</i>	<i>mthong ba bdzun pa kun rdzob bden par gsungs</i>

²⁵ This divergence is noted in Vose 2009: 234, n. 7, where the Sanskrit version of the stanza is cited: *samyagmṛṣādarśanalabdhabhāvaṃ rūpadvayaṃ bibhrati sarvabhāvāḥ | samyagdṛṣāṃ yo viśayaḥ sa tattvaṃ mṛṣādṛṣāṃ saṃvṛtisatyam utkam ||*

MA VI.24

	<i>sNying po</i>		MA (Nag tsho)	MA (Pa tshab)
	bKa' 24b4–5; T59,8–9			
a	<i>mthong ba brdzun pa rnam pa gnyis yin te</i>	<i>mthong ba 'khrul pa'ang rnam pa gnyis 'dod de</i>	<i>mthong ba brdzun pa'ang rnam pa gnyis 'dod de</i>	
b	<i>dbang po gsal dang dbang po skyon ldan no</i>	<i>dbang po gsal dang dbang po skyon ldan no</i>		
c	<i>skyon ldan dbang po rnams kyi shes pa ni</i>	<i>skyon ldan dbang can rnams kyi (/kyis Nag tsho) shes pa ni</i>		
d	<i>dbang po legs gyur (/gyur bKa') la ltos log par 'dod</i>	<i>dbang po legs gyur shes pa log par 'dod</i>	<i>dbang po legs gyur shes bltos log par 'dod</i>	

MA VI.25

	<i>sNying po</i>		MA (Nag tsho)	MA (Pa tshab)
	bKa' 25a1	T60,6–7		
a	<i>gnod pa myed pa dbang po drug po'i</i>	<i>gnod pa myed par dbang po drug po'i</i>	<i>gnod pa med pa'i dbang po drug rnams kyi (/kyis Pa tshab)</i>	
b	<i>yul gyur gang yin 'jig rten la ltos nas</i>		<i>bzung ba gang zhig 'jig rten gyis rtogs te</i>	
c	<i>'jig rten nyid las bden yin lhag ma ni</i>		<i>'jig rten nyid las bden yin lhag ma ni</i>	
d	<i>'jig rten la'ang log pa nyid du gzhang</i>		<i>'jig rten nyid las log par rnam par bzhag</i>	

MA VI.26

	<i>sNying po</i>		MA (Nag tsho)	MA (Pa tshab)
	bKa' 25a1–2; T60,9–10			
a	<i>mi shes gnyid kysis rab bskyod mu stegs can</i>		<i>mi shes gnyid kysis rab bskyod mu stegs can</i>	

b	<i>rnams kyis dngos rnams ji bzhin brtags pa dang</i>	<i>rnams kyis bdag nyid ji bzhin brtags pa dang</i>
c	<i>sgyu ma smyigs sgyu la sogs rnam brtags pa</i>	<i>sgyu ma smig rgyu sogs la brtags pa gang</i>
d	<i>'jig rten la'ang myed pa nyid du mthong</i>	<i>de dag 'jig rten las kyang yod min nyid</i>

MA VI.28

	<i>sNying po</i>		MA (Nag tsho)	MA (Pa tshab)
	bKa' 25a2	T60,12–13		
a	<i>gti mug rang bzhin sgrib phyir kun rdzob ste</i>		<i>gti mug rang bzhin sgrib phyir kun rdzob ste</i>	
b	<i>des (/de bKa') 'dir dngos rnams bden par gang brtags pa</i>		<i>des gang bden par mthong ba'i bcos ma de</i>	<i>des gang bcos ma bden par snang de ni</i>
c	<i>kun rdzob bden par thub pa des gsungs te</i>	<i>kun rdzob bden zhes thub pa des gsungs te</i>	<i>kun rdzob bden zhes thub pa des (/de Nag tsho) gsung te</i>	
d	<i>bcos mar gyur pa'i bden pa kun rdzob du</i>	<i>bcos mar gyur pa'i bden pa kun rdzob du'o</i>	<i>bcos mar gyur pa'i dnogs ni kun rdzob tu'o</i>	

MA VI.29

	<i>sNying po</i>		MA (Nag tsho)	MA (Pa tshab)
	bKa' 25a3–4	T61,1–2		
a	<i>rab rib mthu yis skra shad lasogs pa</i>		<i>rab rib mthu yis skra shad (/bshad Nag tsho) la sogs pa'i</i>	
b	<i>dngos po log pa gang zhig rnam brtags pas</i>	<i>dngos po log pa gang zhig rnam brtags pa</i>	<i>ngo bo log pa gang zhig rnam brtags pa</i>	

c	<i>de nyid bdag nyid gang gis myig dag pa</i>	<i>de'i bdag nyid gang gis myig dag pa</i>	<i>de nyid bdag nyid gang du mig dag pas</i>
d	<i>mthong ba gang yin de bzhin 'dir shes bya</i>	<i>mthong de de nyid de bzhin 'dir shes kyis</i>	

MA VI.30

	<i>sNying po</i>		MA (Nag tsho)	MA (Pa tshab)
	bKa' 25b1–2; T62,1–2			
a	<i>gal te 'jig rten tshad ma nyid yin na</i>		<i>gal te 'jig rten tshad ma yin na ni</i>	
b	<i>'jig rten de nyid mthong yin 'phags gzhan gyis</i>		<i>'jig rten de nyid mthong bas 'phags gzhan gyis</i>	
c	<i>ci dgos 'phags pa'i lam gyis ci byar yod</i>		<i>ci dgos 'phags pa'i lam gyis ci zhig bya</i>	
d	<i>blun po tshad mar gyur pa ga la yod</i>		<i>blun po tshad mar rigs pa'ang ma yin no</i>	

MA XII.4

	<i>sNying po</i>		MA (Nag tsho)	MA (Pa tshab)
	bKa' 24b1–2	T58,17–20		
a	<i>gang phyir chos nyid skye myed yin zhing blo'ang skye ba dang bral ba</i>	<i>gang phyir chos nyid skye myed yin zhing blo la skye ba dang bral ba</i>	<i>gang tshe skye med de nyid yin zhing blo yang skye ba dang bral ba</i>	
b	<i>de phyir de rnams sten la de'is de nyid rig pa lta bu ste</i>	<i>de phyir de rnam rten la de yis de nyid rig pa lta bu ste</i>	<i>de tshe de rnam rten las de yis de nyid rtogs par brjod bya ste</i>	<i>de tshe de rnam rten (/ rnams bsten MABh D) las de yis de nyid rtogs pa lta bu ste</i>
c	<i>gang phyir sems ni yul gyi rnam par byung pas de'i yul</i>		<i>ji ltar sems ni gang gi rnam pa can du 'gyur ba de yis yul</i>	

d	<i>de rab rig pa de bzhin tha snyad brten nas rig pa yin</i>	<i>de yongs shes pa de bzhin tha snyad nye bar²⁶ rten (/ bsten MABh, Nag tsho) nas rig pa yin</i>
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The situation is different for the verses of the MA that are also cited in the PsP (MA VI.8cd, 14ab, 100). There Nag tsho's and Pa tshab's translations are significantly different in structure: the former has verses with 11 syllables per line (12 in MA VI.100b), the latter has verses with 13 syllables per line.

- For VI.8cd, the version cited in the *sNying po* also has 13 syllables per line and matches Pa tshab's translation of the MA with a minor difference in line d.²⁷

MA VI.8

	<i>sNying po</i>	MA (Nag tsho)	MA (Pa tshab)	PsP (Pa tshab)
	bKa' 25b5–6; T63,5–6			
c	<i>de ni de las 'byung na yon tan 'ga' yang yod ma yin</i>	<i>de ni de las 'byung na yon tan 'ga' yang med</i>	<i>de ni de las 'byung na yon tan 'ga' yang yod ma yin</i>	<i>de las de ni 'byung na yon tan 'ga' yang yod ma yin</i>
d	<i>skyes par gyur pa slar yang skye bar rigs pa ma yin nyid</i>	<i>skye zin slar yang skye bar rigs pa'ang ma yin nyid</i>	<i>skyes par gyur pa slar yang skye bar rigs pa'ang ma yin nyid</i>	

- For MA VI.14ab, line b in the *sNying po* matches Pa tshab's translation in 13 syllables. So does line a in *sNying po* T. But line a in *sNying po* bKa' has 11 syllables, but is different from Nag tsho's 11-syllable translation.

²⁶ The two-syllable expression *nye bar* is omitted in MA (P and D), but present in MABh. The two syllables are needed to arrive at 15 syllables like in the previous three lines.

²⁷ Pa tshab's translation of the same verses in the PsP is slightly different for line c. The translation of the PsP was made in Kashmir by Mahāsumati and Pa tshab, then revised by Pa tshab and Kanakavarman in Tibet (MacDonald 2015, vol. I: 15–17, Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 45).

MA VI.14

	<i>sNying po</i>		MA (Nag tsho)	MA (Pa tshab)
	bKa' 26a2	T63,17–18		
a	<i>gzhan la brten pas gzhan zhig 'byung par 'gyur na ni</i>	<i>gzhan la brten nas gal te gzhan zhig 'byung bar 'gyur na ni</i>	<i>gal te gzhan la brten nas gzhan zhig 'byung na ni</i>	<i>gzhan la brten nas gal te gzhan zhig 'byung bar 'gyur na ni</i>
b	<i>'o na me lce las kyang mun pa 'thug po 'byung 'gyur zhing</i>		<i>me lce las kyang mun pa 'thug po 'byung 'gyur zhing</i>	<i>'o na me lce las kyang mun pa 'thug po 'byung 'gyur zhing</i>

- For MA VI.100, lines a and b in the *sNying po* version match exactly Pa tshab's translation of the MA. Pa tshab's translation of the same verses in the PsP is completely different, but also has 13 syllables per line. Line c in *sNying po* bKa' has 13 syllables and resembles Pa tshab's translation, but line c in T counts 11 syllables (different from Nag tsho's translation in 11 syllables). For line d, both T and bKa' have a line of 11 syllables, which is different from Nag tsho's translation.

MA VI.100

	<i>sNying po</i>		MA (Nag tsho)	MA (Pa tshab)	PsP (Pa tshab)
	bKa' 26a4–5	T64,7–8			
a	<i>gal te 'gro ba rgyu yis stong bar gyur na nam mkha' yi (mkha'i T)</i>		<i>gal te 'gro ba rgyu yis stong na nam mkha' yi</i>	<i>gal te 'gro ba rgyu yis stong par gyur na nam mkha' yi</i>	<i>gal te rgyu yis stong na 'gro ba 'di dag gzung bya min</i>
b	<i>ud pa la'i dri mdog ji bzhin gzung du myed nyid na</i>		<i>utpala dri mdog ji bzhin gzung du med 'gyur na</i>	<i>ut pa la yi dri mdog ji bzhin gzung du med nyid na</i>	<i>ji ltar nam mkha'i utpala yi dri dang kha dog bzhin</i>

c	<i>shin tu ches bkra' 'jig rten pa'i 'dzin yin de'i phyir</i>	<i>shin tu ches bkra 'jig rten pa yis 'dzin de'i phyir</i>	<i>shin tu bkra ba'i 'jig rten 'dzin pa'ang yin de'i phyir</i>	<i>shin tu ches bkra'i 'jig rten 'dzin pa'ang yin de'i (de yi) phyir</i>
d	<i>rang gi blo bzhin 'jig rten rgyu las yin shes (Jzhes T) bya</i>	<i>rang gi blo bzhin 'jig rten rgyu las byung shes kyi</i>	<i>rang gi blo bzhin 'jig rten rgyu las yin par shes par gyis</i>	

When it comes to the verses of the VV and the CŚ (also cited in the PsP), the version in the *sNying po* differs from both the translation of these verses in the PsP and the respective revised translations that found their way into the *bsTan 'gyur*.

- For the VV, the translation found in the *bsTan 'gyur* was made in 842 by Jñānagarbha and later revised by Jayānanda and Khu mDo sde 'bar, probably around 1120–1140 (Vose 2009: 48 and 54; Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 43). The translation in the PsP matches that of the VV in the *bsTan 'gyur*. However, a quite different Tibetan version of the verse is found in Jayānanda's MA-ṭīkā—Jayānanda obviously did not rely on his revised translation of the VV when translating this verse in the MA-ṭīkā as part of the quotation from PsP. The revised version is found in the works of rMa bya Byang chub brtson 'grus, a student of Jayānanda and Khu mDo sde 'bar (see below Section 3 (1)), with a minor difference in line d, in which rMa bya's works read *nga ni*, like in *sNying po* T (*De nyid snang ba* 13a2, *'Thad rgyan* 21a6–b1).

VV 29

	<i>sNying po</i>		VV <i>bsTan 'gyur</i> (Jayānanda, Khu) =PsP (Pa tshab)	MA-ṭīkā (D121b2)
	bKa' 25b3	T62,8–9		
a	<i>gang tshe nga la dam bca' yod</i>		<i>gal te ngas dam bca' 'ga' yod</i>	<i>gal te nga la dam bca' 'ga'</i>
b	<i>nga la skyon de yod pa yin</i>		<i>des na nga la skyon de yod</i>	<i>yod par gyur na skyon 'di 'byung</i>
c	<i>nga la dam bca' myed pas na</i>		<i>nga la dam bca' med pas na</i>	<i>bdag la dam bca' med pas na</i>

d	<i>nga la skyon myed kho na yin</i>	<i>nga ni skyon myed kho na yin</i>	<i>nga la skyon med kho na yin</i>	<i>de phyir skyon 'di bdag la med</i>
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As for the CŚ, the canonical Tibetan version of the *Catuḥśataka* is the translation made by Pa tshab and Sūkṣmajana in Kashmir (Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 45).²⁸ The Tibetan of the verse in the PsP differs from it in line b. That in Pa tshab's translation of the MABh has a small difference in line c. Again, the verse in Jayānanda's MA-ṭīkā is different from all the other versions. Interestingly the translation cited by Phya pa is identical to the version of the verse in the Tibetan translation of Śāntaraṅgita's *Madhyamakālamkāra* 68 (Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 122–123), except in line c (line c in the *sNying po* is similar to Pa tshab's translation). The translation of the *Madhyamakālamkāra* was carried out by Ye shes sde and Śīlendraboḍhi at the time of the first diffusion of Buddhism in Tibet.

CŚ XVI.25

	<i>sNying po</i> bKa' 25b4; T62,11–12	<i>Madhyamakā-</i> <i>lamkāra</i> 68 (Ye shes sde)	CŚ <i>bsTan</i> 'gyur (Pa tshab)	MABh D311b5–6 (Pa tshab)	PsP (Pa tshab)	MA-ṭīkā (D121b1)
a	<i>yod dang myed dang yod myed ces</i>	<i>yod dang med dang yod med ces</i>	<i>yod dang med dang yod med zhes</i>			<i>yod dang med dang yod med ces</i>
b	<i>khas mi len pa gang yin pa</i>	<i>khas mi len pa gang yin pa</i>	<i>gang la phyogs ni yod min pa</i>		<i>phyogs ni gang la'ang yod min pa</i>	<i>phyogs gang la ni yod min la</i>
c	<i>de la yun ni ring por yang</i>	<i>de la nan tan ldan pas kyang</i>	<i>de la yun ni ring po na'ang</i>	<i>de la yun ni ring po la'ang</i>	<i>de la yun ni ring po na'ang</i>	<i>yun ni ring por yang de'i skyon</i>
d	<i>cir yang klan ka bya mi nus</i>	<i>cir yang lkan ka bya mi nus</i>	<i>klan ka brjod par (pa CŚ) nus ma yin</i>			<i>brjod par nus pa ma yin no</i>

²⁸ I report here the reading of the verses as cited in Tauscher 1999a: 62.

What can we conclude from this comparison? The translation of the VV and CŚ in the *sNying po* appears to reflect an ancient translation, before the revision by Jayānanda and Pa tshab, respectively. As for the MA verse, the kind of differences that are observable between the *sNying po* version and Nag tsho's and Pa tshab's translations of the MA verses are notably differences in the choice of translation for specific terms, differences in sentence structure, and differences in the number of syllables per line (as in MA XII.4cd). But there is still a common basis, namely, whole verses or lines for which the *sNying po* concurs with these translations or with one of them. This excludes that the *sNying po* reflects a translation completely independent from these two. The cases where the translation in the *sNying po* includes portions that differ from both Nag tsho's and Pa tshab's translations (while still involving portions that are identical to those two) could suggest that the version that Phya pa is citing corresponds to Nag tsho's translation before it was revised by Pa tshab. Verses (respectively, lines) that count 11 syllables in the *sNying po*, 11 syllables in Nag tsho's translation revised by Pa tshab, and 13 syllables in Pa tshab's new translation, strongly speak in favor of such a hypothesis. On the other hand, verses MA VI.8cd, 14ab and 100ab reflect Pa tshab's new translation, at least in one or the other version of the *sNying po*.

The differences in versions T and bKa' of the *sNying po* seem to indicate that modifications took place in the course of the transmission of the *sNying po*, by way of "updating" the translation of the verses originally present in the *sNying po*. Thus, for verses MA VI.23a and VI.100c, the reading in T is closer to Nag tsho's translation, the reading in bKa' closer to Pa tshab's translation. But for MA VI.14a it is the opposite. Should such an "update" be postulated as well for the other cases where both T and bKa' side with Pa tshab's translation? While this is possible, one might, under such a hypothesis, expect a higher proportion of verses matching Pa tshab's translation. A more likely option would be that Pa tshab's new translation was already in circulation at the time Phya pa was writing (respectively, at the time the author of Phya pa's mediating source was writing), but had not yet replaced the previous translation(s) on a broad scale. Phya pa would thus be quoting these verses in a mixture of the older and the newer translation.²⁹

²⁹ Phya pa's acquaintance with the MA is also reported in the colophon of Phya pa's doxography, but no verses from the work are cited. The MA is mentioned along with the other works on which the author relied for his presentation of philosophical systems (*gZhung rnam 'byed* 33b1–3: ...*slob dpon zla ba grags pa*'i

At this point, I was able to identify only one other work that cites these verses in the same translation as the *sNying po*, the doxography of Klong chen pa (*Grub mtha' mdzod*), which, as mentioned earlier, re-uses a lot of material from Phya pa's works.³⁰ Tracing in other Tibetan works the occurrence of the verses in the form attested in each of the two manuscripts of the *sNying po* might help shed more light on this issue of textual history.³¹

3. The opponent's method of argumentation—Logical notions and terminology

In the *sNying po* (§125.111.3), the method prescribed by “Candrakīrti and others” for negating proliferations is termed *khas blangs nang 'gal ba* (in T) or *khas blangs na 'gal ba* (in bKa'). The variation might be due to a

dbu ma la 'jug pa'i gzhung rnam las bsduṣ ste). The relative chronology of the *sNying po* and the *gZhung rnam 'byed* is as yet unclear.

³⁰ Klong chen pa indeed cites the same verses as Phya pa (at the exception of MA VI.26 and MA VI.30, and the fourth quarter of MA VI.28). They are found on the following pages in the Beijing edition of the *Grub mtha' mdzod*: p. 111 (VV 29, CŚ XVI.25), p. 108 (MA VI.8cd), p. 109 (VI.14ab), p. 106 (VI.23), p. 102 (VI.24), p. 104 (VI.25), p. 103 (VI.28), p. 105 (VI.29), p. 110 (VI.100), p. 101 (XII.4). In many cases the verses or lines of the verses appear in a version identical to the *sNying po*, against Nag tsho's and Pa tshab's translations (see in particular MA VI.8d, VI.24a, c and d, VI.29a, b and d, VI.100d, and XII.4). In the first citation of MA VI.23a and d and VI.100c, the *Grub mtha' mdzod* more specifically concord with *sNying po* bKa' against *sNying po* T. This is, however, not the only scenario one meets in the Tibetan translation of these verses in the *Grub mtha' mdzod* (of which I only consulted the Beijing edition). There are also cases of a verse or a line identical to *sNying po* and Pa tshab's translation (which is, in some cases, identical to Nag tsho's, in other cases not), cases where the *Grub mtha' mdzod* version matches Nag tsho's and Pa tshab's translation (the two being almost identical) against the *sNying po* version, and cases where it differs from all other versions. This mixture of scenarios is found also for the citation of VV 29. That of CŚ, on the other hand, clearly sides with Pa tshab's translation against *sNying po*.

³¹ Apart from Klong chen pa's works, the only correspondence that I found through a search of the e-texts available via the Buddhist Digital Resource Center (www.tbrc.org at the time of writing) is for MA VI.30, which is cited in the same version as in the *sNying po* in volume Cha of the *Sa skya bka' 'bum* among the works of the Sa skya hierarch Grags pa rgyal mtshan (1147–1216). The correspondence to the exact folio is unknown. On the issue of variation in quotations, see Roesler 2015, which examines, among other cases, variant quotations of MA II.5 and MA VI.226 in a work of Po to ba, noting that these may be interpreted as representing Nag tsho's unrevised translation (499–501). Besides variations indicative of earlier or alternative translations, Roesler highlights the possibility that discrepancies in quotations might be due to inexact memory, or to an author drawing from a secondary source.

scribal mistake. Indeed, final “-ng” and *tsheg* are very similar in cursive script. It is difficult to assess which was the reading intended by Phya pa. The occurrence of the related expression *khas len na 'gal ba'i thal 'gyur* (see below) with the same reading in the two manuscripts might be an argument—although not a conclusive one—in favor of reading *khas blangs na 'gal ba*.³² The two expressions, however, do not imply a significant difference in meaning. *Khas blangs na 'gal ba* can be translated as “incompatibility with regard to what is accepted,” *khas blangs nang 'gal ba* as “internal contradiction [pertaining to] what is accepted.” This method is also referred to simply in terms of *'gal ba* (“incompatibility”) in the next subsection (§125.111.3, v).

The first mention of this method in terms of *khas blangs na(/nang) 'gal* is illustrated by an example:

If [something] is already existent (*ye nas yod pa*), it is contradictory that [its] arising would be meaningful (*skye ba don yod pa*). If the arising [of something] is meaningful (*skye ba don yod na*), it is contradictory that [it] would be already existent (*ye nas yod pa*), etc.³³

The statement points out the incompatibility (*'gal ba*) between two items A and B, which are accepted by the addressee of the argument. Their incompatibility itself is, as subsequent discussions mention, a matter of the addressee’s acceptance. In the illustration, the argument targets a proponent of Sāṃkhya philosophy who accepts both:

- (A) that something is already existent (*ye nas yod pa*) (this is equivalent to the Sāṃkhya claim that effects already exist in the cause [*rgyu la 'bras bu yod pa*]);
- (B) that its arising is meaningful (*skye ba don yod pa*).

The above argument is a short version of the refutation of “arising from self,” which is further discussed in §125.111.4 [a]. In the introduction to the section illustrating the application of this method for refuting arising

³² The works of rMa bya also present the alternance of *na 'gal* and *nang 'gal* in this expression, with the addition of the expression with *na nang 'gal* (see below Section 4.2.1., n. 53). The passage of Klong chen pa’s doxography in which he is re-using Phya pa’s account (see fn. 11) has the reading *nang 'gal*. Later authors such as Go rams pa (1429–1489) favor the phrasing *nang 'gal*. See Cabezón/Dargyay 2006: 178 (*khas blangs nang 'gal bstan pa*) and 192 (*khas blang nang 'gal gyi thal 'gyur 'ba' zhig brjod*).

³³ *sNying po* §124.111.3 (iv) (T 62,5–6, bKa’ 25b2–3): *ye nas yod na skye ba don yod par 'gal la skye ba don yod na ye nas yod par 'gal zhes pa la sogs pa*.

(§125.111.4), the method for negating proliferations is more specifically called *khas len na 'gal ba'i thal 'gyur*, i.e., “a consequence (*thal 'gyur*) involving/relying on the incompatibility with regard to what is accepted.” In each of the sections [a], [b] and [d], in which arising from self, from something else, and arising without a cause are negated, the argumentative method actually involves three arguments, the technical terms for which are:

- (1) *'gal ba sdud pa'i thal 'gyur*
- (2) *'go snyom pa*
- (3) *bsgrub bya dang mtshungs pa.*

In what follows, I consider these three notions with a focus on their use in the refutation of “arising from self” [a].

Text of *sNying po* §125.111.4 [a] (T 63,1–14; bKa' 25b5–26a1)³⁴

des na **khas blangs na 'gal ba'i thal 'gyur** kho nas spros pa gcod de |

[a]

(i) grangs can pa dag

[p1] mngon par gsal ba (**m**) lasogs pa^a ye nas yod pa (**A**) la skye ba
don myed pas (**nonB**) kyang^b khyab par yang 'dod la |

[p2] dngos po rnams rgyu'i dus na 'bras bu'i ngo bo'ang^c ye nas yod
par (**A**) yang^d 'dod pas |
de ni de las 'byung na yon tan 'ga' yang yod ma yin ||
skyes par gyur pa slar yang skye bar rigs pa ma yin nyid ||
(MA VI.8cd)

ces

[p3] nang gi skye mched lasogs pa (**S**) mi gsal ba rgyu'i dus na'ang (**n**)
ye nas yod par (**A**) yang 'dod cing

[p4] da gdod skye dgos par (**B**) 'dod pa na |

(ii) rgyu'i dus na (**n**) nang gi skye mched (**S**) ye nas yod pa'i (**A**) phyir
skye ba don myed par (**nonB**) thal zhes '**gal ba sdud pa'i thal 'gyur**
brjod la |

³⁴ Differences between the two versions pertaining to punctuation and to orthography (in particular, the consistent spelling *myi* in bKa' against *mi* in T, the alternance '*ga*'/*ga*, *pa/ba*) have not been recorded. Titles, numbers and letters in parentheses and marking in bold characters are editorial. A re-use of this section by Klong chen Rab 'byams pa is found in *Grub mtha' mdzod* 108,11–109,6.

(iii) de khyab pa ma grub par rtog na mi gsal ba'i dus na (n) ye nas yod (A) kyang skye tshod du (B)mngon par gsal ba'i dus na'ang (m) ye nas yod (A) kyang skye dgos par 'gyur (B) la | de (m) skye mi dgos pa'i tshod du (nonB) mi gsal ba'i dus na'ang (n) ye nas yod pa (A) la skye mi dgos pas (nonB) khyab

ces 'go snyom pa dang |

(iv) mngon par gsal ba'i (m) yod pa (A) la skye mi dgos (nonB) pas khyab kyang mi gsal ba'i (n) yod pa (A) la skye^e mi dgos (nonB) pas ma khyab po zhes 'byed na

khyad par de **bsgrub bya dang mtshungs** te | rgyu la 'bras bu yod pa de (A) kho bo cag la ma grub pa ltar khyad par de yang ma grub po

zhes pas

(v) rang las skye ba 'gegs pa dang |

^a Given that *mngon par gsal ba* is later opposed to *mi gsal ba*, the mention *lasogs pa* is not intended to cover *mi gsal ba*. I suspect that *la sogs pa* followed the mention of an example that got lost.

^b bKa' pas kyang : T pas

^c T ngo bo'ang : bKa' ngo bo

^d bKa' yod par yang : T yod par

^e T(em.), bKa' skye : T(ms) skyi

(1) 'gal ba sdud pa'i thal 'gyur

The first type of argument, which one can translate as “a consequence in which incompatible items are brought together,”³⁵ is none other than “a consequence involving/relying on the incompatibility with regard to what is accepted” (*khas len na 'gal ba'i thal 'gyur*). It takes the characteristic form of an argument by consequence, in which the incompatibility between A and B has become the basis for the entailment (i.e., A entails nonB):

³⁵ In Phya pa's epistemological works the expression '*gal ba sdud pa* is used to refer to two incompatible properties being applied together to the same basis (*gzhi gcig la 'gal ba sdud pa*). See *Mun sel* 92b7–93a1, 'Od zer 195b3. It might be considered a synonym to the almost homophonic expression '*gal ba 'du ba*, which Phya pa frequently uses in these works (e.g., *Mun sel* 6b3, 6b4, 16a2, 22a2, 32b3; 'Od zer 7a3, 63b5–6, 131b6), and which is often found also in the *sNang 'grel* (for instance 9a5, 12b4, 60a2) and the *rGyan 'grel* (for instance 21a3, 25b8, 26a2), and occurs a couple times in the *bDen gnyis rnam bshad* (21a5, 23b7) and the *sNying po* itself (T 47,5 and 116,21). See also n. 49, and the alternative use of the expressions *khas blangs 'gal ba 'dus pa* and *khas blangs la 'gal ba sdud pa* in the *bDen gnyis 'chad pa* mentioned at the end of Section 4.2.3.

Because (*phyir*) S is A, it follows (*thal*) that it is nonB (for arguments [a] and [d])

or

It follows that S is nonB (*thal*) because it is A (*phyir*) (for argument [b]).³⁶

The refutation of “arising from self” accordingly has the form (see Text §(ii) above for the Tibetan):

Because the inner sense-field at the time of the cause (S) is already existent (A), it follows that its arising is meaningless (nonB).

A and B represent here the same items that were pointed out to be incompatible in the previous illustration of the opponent’s method (see above n. 33).

The statement of the argument by consequence identified as a *'gal ba sdud pa'i thal 'gyur* is preceded by a list of claims that the addressee of the argument is said to accept. In the case of the refutation of arising from self [a], the Sāṃkhya is said to accept the following (see Text, §(i)):

- [p1] For what is manifest, etc., “already existent” (A) entails “arising is meaningless” (nonB)
- [p2] For entities, the nature of the effect is already existent at the time of the cause (A)
- [p3] Non-manifest (entities) such as the inner sense-field, etc., are already existent at the time of the cause (A)
- [p4] (For non-manifest entities) arising is necessary (B)

That the addressee subscribes to these tenets ensures that the consequence is pertinent. Here the proponent should make sure that the addressee

- (a) accepts the premise ‘S is A’
- (b) accepts the premise ‘A entails nonB’
- (c) does not accept the conclusion that follows from the premises, namely, that ‘S is nonB’³⁷

³⁶ It is not obvious whether this is supposed to represent the actual statement—what the proponent would state in the debate—or is a metalinguistic reference to the statement, which reveals the form of the argument. Typically, the metalinguistic statement expresses the conclusion derived from the first premise, which might be considered a fault for an actual statement. On this difference, see Hugon 2013: 675–676.

³⁷ In *sNyung po* §125.112.21 (T 70,5) the consequence is characterized as “genuine” (*rnal ma*). In Phya pa’s own system, this amounts to a consequence to which the addressee cannot retort that he does not accept the premises or that he accepts the

Requirement (a) is satisfied, because ‘S is A’ corresponds to [p3], which is a particular case of [p2], the Sāṃkhya tenet that effects already exist at the time of the cause. Requirement (c) is satisfied because the Sāṃkhya holds that ‘S is B’ (= [p4]). The entailment (b) is here a key issue. According to [p1], the Sāṃkhya readily concedes that “being already existent” (A) entails “arising not being necessary” (nonB) in the case of what is manifest (*mngon par gsal ba*, Skt. *abhivyakti*).³⁸ For instance, the Sāṃkhya would accept that a pot in the form of a pot present in front of one does not require arising. The Sāṃkhya wouldn’t object in this case to the argument stated in MA VI.8cd, namely, that “the origination once again of what has [already] originated is simply not reasonable.”³⁹ But they would not accept this when it comes to a pot at the stage of a lump of clay, i.e., at the stage it is non-manifest. At such a stage, the pot is already existent (A) (= [p3]), but does require arising (B) (= [p4]).⁴⁰

The question of the entailment is taken up in two follow-up arguments marked with the terms *’go snyom pa* (“equality”) and *bsgrub bya dang mtshungs (pa)* (“similarity to what is to be proven”).

conclusion (see Hugon 2013). In the *sNying po* the notion of a “genuine consequence” is discussed in terms of the premises being established for the opponent and the conclusion not being accepted (see *sNying po* §125.112.13 T 68,17).

³⁸ See Text, note α on my interpretation of *la sogs pa* in this sentence.

³⁹ Trans. MacDonald 2015: 51–52. In the MA this verse represents the argument against arising from self. The place of the citation of MA VI.8cd in the *sNying po* misleadingly suggests that it supports [p3], whereas it is more logical that it is cited to support [p1]. In the parallel passage in Klong chen pa’s *Grub mtha’ mdzod* (108,11–109,6), verse MA VI.8cd is presented as stating a consequence, namely, the Sāṃkhya has to accept that A entails nonB (irrespectively of the subject).

⁴⁰ In the PsP, the Sāṃkhya’s acceptance that a pot situated in front of one does not require re-arising enables the case of the “pot situated in front” to be used as an example when establishing, through an other-acknowledged inference, “not requiring re-arising” (*punarutpādānapekṣa*) from the logical reason “[already] existent by own nature” (*svātmanā vidyamānam*) for a pot at the stage of a lump of clay and other “things disposed to arise” (*utpitsupadārtha*). See PsP §29–30, and MacDonald 2015: 80–82, n. 173–175. Note that Phya pa’s portrayal does not mention explicitly the example of the “pot in front of one” or of the “pot as a lump of clay,” but only the “inner sense-field” as an instance of something that is non-manifest. (Also, Phya pa does not speak of “re-arising” but only of “arising.”) The “inner sense-field” figures as the subject in Bhāviveka’s inference criticized by Candrakīrti in the PsP (§27), as well as in the other-acknowledged inference that Candrakīrti proposes, based on Buddhapālita’s statement (§29–30).

(2) 'go snyom pa

In the refutation of arising from self [a] the first follow-up argument in answer to the qualm that the entailment “A entails nonB” might not be established draws out the “equality” (*'go snyom pa*) between the case of an entity at the time it is non-manifest (n) and the case of an entity at the time it is manifest (m) (like for instance a pot as a lump of clay and a pot in front of one). The argument is that if B necessarily follows from A in one case, it must also follow from A in the other; but if nonB follows from A in one case, it must also follow from A in the other. This amounts to an argument by parity of reasoning: what is entailed must be the same because the same reason applies. As stated in the *sNying po* (Text, §[iii]):

Assuming that (an entity) at the time it is non-manifest (must) arise even though it is already existent, then also at the time something is manifest, arising is necessary even though (the entity) is already existent. But assuming that arising is not necessary (at the time an entity is manifest), also at the time (an entity) is non-manifest, being already existent entails that arising is not necessary. This is the (argument of) equality.

The goal of this argument is to force the Sāṃkhya to accept that A entails nonB in every case, and in particular in the case of an entity that is non-manifest at the time of its cause, of which the subject (S) is an instance.

(3) bsgrub bya dang mtshungs pa

The second follow-up argument provides an answer to a potential objection to the argument by parity of reasoning. The Sāṃkhya might argue that there is no “equality” precisely because there is a “difference” (*khyad par*) between the case of entities that are manifest (m) and those that are non-manifest (n): A entails nonB for the former (=p1), but not for the latter (=p4). The argument is stated as follows (see Text, §(iv)):

Should one object, making a distinction as follows:

The existence of what is manifest (A[m]) entails that arising is not necessary (nonB), but the existence of what is non-manifest (A[n]) does not entail that arising is not necessary (nonB).

[We answer:] This distinction is similar to what is to be proven. Just like the existence of the effect in the cause (=A)⁴¹ is not established for us, this distinction itself is not established.

⁴¹ One should understand that the “existence of the effect in the cause” is equivalent to “being already existent” (A). In arguments [b] and [d], the answer includes the literal expression of A in this sentence.

Invoking the “similarity to what is to be proven” (*bsgrub bya dang mtshungs pa*) is akin to appealing to *petitio principii*, the fault of presenting as a reason something which is to be proven. The objection against the establishment of the entailment by way of “equality” indeed relies on a distinction that amounts to saying that nonB is found in some cases qualified by A but not in other cases qualified by A. The retort points out that A itself is not established for the Buddhist at all—this is something that would have to be proven. Thus invoking a difference between cases where A applies is not a legitimate reason, as A itself would first need to be established.

The outcome of the three-part argument is, in each case, that item A is negated.⁴² How each argument purports to negate each option of arising is actually a moot point. It can be understood as an application of the principle that premises that lead to an unwanted conclusion should be rejected (or negated). The addressee is here expected to reject the premise ‘S is A’. But in practice he could also reject ‘A entails nonB’ (the follow-up arguments seem to be there to ensure that this does not happen), or reject both premises, or accept the derived conclusion nonB and reject B, or just remain puzzled as to what part of the set of tenets he holds is problematic. Phya pa’s standpoint is that unless establishment of specific features by a valid cognition is involved, such arguments do *refute* the opponent (insofar as the opponent is unable to retort), but do not *negate* any tenet held by the latter.

4. Mediating source(s) for Phya pa’s account

Although Phya pa does refer to Candrakīrti as the proponent of the views he criticizes, his portrayal of the opponent’s views illustrates specific logical concepts and technical terms that are not found in Candrakīrti’s works.

Against the option that the formatting was Phya pa’s creation, one can remark that the types of arguments (1) and (3) discussed above are not part of Phya pa’s own theory of argumentation and are not discussed

⁴² The option being negated corresponds exactly to item A in [b] and [d]. But in [a], the outcome of the argument is that “arising from self is negated” (*rang las skye ba ’gegs pa*), whereas item A is “being already existent” (*ye nas yod pa*). The two are to be understood to be equivalent. Śākya mchog ldan’s rephrasing of argument [a] (which he calls *’gal ba brjod pa’i thal ’gyur*) has *bdag la(s) skye ba* for A (*dBu margya mtsho*, chap. 2, vol. 14, 54b1–2 [p. 520]). Klong chen pa also equates the two notions (*Grub mtha’ mdzod* 108,12–13: *rgyu la yod pa skye bas rang las skye ba ’dod*).

or even mentioned elsewhere in his works.⁴³ This is not surprising for *'gal ba sdud pa'i thal 'gyur* (1) and *khas lang na(nang) 'gal ba'i thal 'gyur*, since these terms precisely refer to a method of argumentation by consequence that Phya pa rejects, and only discusses in this particular section of the *sNying po*.

The argument called *'go snyom pa* (2) finds an echo in Phya pa's profuse use of arguments by parallels (on which see Hugon 2008). The *'go snyom pa* argument considered above would amount to a one-step argument by parallels (those usually have more than one step) invoking the parallel between the domain involving the elements (n, A, B) and the domain involving the elements (m, A, B). And it would thus be a special case, for in most instances of arguments by parallel, the elements of the source domain are not preserved in the target domain (as is here the case with A and B). Phya pa does not use the term *'go snyom pa* to refer to arguments by parallels. He calls them on one occurrence *mgo' bsgres*, and uses the verb (*b*)*sgre* to mark parallel statements. Not counting the account of the three arguments by consequence [a], [b] and [d] in the *sNying po*, Phya pa uses the expression *'go snyom* (spelled *mgo snyom*) on a single occasion elsewhere in the *sNang 'grel* (43b3).⁴⁴ However, we will see in Section 4.2.2. that *mgo' bsgres* appears as an alternative expression for what is, in *sNying po*, called *'go snyom pa*.

It is likely that these technical notions are those used by his opponent, and that Phya pa is drawing from the works of Tibetan followers of Candrakīrti's Madhyamaka or repeating (maybe adapting) an earlier portrayal-cum-criticism of their position. Tracing the occurrence of the arguments termed *'gal ba sdud pa'i thal 'gyur*, *khas lang na(nang) 'gal ba'i thal 'gyur*, *'go snyom pa* and *bsgrub bya dang mtshungs pa* can help us zoom in on the source for Phya pa's account.

⁴³ The expression *bsgrub bya dang mtshungs pa* is not used elsewhere in Phya pa's works in the sense it has in this passage of the *sNying po*. For instance, in *Mun sel* 22a4 the expression is used to indicate the similarity between what is to be proven and what is to be defined.

⁴⁴ The expression *mgo snyom* is used in *sNang 'grel* 43b3 (*rnam pa du ma yin yang ngo bo gcig yin na ha cang thal ba ni yon tan la sogs pa zhes pa ste mgo snyom pa'o* ||) to gloss on MĀ D182b4: *yon tan la sogs pa'i chos 'gal ba dang ldan pa yang gcig pa nyid yin na ni sna tshogs kyang gcig pa nyid du thal la* | "If what has contradictory properties such as qualities, etc. is one, it would follow that what is manifold also is one." Phya pa uses elsewhere in the *sNang 'grel* the expressions *mgo mtshungs pa* (45b4, 59a2, 70a5), *mtshungs par bsgre ba* (60a4), and *bsgre* (70a5) in the same sense.

4.1. *Previous refutations of pro-Candrakīrtian scholars*

Phya pa is certainly not the first to express disagreement with the view that Mādhyamikas have no thesis and do not resort to autonomous arguments. Go rams pa reports that Klu mes Tshul khriṃs shes rab (10th cent.) and others already criticized such a view.⁴⁵ Closer to Phya pa's time, relevant first-hand evidence of arguments against this view can be found in the works of two scholars linked with the tradition stemming from rNgog Blo ldan shes rab (1059–1109) in gSang phu: Gro lung pa Blo gros 'byung gnas (ca. 1040s–1120s) and rGya dmar ba Byang chub grags.

The first, who studied under rNgog Blo ldan shes rab, but also under Atiśa (982–1054) and 'Brom ston rGyal ba'i 'byung gnas (1004/1005–1064), refutes in his *bsTan rim chen mo* “some previous teachers” (*sngon gyi slob dpon kha cig*) who advocate the use of consequences exclusively and do not accept autonomous means of valid cognition (see Cabezón 2010: 49). Apart from the shared core thematic under discussion, there is no remarkable similarity between this passage and the *sNying po*.

rGya dmar ba, who had been Phya pa's teacher for Madhyamaka and epistemology in sTod lung, refutes this position in one of his Madhyamaka works.⁴⁶ The set of views that rGya dmar ba rebuts corresponds to the first set of arguments against autonomous inference in Phya pa's portrayal (*sNying po* §125.111.3, i, ii, iii): the absence of a thesis of one's own, there being no autonomous means of valid cognition, the non-establishment of the subject.⁴⁷ Speaking against the rejection of autonomous arguments, rGya dmar ba also provides arguments that find some echo in Phya pa's *sNying po* §125.112.⁴⁸ rGya dmar ba does not spell out the details of the opponent's method of argumentation by consequence and its application, and his account does not include any citation from Candrakīrti's works. One also does not find in his *dBu ma de kho na nyid* the key terms that appear in Phya pa's portrayal of the opponent's views: *khas lang*

⁴⁵ Cf. Yoshimizu 1993: 221–222 and Seyfort Ruegg 2000: §4.2.

⁴⁶ *dBu ma de kho na nyid* 27b5–28a8. A critical edition and translation of the text (in progress) by Kevin Vose and I can be found at: <https://www.oeaw.ac.at/ikga/forschung/tibetologie/materialien/the-dbu-ma-de-kho-na-nyid-of-rgya-dmar-ba-byang-chub-grags-12th-c/>.

⁴⁷ *dBu ma de kho na nyid* 27b6–8 (*de 'gog pa mi 'thad pa sun dbyung ba*).

⁴⁸ rGya dmar ba questions the possibility, for those who do not accept autonomous arguments, of claiming that they have no thesis, to negate the views of others, and to deductively draw the conclusion in a consequence. See *dBu ma de kho na nyid* 27b8–28a1 (*rang rgyud med na dam bca' khas len med pa nyid mi 'thad pa*), 28a1–2 (*gzhan gyi 'dod pa mi khegs pa*), 28a2–3 (*thal 'gyur nyid 'thad par mi rung ba*).

*na(jnang) 'gal ba'i thal 'gyur, 'gal ba sdud pa'i thal 'gyur,*⁴⁹ *bsgrub bya dang mshung pa* and *'go(jngo) snyom*. While rGya dmar ba's work was obviously, generally speaking, influential on the composition of the *sNying po*, for what concerns the rebuttal of supporters of Candrakīrti, it does not provide enough elements that would suggest a re-use by Phya pa in the *sNying po*.

4.2. Tibetan supporters of Candrakīrti

Phya pa was in an ideal position to be directly acquainted with the views of Candrakīrti's Tibetan supporters. The world of pro-Candrakīrti scholars was indeed blooming in Phya pa's time. According to Śākya mchog ldan's *dBu ma rgya mtsho*, Phya pa's arguments against their views, which found their way into the *sNying po*, were triggered by a series of events including: Pa tshab's return to Tibet and his gathering numerous disciples, including former students of Phya pa (rMa bya, gTsang nag pa); the arrival in Tibet of Jayānanda, who also taught a Candrakīrti-oriented Madhyamaka and attracted many disciples (Khu mDo sde 'bar, etc.)⁵⁰; and possibly a live debate between Phya pa and Jayānanda, in which Khu mDo sde 'bar may have acted as an intermediate.⁵¹

⁴⁹ rGya dmar ba however uses elsewhere the expressions *'gal ba 'dus pa* and *'gal ba sdud pa* ("bringing together incompatible items"). For the first see *dBu ma de kho na nyid* 5a2. For the second see *dBu ma de kho na nyid* 3a8, where rGya dmar ba speaks of *'gal ba sdud pa la thal ba byed pa* ("drawing the consequence that two incompatible items are being brought together"). The consequence, in the case under discussion, is that the two truths, which are accepted to be ultimately one, would have distinct natures. See n. 35 on Phya pa's use of the related expression *'gal ba 'du ba*.

⁵⁰ Pa tshab returned to Tibet around the year 1100. Jayānanda is estimated to have been active in Central Tibet between 1120 and 1140 (Vose 2009: 48 and 54).

⁵¹ *dBu ma rgya mtsho*, chap. 2, vol. 14, 53a6–b6 (p. 517–518). Śākya mchog ldan offers a more succinct account in his *dBu ma byung tshul* 13b5–7. On the debate, Śākya mchog ldan writes (*dBu ma rgya mtsho* 53b4): *de'i tshes slob dpon phya pa dang | kha che ānanda gnyis khu lo tstsha ba bar du brgyud pa'i rtsod pa byas pas phya pa rgyal lo zhes bya ba'i gdam du bya ba dag kyang snang la* |. Note that Śākya mchog ldan specifies in the *dBu ma rgya mtsho* that he is reporting a hearsay ("there are some who report that..." [*gtam du bya ba dag kyang snang*]), and continues, saying "*ji ltar yin yang rung ste*," which one can translate "whether or not this was indeed the case." In the *dBu ma byung tshul* he omits this specification and just states that Phya pa debated with Jayānanda at the time the latter came to Tibet (13b6: *de'i dus su phya pas dngos su brtsod...*). Note that Śākya mchog ldan does not imply in either text that the portion of *sNying po* refuting Candrakīrti and others represents an account of the debate. Phya pa's written arguments in treatises are rather presented in the *dBu ma byung tshul* as an "indirect" (*rgyud nas*) refutation and the debate as the occasion for a "direct" (*dngos su*) refutation.

4.2.1. rMa bya Byang chub brtson 'grus—The fourfold typology of arguments by consequence

Phya pa's student rMa bya Byang chub brtson 'grus (d. 1185),⁵² although he had become a student of Pa tshab, Khu mDo sde 'bar and Jayānanda, nevertheless agrees with Phya pa in refuting scholars who hold the view that Mādhyamikas have no thesis at all and no means of valid cognition at all and who prescribe the exclusive use of arguments by consequences which rMa bya refers to as *khas len na nang 'gal gyi thal 'gyur*, *khas len na 'gal gyi thal 'gyur* or *khas len nang 'gal gyi thal 'gyur* to refute the views of others.⁵³ rMa bya refuses this “extreme” view. He holds the absence of thesis and means of valid cognition to be true on the ultimate level, but on the conventional level, the Mādhyamikas can hold negative theses (in the context of a debate with an opponent) and even affirmative theses (e.g., dependent arising). The establishment of these theses, however, only relies on means of valid cognition that are acknowledged in the world, or by an opponent (Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 163–168).

Another feature of rMa bya's works relevant to our inquiry is that rMa bya subscribes to a fourfold typology of arguments, three of which are found among the types of arguments that Phya pa mentioned in his account of the refutation of arising by Candrakīrti and his followers. rMa bya thus lists in both the *'Thad rgyan* (22a6–b3) and the *De nyid snang ba* (15a4–b3):

- (i) *gzhan la grags pa'i rjes dpag*
- (ii) *'gal ba brjod pa'i thal 'gyur*

⁵² Previous studies on rMa bya are found in Williams 1985, Vose 2009 and Doctor 2014. rMa bya Byang chub brtson 'grus is probably identical with the rMa bya rTsoḍ pa'i seng ge listed as one of Phya pa's foremost students of epistemology, one of the “Eight Great Lions” (*seng chen brgyad*). He must be distinguished, however, from rMa bya Byang chub yes shes, Pa tshab's “spiritual son.” (Seyfort Ruegg 2000: Section I §4.2)

⁵³ *Khas len na nang 'gal* is found in *De nyid snang ba* 13a2 (*'on kyang gzhan gyi phyogs ni khas len na nang 'gal gyi thal 'gyur tsam gyis 'gog pa yin te*), *khas len na 'gal* in *De nyid snang ba* 14a7 (*gal te tshad ma med kyang gzhan phyogs khas len na 'gal gyi thal 'gyur gyis 'gog go zhes kyang brjod par mi nus te*). *Khas len nang 'gal* is found in a single occurrence of the expression in *'Thad rgyan* 21a6–b2: *yang kha cig ... (VV 29) ces pa'i tshul gyis dbu ma pa la rang phyogs khas blang rgyu'i lta ba ci yang med pas de sgrub byed kyi tshad ma'ang med la | gzhan gyi brtags pa'i mtha' thams cad khas len nang 'gal gyi thal 'gyur gyi 'gog pa yin no zhes zer ro |*

(iii) *rgyu mtshan mtshungs pa'i 'go snyoms pa (/mgo snyom)*⁵⁴

(iv) *bsgrub bya dang mtshungs pa'i ma grub pa*

Although the expression “*thal 'gyur*” only occurs in the term for the second, all four are grouped under the heading “arguments by consequence” (*thal 'gyur gyi rtags/thal 'gyur gyi gtan tshigs*).⁵⁵

rMa bya also provides an explanation for each of the four types (in a slightly different wording in the respective texts):

- ◆ Type (i), *gzhan la grags pa'i rjes dpag* (“other-acknowledged inference”), eliminates the opponent’s view (A) by directly establishing the opposite thesis (nonA) for the opponent based on a logical reason (B) the three characteristics of which are accepted by the opponent. In other words, when the opponent accepts ‘S is B’ and ‘B entails nonA’, he is logically forced to accept nonA, which is opposite to his own view A.⁵⁶
- ◆ Type (ii), *'gal ba brjod pa'i thal 'gyur* (“consequence that expresses an incompatibility”) is defined as:

Bringing out the opposite (i.e., nonA) in the mind of the opponent, through an argument such that qualification of the subject (S is A), entailment (A entails nonB) and the elimination [of the derived conclusion (S is nonB)] are established for the opponent.⁵⁷

Such an argument draws from ‘A’ the consequence ‘nonB’ that the opponent does not accept, leading the opponent to reject ‘A’. This type can tentatively be equated with what Phya pa referred to as *'gal ba sdud pa'i thal 'gyur*. That the difference is only terminological would be supported by the fact that Śākya mchog ldan, when paraphrasing Phya pa’s presentation in the *dBu ma rgya*

⁵⁴ In the verse that presents the “four great consequences” (*thal 'gyur chen po rnam bzhi*) this type of consequence is referred to as *'go snyoms* (*De nyid snang ba 15a5*)/*mgo snyom* (*De nyid snang ba rtsa 2a3*).

⁵⁵ Anne MacDonald drew my attention to the fact that rMa bya hence considers here “other-acknowledged inference” (i) as a type of consequence, whereas Candrakīrti clearly distinguishes the two (see PsP §56–§60). I come back to this point below in Sections 4.2.2. and 4.2.3.

⁵⁶ *De nyid snang ba 15a7: tshul gsum pha rol po'i khas blangs kyis pha rol po'i blo ngor mtha' gcig tu bsgrub pa. 'Thad rgyan 22a6–22b1: phyogs chos khyab pa pha rol la grub pa'i rtags kyis pha rol gyi ngor mtha' gcig tu nges pa'i dam bca' bsgrubs nas gzhan phyogs sel ba.*

⁵⁷ *De nyid snang ba 15a7: phyogs chos khyab pa bsal ba pha rol po la grub pa'i rtags kyis pha rol gyi blo ngor bzlog pa 'phen pa.* A similar definition is given in *'Thad rgyan 22b1–2: phyogs chos khyab pa bsal ba gsum pha rol la grub pas pha rol gyi ngor bzlog pa 'phangs pa'i sgo nas gzhan phyogs sel ba.*

mtsho, rephrases 'gal ba *sdud pa'i thal 'gyur* as 'gal ba *brjod pa'i thal 'gyur* (see fn. 42 for the reference).

- ◆ rMa bya explains that type (iii) is an argument that “draws the parallel, by way of the reason being the same, that what it is a reason for also is the same.”⁵⁸ He resorts to it on several occasion to establish entailment. rMa bya's 'go *snyoms* thus corresponds to 'go *snyom pa* in Phya pa's account.
- ◆ *bsGrub bya dang mtshungs pa'i ma grub pa* (iv) has two subtypes, the first of which—*dnegos por smra ba'i sgrub byed bsgrub bya dang mtshungs par ma grub pa* “a probans of the substantialists that is unestablished insofar as it is like something to be proven”—clearly corresponds to *bsgrub bya dang mtshungs pa* in Phya pa's portrayal.

In the *De nyid snang ba*, rMa bya states that the fourfold list of arguments by consequence is “of traditional origin” (15a6: *rgyun lugs su 'byung*). He illustrates the use of each type in works by Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti. For (i) he cites a verse from the MA which may correspond to MA VI.104 (the Tibetan is quite different from both Nag tsho's and Pa tshab's translations). For (ii) he cites a verse from MMK that corresponds to MMK IV.2 (also with a translation that differs from the canonical one). For (iii) he cites MMK XX.20cd, and for (iv) he cites MMK IV.8 (in which the expression *bsgrub par bya dang mtshungs pa* occurs in Tibetan for the Sanskrit *samam sādhyena*).

The fourfold typology found in rMa bya's works is reported by several later Tibetan scholars. To mention a few: it is found for instance in the early fourteenth century doxography of dBus pa Blo gsal Byang chub ye shes as part of the Prāsaṅgika position linked with the name of Buddhapālita (Mimaki 1982: 176, 4–7 “*rtags bzhi*”), in Tsong kha pa's (1357–1419) account of an opponent's view and in the notes on this passage by 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa (1648–1721) (Mimaki 1982: 176, n. 475; see also below 4.2.3), in Śākya mchog ldan's fifteenth-century *dBu ma rgya mtsho*,⁵⁹ and in the sixteenth century *gZhung lugs legs par bshad pa* that was falsely ascribed to Sa skya paṇḍita (Mimaki 1982: 176, n. 475). The fourfold typology is also mentioned by bCom ldan rig pa'i ral gri (1227–1305) in his doxography, by Rong ston Shes bya kun rig

⁵⁸ 'Thad rgyan 22b2: *rgyu mtshan mtshungs pa'i sgo nas rgyu mtshan can yang mtshungs par bsgre ba*. 'Thad rgyan 15a7: *rgyu mtshungs pa la rgyu mtshan can mi mtshungs par 'dod pa la mtshungs par smra ba ste*.

⁵⁹ *dBu ma rgya mtsho*, chap. 10, vol. 15, 11a5 (p. 547). Śākya mchog ldan cites the verse introducing these four in rMa bya's *De snyid snang ba* 15a5.

(1367–1449) in his commentaries on Candrakīrti’s works, as well as in Go rams pa’s commentary on the MA and in the works of Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507–1554).⁶⁰ But what is its origin and the history of its transmission up to rMa bya?

Part of the terminology may actually be traced in Candrakīrti’s works. The PsP seems to be the source for the expression *gzhan la grags pa’i rjes dpag*.⁶¹ It might also be the source for the expression *’gal ba brjod pa’i thal ’gyur*.⁶² On the other hand, I am unaware of a technical term in Sanskrit that would correspond to the notion of *’go(lmgo) snyom(s)* or *mgo bsgre*. As noted, rMa bya quotes a verse from the MMK with the expression *samam sādhyena* in relation to the type of argument called *sgrub bya dang mtshungs pa*, which is known in Indian logic, including in some Madhyamaka texts, as the *sādhyasama* (see Mimaki 1982: 177–178, n. 479 for references). To the best of my knowledge, the fourfold typology itself is not found as such in any Indian work.

One can here exclude that rMa bya learned these types of arguments from Phya pa. Conversely, it is improbable that Phya pa would have been made aware of the equivalent arguments he ascribes to his Candrakīrtian opponent through his former students (I surmise, rather, that Phya pa’s Madhyamaka compositions were the works he taught his students at gSang phu).⁶³ One must also keep in mind the terminological difference in the *sNying po* regarding rMa bya’s second type (ii) and the absence of the mention of “other-acknowledged inference” (i) in the *sNying po*.

rMa bya’s knowledge of the fourfold typology is more likely to come from one of his subsequent teachers, Pa tshab, Khu mDo sde ’bar or Jayānanda, or someone in their circle. However, rMa bya’s teachers Pa tshab and Jayānanda do not, as far as I know, mention this fourfold

⁶⁰ Go rams pa’s discussion is dealt with in some details in Jackson 1987: 434–435, n. 156. Go rams pa also mentions a subdivision of *mgo snyoms* by gTsang nag pa (see Jackson 1987: 457, n. 216). The other references were found via a search of the e-texts available via the Buddhist Digital Resource Center. Unfortunately the correspondence to page numbers is unknown.

⁶¹ Mimaki (1982: 176, n. 476) points out PsP §57 and §58 as possible sources. Anne MacDonald also pointed out to me the discussion in PsP §28, §29 and §59–§60.

⁶² Mimaki (1982: 176, n. 477) mentions PsP ad MMK II.12 as a possible source for the term *’gal ba brjod pa’i thal ’gyur*. Note also Candrakīrti’s mention of *virodhacodanā* (Tib. *’gal ba brjod pa*) in PsP §28, where this notion is, however, associated with that of “inference from [the opponent’s] own [point of view]” (*svata evānumāna*, Tib. *rang gi rjes su dpag pa*).

⁶³ According to ’Gos lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal (1392–1481) Phya pa composed these treatises before occupying the chair of gSang phu ne’u thog (*Deb sngon* 405).

typology as a set, and neither discuss nor use the last two types (*'go/mgo snyom(s)* and *bsgrub bya dang mtshungs pa*).

Two recently recovered works bring evidence for this fourfold typology before rMa bya.

4.2.2. The fourfold typology in a report of Atiśa's teaching

The fourfold typology adopted by rMa bya is attested in an eleventh-century work said to report the teaching of Atiśa, the *General Explanation of, and Framework for Understanding, the Two Realities* (*bden gnyis spyi bshad dang / bden gnyis 'jog tshul*, hereafter: *bDen gnyis spyi bshad*). This work surfaced within the *bKa' gdams gsung 'bum* collection and has been studied and translated by James Apple (Apple 2016 and Apple 2018a: 171–266). It provides us with evidence of a precedent for the view portrayed by Phya pa, before Candrakīrti's works were translated into Tibetan and spread in Tibet. Apple draws out the following points in his summary of the contents of the work (Apple 2016: 634):

- Atiśa was a partisan of the view that Mādhyamikas hold no thesis.
- Reasoning refutes the erroneous views of the opponent, but does not invalidate the Mādhyamika proponent's absence of acceptance.
- Mādhyamikas do not posit proofs, but arguments by consequence and other-acknowledged inferences.
- Means of valid cognition are only conventional.

On argumentative method, the *bDen gnyis spyi bshad* says:

slob_dpon klu sgrub kyi bzhung las | 'gal ba rjod pa'i thal 'gyur : ltas snang yang sgrub bya dang mtshungs pa : mgo bsgr ba ste | khyed 'di ltar 'dod na rgyu mtshan khyad_par med pa'i phyir : 'di yang khas len dgos zhes pha rol po dang sbrel | gzhan la grags pa'i rjes_dpag | rang rgyud khas len pa ltar na yang khyed rang gi rig pa 'di dang 'gal zhes brjod pa ste | phyogs_chos dang khyab pa pha rol po dang 'brel te khas blangs (em. khas blangs: Ms khas blangs kyi blangs) kyis grub pa'o ||⁶⁴

⁶⁴ *bDen gnyis spyi bshad* 21b3[p.64]–22a2[p.65] (trans. in Apple 2016: 653, [706.16–20], see also Apple 2018a: 204). The notation *x_y* indicates that the two syllables are written in an abbreviated form in the manuscript; “:” indicates a punctuation mark consisting of two vertically aligned dots. I am not sure how to make sense of the expression “*ltas snang yang*” before *sgrub bya dang mtshungs pa*. In view of rMa bya's formulation of this type as *bsgrub bya dang mtshungs pa'i ma grub pa* (“unestablished insofar as it is similar to what is to be proven”) and of later formulations in terms of *sgrub byed bsgrub bya dang mtshungs pa* (“a probans

The expressions that I marked in bold characters correspond to the four types of arguments in rMa bya's list. They are here introduced in a different order, and the argument of "equality" is called *mgo bsgre ba* rather than *'go(lmgo) snyom(s) pa*. A short explanation is only provided for *mgo bsgre ba*—explained with the phrase "If you accept this, you must also accept that, because the reason is not different"—and for *gzhan la grags pa'i rjes dpag*.⁶⁵ While rMa bya tags the four arguments "arguments by consequence" (see fn. 55), this is not explicit in the *bDen gnyis spyi bshad*.⁶⁶

Nāgārjuna is named as the source of the various types, but no specific passages are cited in this regard. Like in the case of rMa bya (who links the fourfold typology with Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti, see 4.2.1), the reference to Nāgārjuna appears to be an attempt to legitimize this typology, but the existence of an Indian textual source for the typology as such is questionable. Now, since the *bDen gnyis spyi bshad* claims to report Atiśa's teaching, it would be possible that the fourfold typology was part of his teaching, in which case there would be an Indic origin for the four expressions. These expressions do not seem to appear in other works of Atiśa.⁶⁷ They are not mentioned either in the early bKa' gdams pa commentary on Atiśa's *Sayadvayāvātāra* studied by Apple (Apple 2013 and 2018a: 123–170). Another possibility is that the fourfold typology mentioned in the *bDen gnyis spyi bshad* is a Tibetan addition supplemented in the course of the transmission of the record of Atiśa's

that is similar to what is to be proven," cf. n. 74), I would tentatively suggest reading *ltar snang yang sgrub bya dang mtshungs pa*, i.e. "and the pseudo-[logical reason] similar to what is to be proven."

⁶⁵ The explanation of other-acknowledged inference presents some difficulties. I understand it as follows: "One states: 'In accordance to what is accepted [in] your own continuum (i.e., the triply characterized reason 'B'), your own awareness (A) is incompatible with that (i.e., the thesis established by the other-acknowledged inference, 'nonA').'"

⁶⁶ If "*pha rol po dang sbrel*" ("bound to the opponent") is read with the first three arguments, this suggests that they are grouped in one category, while other-acknowledged inference stands apart. But this distinct status is just about its being qualified by the notion that "qualification of the subject and entailment are established via acceptance, in connection with the opponent" (*phyogs chos dang khyab pa pha rol po dang 'brel te khas blangs kyis grub pa*). The explanation of other-acknowledged inference (see the preceding note) might be understood as indicating that such an argument points out an incompatibility to the opponent, just like *'gal ba brjod pa'i thal 'gyur*.

⁶⁷ A search in the e-text of Atiśa's collected works (Beijing 2006) via the Buddhist Digital Resource Center did not yield any result for the four terms of the typology (not counting their occurrence in the *bDen gnyis spyi bshad*, which has been included in this publication by the editor of the collected works).

teaching up to the compilation of this text in the second half of the eleventh century.⁶⁸

4.2.3 The fourfold typology in a work by Khu mDo sde 'bar (?)

Another interesting source is a short Madhyamaka work also published in the *bKa' gdams gsung 'bum*, the *Slob dpon gyi lugs kyis bden pa gnyis 'chad pa*, “Explanation of the two truths according to the system of the Teacher” (hereafter: *bDen gnyis 'chad pa*). An introduction to this work with an English translation was published by Apple (2018b). The work states that it reports the teaching of the two truths according to Candrakīrti based on Nag tsho Lo tsā ba (Atiśa’s student and first translator of Candrakīrti’s MA).⁶⁹ On a few occasions, the view of Nag tsho is contrasted to that of the “Teacher,” who could possibly be an Indian teacher of the person writing the text. Also mentioned by name in the text are Pa tshab (1055–1145?) and the king of Guge bTsad po rTse ldan (reigned from 1057–1088), setting the late eleventh century as a *terminus a quo* for the composition of the text.

Discussing argumentative methods in the fourth section of the work, the author of the *bDen gnyis 'chad pa* distinguishes “proving consequences” (*bsgrub pa'i thal 'gyur*) and “refuting consequences” (*sun 'byin pa'i thal 'gyur*) (9.6–7)⁷⁰ and claims that only the latter should be applied by Mādhyamikas to eliminate the opponent’s mistaken views (10.2). A refuting consequence performs two actions: directly, it “brings together incompatible items in the other’s mind” (*gzhan gyi blo la 'gal ba bsdus/ 'gal ba sdud*) and indirectly, it brings about the rejection of a philosophical system (7.2; 10.3–4).

Four varieties of consequences are listed (10.6), which correspond to the four types of arguments in rMa bya’s works (see 4.2.1) and in the eleventh-century work reporting Atiśa’s teaching (4.2.2):

⁶⁸ Apple assesses the work to have been compiled by a colleague or disciple of rGya ICags ri ba, who was a teacher of sGam po pa bSod nams rin chen (1079–1153). See Apple 2016: 623–627 and 2018a: 172–174.

⁶⁹ Apple previously described this work as follows (Apple 2016: 622): “An outline to the system of the two realities of the Ācārya [Nāgārjuna]. The text discusses six points of difference between so-called “Consequentialists” (*thal 'gyur ba*, *prāsaṅgika*) and “Autonomists” (*rang rgyud pa*, *svātrantika*) based on the views of Atiśa, and Tibetan scholars such Nag-tsho lo-tsa-ba Tshul-khriims rGyal-ba, rNgog lo-tsa-ba bLo-ldan shes-rab, and Pa-tshab nyi-ma grags.”

⁷⁰ These numbers refer to the Arabic numbers written on the folios, and to the line number. Note that this (modern) numbering of the folio does not reflect the actual order of the folio (nos. 11 and 12 are to be read between the pages numbered 4 and 5).

- *'gal ba brjod pa'i thal 'gyur*
- *gzhan la grags pa'i rjes dpag*
- *bsgrub bya dang mtshungs pa'i ma grub pa*
- *'go snyom* (explained as *'go bsgre khas len 'gog pa*)

The terminology in the *bDen gnyis 'chad pa* is identical with rMa bya's list, but the order is again different. This enumeration is followed by an explanation pertaining to each variety,⁷¹ except for the first, for which the author refers to a previous passage dealing with the refutation of the Sāṃkhya views on arising. The refutation of “arising from self” (7.2–9) includes a list of the tenets the Sāṃkhya opponent subscribes to (7.3–6); the statement of the “genuine consequence” (*rnal ma'i thal 'gyur*) (7.6–7); the rebuttal of an objection regarding entailment (7.7–8). The author does not indicate a source for the fourfold typology, but one can note that, when explaining the third (*bsgrub bya dang mtshungs pa*), he cites MMK IV.8, the same verse that rMa bya cites to illustrate the use of this argument by Nāgārjuna.

Apple (2018b: 945–950) identifies the *bDen gnyis 'chad pa* as being a work by Khu mDo sde 'bar (ca. 1060–1140). The latter not only was a pupil of Pa tshab, a disciple and collaborator of Jayānanda, and a teacher of rMa bya (Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 42–43), but was also reportedly involved as an intermediate in the debate between Phya pa and Jayānanda (see fn. 51). Khu mDo sde 'bar would thus be, from a circumstantial perspective, both an ideal source for rMa bya's fourfold typology of arguments and an ideal candidate for Phya pa's portrayal of the opponent's view in the *sNying po*.

Apple bases his ascription of the *bDen gnyis 'chad pa* to Khu mDo sde 'bar in great part on the similarity of the contents of the text with the second view discussed by Tsong kha pa in his *Lam rim chen mo* (dated to 1402) and the identification of the proponent provided by 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa (1648–1721).⁷² The first view addressed by Tsong kha pa is that of Jayānanda; it includes a citation from the latter's MA-ṭīkā (Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 156–159). Tsong kha pa introduces the second view as that of “the Lo tsā bas who are disciples of this paṇḍit [i.e., of Jayānanda]” (*paṇḍi ta de'i slob ma lo tstsha ba dag*). 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa identifies the proponent of the second view as “the translator Khu [mDo sde 'bar] and others” (*khu lo la sogs*). The view in question indeed

⁷¹ *bDen gnyis 'chad pa* 10.7–13.7. Translated in Apple 2018b: 969–971.

⁷² On this passage of the *Lam rim chen mo* (675,5–676,19) see Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 161–162 and Yoshimizu 1993. The beginning of the passage (up to the beginning of Tsong kha pa's mention of the definition of each type), with 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's notes, is cited in Apple 2018b: 246 and n. 41.

matches the position of the author of the *bDen gnyis 'chad pa* regarding the claim of the Mādhyamikas holding no thesis of their own (at least when investigating ultimate reality),⁷³ the rejection of autonomous arguments, and the exclusive use of arguments by consequence that refute the opponent but do not induce a proof (the distinction is drawn between “refuting consequences” [*sun 'byin gyi thal ba*] and “proving consequences” [*(b)sgrub pa'i thal 'gyur*]). In particular, Tsong kha pa includes in the presentation of this view the four arguments: *'gal ba brjod pa'i thal 'gyur*, *gzhan grags kyi rjes dpag*, *sgrub byed bsgrub bya dang mtshungs pa* and *rgyu mtshan mtshungs pa'i mgo snyoms*. (See *Lam rim chen mo* 675,15–676,7). The explanation of the four is far from being literally identical with that of the *bDen gnyis 'chad pa* but presents relevant similarities, such as the mention, in the case of *'gal ba brjod pa'i thal 'gyur*, that this “statement of incompatible items being brought together” (*'gal 'du brjod pa*) leads the opponent to reject his philosophical system (*grub mtha' 'dor ba*). In the *bDen gnyis 'chad pa*, the list of the four arguments is given when distinguishing the types of consequences. All four are thus considered to be instances of “consequences” like in rMa bya’s writings (see fn. 55).⁷⁴

⁷³ On this specific point, see the end of the account of the second position in *Lam rim chen mo*, translated in Yoshimizu 1993: 210, in which the proponent of this position defends the idea that not all assertions (*'dod pa*) amount to a thesis (*dam bca'*). See in this regard the discussion in *bDen gnyis 'chad pa* 13.8–10, in the more general context of the question whether *prāsaṅgikas* may hold negative theses. The author first concedes this possibility (13.8: *rnam dpyad* {for *bcad*} *dgag pa'i dam bca de mod*), highlighting the idea that such theses are established by a consequence expressing a contradiction (unlike positive theses that require an autonomous argument). He then point out that a negative assertion of the kind (*rnam dpyad dgag par 'dod pa*) does not amount to a thesis of one’s own (*rang dam bca*). The author’s mention of the statement that *prāsaṅgikas* have neither a positive nor a negative thesis (14.1: *dbu ma thal 'gyur ba la yongs cod sgrub pa'i dam bca myed par ma zad* | *rnam bcad dgag pa'i dam bca yang myed do zhes bya ba*) occurs in answer to the question whether asserting the refutation of others amounts to a thesis pertaining to the ultimate. One can thus understand the author to support the view that there is no thesis whatsoever with regard to the ultimate, but that negative theses are acceptable with regard to the conventional, provided they are established by consequence only.

⁷⁴ 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa’s gloss on Tsong kha pa’s mention of “four [arguments]” (*bzhi*) splits the four into “three consequences and one logical reason” (*thal 'gyur gsum dang gtan tshigs gcig ste*). The following gloss specifies that the “logical reason” is other-acknowledged inference and reformulates the other three types with the addition of the expression *thal 'gyur*. Cited in Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 163, n. 73: *de yang 'gal brjod kyi thal 'gyur dang gzhan la grags pa'i rjes dpag gam gzhan grags kyi gtan tshigs dang* | *sgrub byed bsgrub bya dang mtshungs pa'i thal 'gyur dang rgyu mtshan mtshungs pa'i mgo snyoms kyi thal 'gyur dang bzhi'o* ||

That Tsong kha pa had in mind Khu mDo sde 'bar when referring to “the translator, student of Jayānanda,” as 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa affirms, is a likely option, especially considering that Khu mDo sde 'bar's name was famous in Madhyamaka circles at that time (see Apple 2018b: 949), and that an equivalent position is also ascribed to him by Go rams pa (Yoshimizu 1993: 211).⁷⁵ It remains in question, however, whether Tsong kha ba based his account of this view on a written source or on orally transmitted information. 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's mention of “others” indicates that Khu mDo sde 'bar's position was shared by several scholars, thus opening further possibilities for the authorship of the *bDen gnyis 'chad pa*, although it is likely that its author, if he is not Khu mDo sde 'bar himself, is to be found within the circle of Khu mDo sde 'bar.

Regarding the possible relationship between Phya pa's portrayal of the opponent in the *sNying po* and the *bDen gnyis 'chad pa*, in addition to the mention of the four types of arguments, an interesting feature is that the *bDen gnyis 'chad pa* contains the second set of three arguments against autonomous arguments that Phya pa mentions in the *sNying po* (iv, v and vi in §125.111.3). It is said that consequences are to be applied to eliminate the mistaken cognitions of others and superimpositions, because autonomous arguments are unnecessary (*dgos pa myed*), powerless (*nus pa myed*), and incorrect (*mi rigs pa*) in the Madhyamaka context (7.1–2ff.).

Especially noteworthy is also the connection made in the *bDen gnyis 'chad pa* between '*gal ba brjod pa'i thal 'gyur* and the idea of “bringing together incompatible items in the other's mind” (*gzhan gyi blo la 'gal ba bsdu/s'gal ba sdud*) (10.3–4), which is also expressed in terms of *khas blangs 'gal ba 'dus pa* and *gzhan gyi khas blangs la 'gal ba sdud (pa)* (7.2). The idea of “bringing together incompatible items” finds a precedent in the discussion of arguments by consequence in a Madhyamaka commentary included in the manuscript-bundle published in the *bKa' gdams gsung 'bum* (vol. 11) and ascribed to Pa tshab; more precisely, in the first of the three texts in this manuscript, which the colophon identifies as the teaching of Hasumati (= Mahāsumati, Pa tshab's teacher in Kashmir).⁷⁶ The author uses in this regard the expression '*gal ba bsum (pa)*.⁷⁷ The term '*gal ba bsdu/sdud* in the *bDen gnyis 'chad pa* is terminologically closer to Phya pa's reference to this type of consequence in terms of '*gal ba sdud*

⁷⁵ Go rams pa, however, does not include the fourfold typology of consequences in his account of Khu mDo sde 'bar's view.

⁷⁶ See Dreyfus/Tsering 2009 for a preliminary investigation of this material.

⁷⁷ *gSal byed* 12a.1,3–4 (p. 51): *gzhan gyis 'gal bas khyab pa'i chos khas blangs pa la thal ba'i sgo nas phyir rgo la la 'gal ba bsum nas bzhag pa'i sgo nas 'gal ba khas len par byed pa'i sgro 'dogs khegs so* |

pa'i thal 'gyur. This expression is a specific feature of Phya pa's portrayal in the *sNying po*, and so far I have not been able to find any evidence of a fourfold typology of arguments mentioning it in place of *'gal ba brjod pa'i thal 'gyur*, at the exception of Klong chen pa's doxography, in which, as I argue earlier, the author is re-using Phya pa's text.

While there are thus a number of remarkable features of the *bDen gnyis 'chad pa* that would make it a potential candidate for being Phya pa's source, there are also important differences. Just mentioned was the absence in the *bDen gnyis 'chad pa* of the specific expression *'gal ba sdud pa'i thal 'gyur*. Significantly also, in the refutation of arising from self, the author of the *bDen gnyis 'chad pa* does not use the specific formulation *ye nas yod pa* for tenet A, an expression that Phya pa uses in the *sNying po* (and in the *sNang 'grel*, see 48a3ff.), but which other Tibetan scholars (at the exception, again, of Klong chen pa) do not typically use when discussing this argument. The initial argument addressed to the Sāṃkhya to refute arising from self (the “genuine consequence”) is phrased quite differently in the *bDen gnyis 'chad pa* than in the *sNying po*,⁷⁸ and does not solve the issue of the entailment by appealing to follow-up arguments termed *'go snyom* and *bsgrub bya dang mtshungs pa'i ma grub pa*. The counter-argument is formulated in the form of a classical consequence (7.8: *thal 'gyur 'god pa*). The explanation of *'go snyom* (13.5–7) itself is illustrated by the “equality” between contrapositive statements. In addition, the short *bDen gnyis 'chad pa* does not discuss the other options of arising.

Another element that deserves consideration is the Tibetan translation of the verses cited in the *bDen gnyis 'chad pa*. Several of the verses of the MA cited in *sNying po* §125.111 are also cited in the *bDen gnyis 'chad pa*, namely, MA IV. 23, 24 (twice), 25 (twice), 28 (twice) and 29 (not cited are MA XII.4, MA IV.26, IV.30, and the three verses cited in the refutation of arising [a], [b] and [d]), as well as VV 29 and CŚ XVI.25. Apple's analysis of the citations in the *bDen gnyis 'chad pa* showed that the translation corresponds to that of Pa tshab (to that of Jayānanda and Khu mDo sde 'bar in the case of VV) (Apple 2018b: 941, n. 22). There are a few minor variants with the canonical versions, and other variants which may have resulted from scribal mistakes. In contrast, as discussed in Section 2, the verses in the *sNying po* only side partially with the revised trans-

⁷⁸ The elements of the argument in the *bDen gnyis 'chad pa* are: *skye ba* (S), *yod pa skye ba* (A), *don myed cing thug pa myed* (nonB). *bDen gnyis 'chad pa* 7.6–7: *grangs can gyi skye ba chos can | khyod skye ba don dang bcas shing thug pa dang bcas par 'dod kyang don myed cing thug pa myed par thal | bya ba dam bca | he du ni yod pa skye ba yin pa'i phyir dper na rgyu yod yod pa de yang skye na don myed par 'dod pa bzhin no || de ni rnal ma'i thal 'gyur yin no ||*

lation by Pa tshab, and would appear to precede Pa tshab's revision of Nag tsho's translation of the MA, and, for CŚ and VV, to reflect ancient translations prior the revisions by Pa tshab and by Jayānanda and KhumDo sde 'bar. Whether one should, on the basis of the verse citations, conclude that Phya pa portrays a follower of Candrakīrti who was active prior to the time the author of the *bDen gnyis 'chad pa* was writing is a disputable question. While the *bDen gnyis 'chad pa* attests the adoption of Pa tshab's translations, it might be the case that other contemporaneous authors in the same circle were still using the earlier translations. It is also conceivable that Phya pa is drawing from earlier translations of the Indian works cited, which were known to him, although the scholars he portrays had actually already adopted the new translations.

It is also debatable what weight should be ascribed, for dating the *sNying po* and the position it portrays, to Phya pa not using the terms *rang rgyud pa* and *thal 'gyur ba* (see the Introduction), whereas these are profusely used in the *bDen gnyis 'chad pa*.

The differences pointed out above exclude that Phya pa's portrayal is a re-use of the *bDen gnyis 'chad pa*, or even that it would be based on this work. Still, the similarities hint to Phya pa's mediating source being part of the same intellectual circle as the author of this work, if not a precursor.

As noted before, Pa tshab and Jayānanda do not, as far as I know, mention the fourfold typology as a set, and neither discuss nor use *'go/mgo snyom(s)* and *bsgrub bya dang mtshungs pa* in their works.⁷⁹ One can add to this the lack of terminological correspondence with the *sNying po* in their discussion on the refutation of arising. As such, they do not appear to be likely candidates for being the source of Phya pa's portrayal. While the works of their pupils that are available show more similarities with the portrayal in the *sNying po*, they do not, on the other hand, account for the use of pre-Pa tshab translations of verses from the MA and for the expression *'gal ba sdud pa'i thal 'gyur*. They highlight the *prāsaṅgika/svātantrika* division and adopt a fourfold typology of

⁷⁹ Vose (2009) discusses evidence that Jayānanda and Phya pa knew each other's positions, especially regarding the understanding of Buddhahood and of the two truths (Vose 2009: 54 and 197, n. 90, and the detailed discussion in chap. 4). On the other hand, the excursus on argumentation in Jayānanda's MA-ṭīkā, which is followed by the citation of an important portion of the PsP (on this excursus see Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 157 and Vose 2010: 558), which includes the same verses of the MA, VV and CŚ as those cited in Phya pa's account, does not provide evidence of Jayānanda engaging Phya pa's arguments. There is also no literal correspondence between this passage and the *sNying po* that could suggest a re-use, by Phya pa, of a something like a preliminary version of the MA-ṭīkā.

arguments including “other-acknowledged inference,”⁸⁰ whereas such elements are absent in the *sNying po*, and do not combine *'gal ba sdud pa'i thal 'gyur*, *'go/mgo snyom(s)* and *bsgrub bya dang mtshungs pa* in the refutation of arising. One should here keep in mind, as attested in the *bDen gnyis spyi bshad*, that this fourfold typology is already attested in the late eleventh century, in the teaching lineage stemming from Atiśa’s oral teachings on Madhyamaka, a text which also does not mention the *prāsaṅgika/svātantrika* division. This speaks in favor of the fourfold typology being an element of Madhyamaka teaching that preceded Pa tshab’s return to Tibet and being passed on to Pa tshab’s students via another channel than the teachings of Pa tshab or Jayānanda.

It may seem too much of a platitude to conclude with the wish that further investigations of early Tibetan works will shed more light on the question of Phya pa’s source(s)—although I do hope this will be the case. The above discussion demonstrates, however, the remarkable steps forward that the newly available texts from the *bKa' gdams gsung 'bum* collection allow us to take in tracing the history of ideas in the early Tibetan tradition and in gaining a better sense of their dissemination among scholars of various lineages.

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⁸⁰ Another student of Pa tshab, Zhang Thang sag pa (ca. 1080–1150), uses arguments termed *'gal ba brjod pa'i thal ba*, *'go snyom gyi thal ba* and *'go' snyom*, and *sgrub bya dang mtshungs pa'i thal ba* but does not define these notions or enumerate them as part of a fixed fourfold set. See *Tshig gsal ti ka* 64, 8–9; 65, 12–13; 74, 1–2 and 14. See Jackson (1987: 435, n. 156) for the reference to Śākya mchog ldan’s mention of scholars reporting a discussion of these reasonings by Zhang.

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in Memory of Helmut Krasser

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